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What is meaning? What is a meaner? I take the view that,
using the everyday, pretheoretic notion of meaning as a guide, an
attempted answer to the second question is an attempted answer
to the first, since meaning is only found in meaners. Further,
I claim that an attempted answer to the second question should
not he based on such unexplained psychological and semantic
terms as intention, truth, reference, meaning, hut on terms which
are more directly compatible with an assumption that some kind
of physicalism is true.
The notion that meaning is in the individual, is a property
of a meaner, has been explicitly attacked by Putnam and more
obliquely by Fodor. Chapter 1 examines some of their contentions
and finds them wanting.
In Chapter 2, I argue that the explanation of meaning should
begin with individual meaners and then be extended to meaning
communities. Some interpretations of Wittgenstein's private-language
argument augur badly for such an approach and I spend some time
looking at these interpretations. What makes an individual meaner
a meaner, I claim, is the possession of an instantiation of a
semantic apparatus, and it is with a partial, attempted description
of this semantic apparatus that I am largely concerned.
A model of the semantic apparatus is sketched in Chapter 2,
and extended and refined to take account of language and public
language in Chapter 3> truth, presupposition, and negation in
Chapter 4, and sense relations in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3» whilst assuming that many syntactic rules are
independent of semantics, argues that the primitives of syntax
are a subset of those of semantics.
Chapter 4 argues against Strawsonian presupposition and
for scopal negation, whilst taking a view of truth that has some
kind of correspondence theory as its base, hut allows coherence
considerations to override.
Chapter 5 offers some explications of synonymy, hyponymy,
and antonymy, using these to explain analyticity, and claims,
contra Quine, that since meaning is explicable in terms other
than synonymy, the traditional synthetic/analytic distinction
can he maintained.
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This essay is an attempted answer to the question:
(l) What makes a meaner a meaner?
This is an interesting question for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that any satisfactory answer is going to have
say something fairly specific about meaning: What it is and
how it arises. There would, however, be ways of answering (l)
and saying something about meaning which whilst possibly
interesting and clarifying would not serve the intended purpose
here. Such answers would avail themselves of unexplained
psychological and semantical terms such as, true, refer,
denote, intention, meaning. Answers involving such
unexplained terms would be unsatisfactory in the sense that
they do not talk about meaning in such a way that it makes
perfectly good sense to ask, say, whether this animal or that
is a meaner or whether this machine or that alien is a meaner.
The reason it would not make perfectlj1' good sense is that terms
such as intending, meaning, and referring are typically used of
humans and we have no more way of extending these to machines
than we have at present of extending the notion of being a
meaner to machines.
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The assumption that an answer to (l) can he given in
non—semantic and non-psychological terms here amounts to the
claim that physicalisin is true. By physical ism I mean the
doctrine that psychological, biological, and semantic facts are
explicable in terms of physical facts (cf. Field, 1972). This
does not mean that for each semantic, psychological, and
biological category there will he a physical one. To assume
that this is the case would he to assume that such disciplines
do not cross classify the phenomena of the world - and this
seems most unlikely since it would require that the categories
of semantics, psychology and biology coincide exactly with the
categories of physics as delimited hy postulated natural laws.
More likely, as pointed out hy Fodor"^ (l975)» a category of
semantics, biology, or psychology will involve several
categories of physics. Such pir/sicalism, Fodor (op. cit. : 12)
calls token physicalism to distinguish it from kinds of
physicalism embracing stronger reductionist claims. For
convenience and brevity, I shall just use the term physicalism
in the ensuing text to mean "token physicalism" or something
rather like it.
Now, however, it might be claimed, a problem has arisen
because, on the one hand, what makes a meaner a meaner is to be
explicated in non-semantic and non-psychological terms, but on
Fodor made this point forcefully, but the idea was not new,
ef. Nagel 1965» for example.
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the other hand, a type of physicalism is embraced which holds it
unlikely that there is a one to one correspondence of
psychological and semantic categories with physical ones; so
any theory must be couched in terms other than semantic,
psychological, or physical. I think that this is all true but
not a problem. The language of the theory will certainly not be
the language of physics. The properties specified in the theory
will most likely not correspond to categories of physics on a
one-to-one basis, but, nonetheless, such properties, it is claimed,
will be recognisable as physical phenomena. The descriptions
the theory will give will be of a kind which only partially
specify the phenomena under consideration. The partial
specification is adequate because the theory is only concerned
with certain properties and not with the concomitant properties
of such properties. Suppose the theory, for example, specified
that some of its objects were to have the property of being able
to be seen from a certain point, y, then such a description might
involve many things which had nothing in common except the
specified property. Although the laws of physics would cover
what was involved in being able to be seen from a point y it's
not at all the case that physics has a category for such a
phenomenon. "Being able to be seen from y" is just not a
category of physics, but it does describe a phenomenon which
one could look for, investigate, and give a description of by
using a number of categories of physics.
Field (1972) introduced the term semanticalism for the
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doctrine that there are irreducibly semantic facts, where
irreducible here is to mean something like "inexplicable in
terms of physics". Field likens semanticalism to Cartesianism
and vitalism. Cartesianism claims that there are irreducible
facts of the mind, i.e. that the mind is something over and
above the brain. Vitalism claims that there are irreducible
biological facts, i.e. that a living organism is something
over and above the atoms and their properties out of which it is
composed. One cannot decide a priori whether Cartesianism,
vitalism, or semanticalism is right or wrong, but one way to
get nearer to the truth is to adopt a physicalist approach, for
as Field says:
....physicalism should be accepted until we have
convincing evidence that there is a realm of phenomena
it leaves out of account. Even if there DOES turn out
to be such a realm of phenomena, the only way we'll
ever come to know that there is, is by repeated efforts
and repeated failures to explain these phenomena in
physical terms. (1972, page 92 in reprint in Platts 1980)
I happen to believe that some form of physicalism is
true, but even if I didn't believe it, attempting an account of
semantics in non—semantic terms would seem to be the best
(only?) step to take in getting nearer the truth.
0.1 The Scope of the Theory
What the theory to be proposed seeks to explain is the
minimum requirement for a meaner to be a meaner. Such a
minimum requirement I call the semantic apparatus (v. 1.2).
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Specifically not covered by the theory is any explanation of
what guides the workings of the semantic apparatus when choice
is available. Such explanation might well involve the large
problems of intentionality, freewill, and consciousness. In
attempting to make progress in semantics, it is necessary to
restrict the field as much as possible and to avoid related
areas, such as consciousness, which at the present time offer
insurmountable difficulties. The hope and expectation is that
a clearer understanding of in what the semantic apparatus
consists will help towards an understanding of these other
problems.
Of course, such a restriction of scope will seem
unsatisfactory to someone who insists that a meaner must be
conscious or intend this or that. To such a person, I can
only repeat that if consciousness and intentionality are
something over and above the semantic apparatus (and this is
not necessarily a foregone conclusion), then it is still better
to restrict the scope of the theory to an area which promises
some progress rather than expand it to one that promises little.
This may seem like looking for a lost match at night underneath
a street light because "it's lighter there", but the worst
that might be concluded is that one is looking for two lost
matches, one of which is under the street light.
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0.2 Some Conventions
In talking about language and meaning one has, of course,
to use language itself. This requires that certain conventions
be adopted in order to maintain sense and clarity. I take it as
a basic truism that signs always occur in referring mode. By
referring mode, I mean that a sign always signs something,
otherwise it would not be a sign (hence "truism"), and what it
signs is never its own form or meaning, but rather its would-be
referent. If a sign signed its own form, then, of course, it
would be a sign no longer for what distinguishes a sign from a
non-sign is the fact that it is taken to sign something other
than itself. That a sign always signs its would-be referent
and not its meaning is much harder to explain, but it appears to
have to do with the fact that whilst a would-be referent can
be a meaning (but not the meaning of the sign itself), many
would-be referents cannot be meanings. Hence, if a sign always
signed its own meaning, then only meanings could be would—be
referents. This would leave the vast majority of the world as
something which could not be talked about at all. Before
introducing the conventions I shall adopt to distinguish the
three would-be referents of the form of a sign, the meaning of
a sign, and of the would-be referent of a sign, some potential
misunderstandings about the notion of the referring mode must be
forestalled.
First, it matters not at all that many language items do not
denote (for this and other reasons it is necessary to talk of
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would-be referents), for suppose that I am talking of unicorns,
then I am not talking about the word unicorn or about the meaning
of the word unicorn, but about unicorns, and in using the word
unicorn, I cannot but help speak about unicorns even though there
are none. In language, one may speak as easily of the
non-existent as of the existent, but always one sjjeaks of
would-be referents because with language one can do nothing else.
Second, a sign by itself is not a sign at all: it is only a
sign for a meaner. Signs j^er se, therefore, do not themselves
2
refer, but speakers and hearers' may refer in using signs.
Hence another reason for the would—be in would—be referent.
Third, although for a sign to be in referring mode it is
not necessarily the case that it should denote, qualms might
arise in connection with the full/form word distinction since
form words are often scarcely allowed to have meaning, let alone
would-be referents. Ullrnan (1962 :43 ff) traces the full/form
word distinction back to Aristotle and in more recent times such a
distinction has often been made although a variant vocabulary:
full/empty, content/empty, lexical/functional, has sometimes been
employed. Ullman (: 43) characterises the full/form word
distinction like this:
Lyons (1977 : 177) stresses the role of the speaker in referring,
but a good case may be made out for the hearer being the principal
referrer since it is always the hearer that decides whether a sign
is to be taken as referring or not and to what it is the sign refers.
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The distinction is based on purel3r semantic criteria.





It is obvious that the words in the first column have
some meaning even if they appear in isolation, as they
do on this page, whereas those in the second column have
no independent meaning proper: they are grammatical
elements which will contribute to the meaning of the
phrase or the sentence when used in conjunction with
other words.
If, as Ullman claims, form words "have no independent meaning
proper" then how is compositionality of meaning preserved in
the case of constructions involving form words? That
compositionality of meaning is preserved with regard to form
words is clearly evident from the fact that having learnt the
use of and in some constructions, one can go on not only to
construct a vast number of novel constructions involving and
but also to understand these novel constructions. If and
did not bring a regularly identifiable portion of meaning to all
these constructions, then understanding would be impossible. But
if and always brings a particular portion of meaning to the
constructions into which it enters, why not allow that this is
the meaning of and? After all, if I change and for af the
meaning changes in a regular and predictable way whatever the
other elements of the construction.
Part of the difficulty of ascribing, or the unwillingness to
ascribe, meanings to form words may stem from the fact that many
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of them denote relations rather than objects; hut I find it hard to
doubt that there is onness, inness, andness, toness, and
fromness, etc. in the world and that words such as on, in, and,
to, from not only denote but can be used to refer. Virtually all
writers recognise that a full/forirt word demarcation line cannot
be drawn with any precision. Gleason (1955 : 156), for example,
views function words (i.e. form words) as forming a cline from
those that are purely structural markers to those which have
considerable lexical meaning. I doubt that a purely structural
marker can be found because of the compositionality argument
advanced above and I see no substantial objection to a uniform
view of language that assumes that when one uses form words, such
as and, the, and of, one is just as much talking about andness,
theness, and ofness as one is talking about brickness and
womanness when one uses the words brick and woman.
Granted that all language is in referring mode all of the
time, the conventions needed to talk about word forms and word
meanings are two new signs. I shall use the following two new
signs:
Cat has as its would-be referent the word form
underlined.
"cat":- has as its would-be referent the meaning of the
word form within quotation marks, i.e. the meaning
of cat.
Of course, whilst we have a very clear idea about what the form
of a word is, there is much less clarity concerning what meaning is.
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The ensuing chapters will make an attempt at getting a firm grasp
on the notion of meaning and on what meaning itself is.
Many writers do not make the threeway distinction between
cat, cat, and "cat" (Leech, 197^ is one of the exceptions) and
in such cases it is often not clear what their use of quotation
marks signifies: is it the word form or the meaning, or both?
Semantics is a confusing enough subject without adding to that
confusion unnecessarily. However, having said that, it must be
admitted straight away that underlining and quotation marks will
be used for other purposes in the text. Some of these other
uses will be to indicate titles, direct quotations or scare
or shudder quotes. Hopefully, context will stop such uses being
confused with the above conventions.
0.3 The Approach
General semantics as pursued here provides a way of linking
language with the world, of bridging the gap between meaning and
external objects. The main object of the ensuing chapters will be
to map out on a broad front a sketch of a theory of general
semantics rather than concentrate on an in-depth study of one
particular aspect of such a theory. In the choice between
depth and breadth in theorising, the former is often held in
higher regard and the hand waving that it necessarily involves
at a more general theory into which it might fit is readily
accepted. Hut both types of theorising are needed and, indeed,
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it is only the broad approach which can locate and relate narrower
approaches into a more comprehensive and comprehensible whole.
However, if narrow theorising hand waves at a more general theory
in which it is supposedly embedded, then broad theorising hand
waves at much detail which it assumes can be filled in. I believe
that in the present state of semantics as it impinges on the world
at large and meaners in particular, broad theorising is needed
into which later, hopefully, much detail can be fitted.
In chapter 1, I set the scene by outlining my approach and
considering some claims by Putnam and Fodor which, if sustainable,
would render it still-born. Towards the end of the clmpter, I
mention the terminology, of which I am afraid there is rather
a lot, that the reader will meet and I refer the reader to the
appendix where the majority of this terminology is listed. The
use of such terminology allows for a brevity, clarity, and over all
comprehensibility, which could not otherwise be obtained, and I
strongly recommend the reader to bear with it for this reason.
Chapter 2 emphasises and expands the claim that in considering
meaning, general semantics must start with meaning in the
individual rather than with meaning in society. This view leads
to a possible clash with Wittgenstein's purported claims about
private language and I consider the matter in some detail.
Whilst chapter 2 deals exclusively with meaning and the
individual, the next three chapters connect the individual meaner
to the world and to other meaners, whilst continuing to expand
the explication of meaning in terms of the individual. Language
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is closely connected to meaning and this is taken up in chapter 3»
where criteria for language in general and public language in
particular are suggested.
The connection between language and meaning is only rivalled
in its strength by that of the connection between meaning and
truth. This latter connection is discussed in chapter 4, where
the closely related questions of presupposition and negation are
also treated.
In the fifth and final chapter, I consider sense relations
both in respect of individual meaning and public meaning. Sense
relations, synonymy, antonymy, hyponyray, underpin many of our
inferences and their importance is hard to over-estimate. One
consequence of sense relations is analyticity, and concerning this
I argue, contra Quine, for the traditional distinction between the
synthetic and the analytic.
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1. An Approach to Semantics
1.0 The Meaning of Meaning
Many works on semantics begin with or include a consideration
of what the terms meaning and mean mean. This is only to be
expected because semantics is the study of meaning and what
better way to find out what one is studying than to find out what
meaning means?
Ogden and Richards (1923) were perhaps the most assiduous in
this respect, listing no less than twenty—two definitions of
meaning. Leech (l97^)> however, sounds a warning note concerning
this way of proceeding. He observes that it is somewhat odd to
be so concerned with the term meaning in semantics when meaning
(and not the term meaning) is the very object of investigation.
This is to say that if we could give a satisfactorily detailed
definition of the term meaning then it is not at all clear that
we should have anything left to investigate. Leech maintains
that it is the semantic theory which will determine what the
term meaning means within the theory.
Leech seems quite correct in holding that a theory
determines the meaning of its terms (at least, ideally so),
but what of the situation prior to the construction of the theory?
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The terms meaning and mean are used to refer to a number of
phenomena, some of which we may wish to study and some of which
we may not. Some attempt, however imprecise, at a
pretheoretical identification of the type of meaning to he
investigated seems to he required.
The type of meaning with which this study is concerned
approximates to that which Grice (1957) identified as nonnatural
meaning and to that typically associated with Peirce's (1931-35)
subcategory of signs called symbols. This type of meaning is
to be distinguished from that exemplified in (l) and (2).
(1) Those clouds mean rain.
(2) The meaning of those clouds is rain.
The sense in which clouds mean rain in (l) and (2) is that a
natural consequent of at least some clouds is rain. Such
consequents have nothing to do with meaners: rain would still
fall from clouds even if there were no meaners. For Grice,
clouds mean naturally. Clouds were signs for Peirce too and
belong to his subcategory of signs, indexes. An index sign
is one that according to Peirce is in some sense intrinsically
connected to what it signs or indicates.
In contrast, the word door^ means "door" nonnaturally. The
Lest there should be any confusion: door means and has meaning,
but it is not a meaner in the sense that I wish to use that terra.
I restrict the term meaner for somebody or something in which
meaning arises. Left to its own devices no meaning would ever arise
in the case of door.
1.1 Where are Meanings? 15
relationship is arbitrary in the sense that there is nothing
intrinsic in door or "door" which connects them, and if they
were not connected they would not, therefore, be intrinsically
different. Clouds are different: if clouds never meant rain,
then clouds or rain would be intrinsically different from
what they are.
This is vague, but precision can only come with the theory;
nonetheless, the phenomenon of nonnatural meaning, the object
of this study, should be recognisable from what has been said.
This study is concerned, then, with how (not whyI) it is that door
means "door" but could quite easily have meant something or
nothing else.
(There are, of course, other senses of meaning and mean with
which I am not concerned. These, I take it, are sufficiently
different from the senses discussed above as not to require
separate exclusion.)
1.1 Where are Meanings?
(l) Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just
ain't in the head.^ (Putnam, 1975 ? 227)
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The use of quotation marks around meanings by Putnam is
puzzling. Such marks seem to be put to various uses in his
article and hence one cannot divine their significance in (l).
Since I take it that here Putnam is talking about the phenomena
of meanings I should have expected no quotes at all.
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Since humans are meaners and since the theory to be proposed
claims that meaning is to be found, and only to he found, in
meaners, Putnam's claim, if true, would make the exercise
pointless. Some consideration of Putnam's argument is therefore
called for.
Putnam first sets forth two principles which he feels
(must feel in the light of (l)) anyone that believes meanings
are in the head is committed to
(i) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter
of being in a certain psychological state.
(il) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of intension)
determines its extension (in the sense that sameness
of intension entails sameness of extension), (op.ci t.:219)
From these, after noting certain difficulties with the terms
psychological state and extension, Putnam concludes a third
principle:
(ill) Psychological state determines extension (op.cit.:222).
I will ignore the difficulties with the term extension
which Putnam rightly notes. However, when it comes to the term
psychological state, Putnam says that this is to be taken in what
he calls a narrow sense. A psychological state in the narrow
sense requires, according to Putnam, that that state does not
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presuppose the "existence of any individual other than the
subject to whom that state is ascribed. (in fact, the
assiunption was that no psychological state presupposes the
existence of the subject's BODY even: if P is a psychological
state, properly so called, then it must be logically possible
for a 'disembodied mind' to be in P.)" (op.cit.:220). To take
such a position regarding psychological states is to adopt,
according to Putnam, "the assumption of methodological
solipsism" (op.cit.:220). The importance of the way in which
Putnam uses the term psychological state will shortly emerge.
There is, I think, good reason to believe that principle (il)
is false, but for the moment I shall accept it, returning to
consider it in a little while.
What Putnam claims to show is that (ill) is false and,
hence, that (i) and (il) cannot both be true. His main
argument for this is along the following lines.
We are to suppose that there is out in space a twin-earth
exactly alike earth in all respects, even down to the people, with
the exception of one: what is called water on twin-earth is
not of the same chemical type as water on earth. Rather, the
stuff being called water on twin-earth we are to assume has a
chemical composition abreviated XYZ. Looking down on both
earth and twin-earth we could then see that the term water has
two meanings, in the sense of extension: on earth it refers to
H^O, on twin-earth to XYZ. We are further to suppose that the
year is 1750 and that chemistry is in its infancy on both earth
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and twin-earth. No-one knows, therefore, that the water on
earth is different from that on twin-earth, after all, it looks
the same, it tastes the same and presumably it performs the
same in any usage current in 1750.
Consider now an English speaking Oscar-^ on earth and his
English speaking counterpart, 0scar9, on twin-earth. Oscar^
and 0scaro are as alike as one could wish, right down to their
beliefs about water. Putnam now claims that Oscar^ and Oscar^
were in the same psychological state in 1750 concerning the term
water but that the extensions of that term were very different
on earth and twin-earth. Of course, we would not learn that
the extension of water was different on earth from that of
twin—earth until chemical analysis had been developed, but
once it had, Putnam argues, then we would maintain that the
extensions had always been different and not that the
extension of water had changed.
Putnam's view here stems from his view on natural kinds.
Water is a natural kind and it is identified, according to
Putnam, not simply by its nominal characteristics, such as
being colourless, tasteless, wet, etc. but also by its being
the same kind of stuff as we or somebody else called water
yesterday, or a hundred or a thousand years ago. Putnam calls
this relation sameT. The sameT relation is different on
Li Li
earth from what it is on twin-earth in the sense that the
defining substances, those which were baptised water, are
different. For brevity, let's call the same, relation regardingJL
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XYZ on twin-earth same and the same, relation regarding HOJL—j JL j 1J I—
on earth same.,,.LE
The meaning of natural kind terms, like water, involve
indexing, i.e. a pointing towards a particular substance at a
particular time and place as an example of the type of stuff
that water can be used to refer to on subsequent occasions.
Searle (1983) bel ieves that such indexicality is Putnam's
undoing for he says that all Putnam has succeeded in doing is
to substitute for a traditional cluster—of-concepts intentional
content an indexical intentional content (: 204). If we correlate
Searle's intentional contents with Putnam's psychological states,
then we can perhaps see what Searle is getting at: if an
earthian's psychological state concerning water includes an
indexical content, that content will be or concern sameTT71 and
Lb,
if a twin-earthian's psychological state concerning water
includes an indexical content, that content will be or concern
same..; but then the psychological states will be different andJul
not, as Putnam claimed, the same and hence, their determining
different extensions is a distinct possibility.
Does Searle's argument succeed? If it doesn't then I
think that nothing can given an acceptance of principles (i)
and (il). To see that this is so consider (a) and (b) below,
which are respective descriptions of the earthian and
twin-earthian psychological states concerning water.
(a) The stuff which is colourless, tasteless, wet,
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and is of the same structure as the stuff other people
of my earthian community have called water for the
last hundred years.
(B) The stuff which is colourless, tasteless, wet, and
is of the same structure as the stuff other people
of my twin-earthian community have called water
for the last hundred years.
Clearly, (a) and (b) are different and the fact that they can
determine different extensions is as I have said a distinct
possibility. It is to he noted that it is only a possibility:
it is agreed (Putnam included) that different psychological
states can determine the same extension, the traditional example
of this being the terms creature with a heart and creature with
a kidney. What is not clear, however, is that (a) and (b) are
allowable characterisations of psychological states in Putnam's
terms. It was pointed out earlier that Putnam holds that the
term psychological state in his argument is to be read in the
narrow sense, i.e. for the sake of argument, he embraces the
assumption of methodological solipsism. It will be recalled
from the quotation given earlier in this connection that
psychological states in the narrow sense cannot presuppose
the existence of other people (and presumably not, therefore,
of any other thing) or, indeed, even the existence of the
body of the individual who is in the psychological state.
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(a) and (b) make specific reference, however to other
individuals and another thing (i.e. water). Indeed, all
indexical meanings must make reference to what is being indexed
and it would appear that the assumption of methodological
solipsism, as depicted by Putnam, rules out any such meanings
being psychological states in the narrow sense.
If this is true then, on Putnam's terms, Searle's argument
must fail and so must all arguments against Putnam's position,
for psychological states in the narrow sense cannot by fiat
presuppose the things indexed as indexical meaning requires.
Indeed, the situation is more severe than this, since it
appears that narrow psychological states belong to a different
logical category from that of indexical meaning. Ryle (1949)
introduced the notion of category mistake as being the
attempting to combine two categories (in Ryle's particular
concern, body and mind) which in fact were of different
logical types. In order to combine things or to talk of their
having cause or effect upon each other, those things must be of
the same logical type. As an example of logically different
types, Ryle offered, on the one hand, the University of Oxford,
and, on the other, the actual college buildings which make up
the university. To go looking for the university in addition to
the buildings which compose it, is to assume that the university
is another building. Ryle's point is that since the university
is of a different logical type from its buildings, it is quite
impossible to talk about one in the same way as one talks about
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the other. If psychological states in the narrow sense and
indexical meanings are of different logical types, then it is
inappropriate to try to combine them and what Putnam's argument
shows is just this. There is a suggestion that this is what
Putnam might be doing where on page 221 (op.cit.) in talking
about the adoption of the assumption of methodological
solipsism he says: "But three centuries of failure of mentalistic
psychology is tremendous evidence against this procedure,
in my opinion."
If it is a category mistake to try to combine narrow
psychological states and indexicals, but one still wishes to
reject Putnam's view so trenchantly expressed in (l), what
can be done? Assuming one accents Putnam's two princinles
(i) and (il) and principle (ill) which is a consequent of
them - and for the moment, I shall - then the remaining
alternatives seem to be to reject narrow psychological states,
or indexical meanings, or both. Although there are certain
difficulties with indexical meanings, I shall not pursue these
here. The real problem, I contend, lies with narrow psychological
states and it is this notion which must be rejected.
The implicit argument in Putnam against an alternative to
narrow psychological states is along the following lines: If
meanings are psychological states, then if Jane and Jill are to
have the same meaning with respect to a particular term, say
water, then Jane and Jill must have the same psychological state;
however, if psychological states involve particulars then they
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cannot have the same psychological state because in the one
case it is Jane's psychological state and in the other Jill's.
That iutnam subscribes to such a view is, I believe borne out
by his remark on page 222 (op.cit), "Indeed, Frege's argument
against psycliologism is only an argument against identifying
concepts with mental particulars, not with mental entities
in general". Now in abstracting, we can abstract how we like,
and there is no reason why in talking of psychological states we
should not abstract from the possessors of those states but
still allow the details of the environment in which those
states exist, i.e. one is not interested in the fact that Jane
or Jill has the psychological state, but one is interested in
the fact that a psychological state, x has a relationship to
or presupposes a particular, say Mount Everest. In such a case,
x is the psychological state it is because of the existence of
Mount Everest. Of course, such a possibility is a non-starter
for the non—physicalist because psychological states and
physical facts will, on Eyle's view, be of different logical
kinds and cannot, therefore, interact. For a physicalist, a
psychological state will be one or several physical states
(there is no necessary one-to—one correspondence, of course),
so talk of interaction with other physical phenomena is not
out of place.
On such a view, Jane and Jill can both still have the same
psychological state x even though x presupposes a particular,
Mount Everest. It follows, therefore, that if meanings are
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psychological states, then Jane and Jill can have the same
meanings for terms. The fear that allowing particulars to enter
into psychological states means the demise of public meaning is
thus unnecessarily held. If particulars can enter into
psychological states, then, I believe, Searle's argument
against Putnam holds. Public meaning is in fact quite a
complicated subject as we shall see in chapter 3«
I mentioned earlier that there seems to be good reason
for doubting the truth of principle (il), i.e. that meaning
in the sense of intension, determines extension. This might be
demonstrated with a little fiction. Suppose that in an English
text of 1750 we come across the word numpat. Now by pure bad
luck, all other records which contained this word have been
destroyed and the only information that the text contains about
numpat is that a numpat is a kind of tree — which one, it does
not say and, for the sake of example, we may assume we shall
never know. 'v.re may, therefore, use the word numpat in, for
example, such utterances as, "There were numpats around in
1750", but do we know the meaning of numpat? Clearly, if by
knowing the meaning we mean being able to determine its extension,
we do not, for we cannot distinguish numpat trees from other
kinds of trees. Putnam's division of linguistic labour will
be of no use here, because there is nobody extant who knows
any more about numpats than you or I. But can we, therefore,
be said to know the meaning of numpat? Intuitions here might
vary, but I am inclined to say that we can. The reason I
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incline to this view is that it seems to me that there are a
great many words which many people use of which, to all
intents and purposes under the normal reading of meaning,
they appear to know the meaning. Such words refer to types
of chemicals, trees, fish, etc. Many of the people using
such words would not be able to determine the extension of the
words. For example, in my vocabulary I have the word guppy.
I think, I know the meaning of this word: it's a kind of
fish; however, I could not pick out a guppy from other fish.
I think that in ordinary parlance, it would be allowed that I
know the meaning of the word guppy. but, if this is so, then
knowing the meaning of a word is not necessarily co—extensive
with knowing its extension and, therefore, meaning does not
necessarily determine, or does not fully determine, extension.
If knowing the meaning of a word is not necessarily the same
as knowing its extension, then Putnam's principle (il) fails
and so does the consequent, principle (ill). It is to be
noted that Putnam cannot repeat his argument based on
knowing an extension rather than knowing a meaning because I
do not claim to know the extension of the word guppy, only
its meaning.
The suggestion that knowing the meaning of a word and
knowing its extension are not necessarily co-extensive may
seem unpalatable to some, but such a suggestion may be no
more than a reflection of the fact that the connection between
meaning and the world is more tenuous than we care to admit.
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Putnam attempts to show that meanings cannot be in the head.
Fodor argues that meaning, reference, truth, and any other of what
he calls semantic notions, do not lie within the province of
psychology; specifically, he says, "My point then, is OF COURSE
not that solipsism is true; it's just that truth, reference and
the rest of the semantic notions aren't psychological categories".
(1981 : 253). Now my concern here is not with whether semantic
notions are psychological categories or not, hut rather with the
implication that if they are not, then meanings are not somehow
in the meaner, not somehow in the head. Let me say here without
pre-empting the more careful formulation to be given later,
that I take it that meanings are in the meaner in the sense
that meaning is a relationship between two things internal to
the meaner. The suggestion that is repeatedly made that meaning
is a relationship between language and the world I take to be
at best, a gross oversimplification, and at the worst, false.
Yet in a more sophisticated form this seems to be Fodor's
position, for example, "From the point of view of the
representational theory of mind, this means that seeing
involves relations between mental representations AND TIIEIR
REFERENTS; hence semantic relations within the act", (op.cit.:228)
Semantics of this kind, Fodor calls natural psychology,
and although he mentions (op.cit.:250) that there may be certain
other kinds of semantics, he does not go into detail. Such a
semantics (natural psychology, which is not part of psychology as
usually construed), claims Fodor, requires the stating of
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natural laws regarding stimuli and responses, and this requires
a great deal of detailed work which will not be carried out in
the foreseeable future. Fodor notes the connection of such a view
with that of Bloomfield (1933) that semantics cannot be done
without great advances in or even the completion of the physical
sciences; and although he queries (op.cit. footnote 11 : 331) the
point of so defining semantics that there cannot be any, by and
large, he accepts Bloomfield's contention.
I wish to argue that, on Fodor's view, either there cannot
be any semantics now or at any time in the future or Fodor
has misconstrued what semantics is and annexed for his "syntax"
what rightfully belongs to the domain of semantics. In support
of this argument I shall draw on Fodor's own premisses as given
in both his The Language of Thought (1975) and Representations (l98l).
Whilst his position on a language of thought does not seem to have
changed in any fundamental respect between 1975 and 1981, there
is a discernable shift regarding his view of semantics. In
The Language of Thought, as I shall show later, Fodor views semantics
as being at least partly based on meaning. In Representations,
on the other hand, he seems to have swung wholly to a referentially
based view of semantics. Since his view of semantics to which I
take particular exception is contained in Representations, a
refutation is called for.
Fodor's position in Representations is such that it leaves
no room anywhere for semantics. Since I take it that it is
desirable to have such a thing as semantics, Fodor must be wrong,
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but wrong is his dichotomy of the semantic and the non—semantic,
not necessarily wrong in the details of his model with which I
have much sympathy. In Representations, Fodor is arguing for a
psychology which adopts what he calls a computational theory of mind.
Of computational, Fodor says this:
I take it that computational processes are both SYMBOLIC
and FORMAL. They are symbolic because they are defined
over representations, and they are formal because they
apply to representations in virtue of (roughly) the
SYNTAX of the representations...
I'd better cash the parenthetical "roughly". To say
that an operation is formal isn't the same as saying
that it is syntactic since we could have formal processes
defined over representations which don't, in any obvious
sense, HAVE syntax. Rotating an image would be a timely
example. V/hat makes syntactic operations a species of
formal operations is that being syntactic is a way of
NOT being semantic. Formal operations are the ones that
are specified without reference to such semantic properties
of representations as, for example, truth, reference, and
meaning. Since we don't know how to complete this list'
(since, that is, we don't know what semantic properties
there are), I see no responsible way of saying what,
in general, formality amounts to. The notion of
formality will thus have to remain intuitive and
metaphoric, at least for present purposes: formal
operations apply in terms of the, as it were, shapes
of the objects in their domains. (: 226, 227)
Fodor admits that he is not very clear (: 227, 228) about
the formality condition, but seems to assume that this will become
clearer. The question is, however, how can it given that
(a) Fodor claims that semantics (as construed as natural
psychology) can't be done; (b) Fodor has defined the formality
condition in terms of the non-semantic; and (c) the only way to
delimit semantics is to do some? Putting this to one side,
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however, there are more serious problems with Fodor's view.
Although Fodor only speaks metaphorically about formal
operations applying in terms of the shapes of its operands, this
notion extended seems to me to give the only non—arbitrary
definition of formal characteristics that one is likely to find
and, in addition, this is the definition which underpins the
traditional or usual notion of formal. The formal characteristics
of something are its non-accidental properties, those properties
without which it would not be what it is, in short, its
intrinsic properties. Shape, size, mass, electrical and chemical
properties of x are all formal characteristics of x on this view
because they are all intrinsic properties of x. There will be
other properties of x, its relation to other things, for example,
but these will be accidental properties of x, not intrinsic
ones: x would still be x if these relations changed. Any
choosing of a subset of the intrinsic properties of x as being
the set of its formal properties would be arbitrary since one
intrinsic property of x is as good as another for its
3identification.
Nov Fodor explicitly makes a dichotomy between the formal on
the one hand, and the semantic on the other. Hence, on the view
3 This is not to say that all intrinsic properties are equivalent
for a particular formal operation, clearly they are not; but
unless one could show that no formal operation could operate
with a particular intrinsic property, then to dismiss that
property as being non-formal would be arbitrary.
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of formality taken above, the formal properties of an operand
will be its intrinsic properties, whilst any semantic properties
it has will be accidental ones. This dichotomy between formality
and semantics parallels, as Fodor notes, that between syntax and
semantics. The latter dichotomy is supposed to be perfectly
clear but I shall suggest later on that this is not the case.
Both formality and syntax are supposed to be concerned with the
shape of their data (to call them symbols might be misleading)
rather than with their interpretation or content. Syntactic
rules and formal rules are supposed to operate only on the
intrinsic properties of their data. So, for example, if the
datum is a wooden cube then its being a cube or wood or of a
certain size or colour will all be properties on which a formal
or syntactic rule could operate, whereas its meaning "three
red chickens" is not an intrinsic property of it, not part of
its physics: it could just as well have meant something else
or nothing at all. Whether, the cube has any non-formal
properties in addition to its accidental relationships with other
cubes seems, then, to depend in large part on whether it has
any meaning, nonnatural meaning in the sense described in 1.0.
The difficulty for Fodor stems from the fact that whereas the
cube is endowed with meaning by and only has meaning for a
meaner or meaners, one cannot say that of the operands in Fodor's
computational-theory-of—mind approach because either that leads
to an homonculus or an infinite regress. Fodor rejects the
homonculus, naturally, and blocks the regress, but only at the
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expense of being left with no possibility of having any semantic
properties in his sense. To see why this is so, we need to turn to
Fodor's The Language of Thought.
In The Language of Thought, Fodor argues "... that you
cannot learn a language whose terms express semantic properties
not expressed by the terms of some language you are already able
to use". (: 61).^ Such a claim, thought of in terms of natural
language, leads to a regress, since to learn a language one
needs a language, but then to learn that language one needs a
language, and so on ad infinitum. Fodor stops this regress by
postulating an innate language of thought, one that may possibly
be developed by combining predicates, but one nonetheless which
does not have to be learned. The immediate questions that the
postulation of such a language of thought leads to are:
"What is a language of thought like?" and "Why is a language of
thought the way it is rather than some other way?" Fodor gives
a partial answer to the first question and a full answer to the
second in an analogy that he makes with computers in The Language
of Thought:
Real computers characteristically use at least two different
languages: an input/output language in which they
4
Fodor does allow that in learning a language one may combine
units of the language one already knows in ways that one has
never done before. Hence "airplane" of the language one is
learning may bring about a combination of "flying" and "machine"
in the language one knows, but the point is that airplane
just means "flying machine" (: 96).
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communicate with their environment and a machine language
in which they talk to themselves (i.e., in which they run
their computations). 'Compilers' mediate between the two
languages in effect by specifying biconditionals whose
left-hand side is a formula in the innut/output code and
whose right-hand side is a formula in the machine code.
Such biconditionals are, to all intents and purposes,
representations of truth conditions for formulae in the
input/output language, and the ability of the machine to
use that language depends on the availability of those
definitions. (All this is highly idealised, but it's
close enough for present purposes.) My point is that,
though the machine must have a compiler if it is to use the
input/output language, it doesn't ALSO need a compiler
for the machine language. What avoids an infinite
regression of compilers is the fact that the machine is
BUILT to use the machine language, lloughly, the machine
language differs from the input/output language in that
its formulae correspond directly to computationally relevant
physical states and operations of the machine: The physics
of the machine thus guarantees that the sequences of states
and operations respect the semantic constraints on
formulae in its internal language. What takes the place
of a truth definition for the machine language is simply
the engineering principles which guarantee this
correspondence.
I shall presently return to this point in some detail.
For the moment, suffice it to suggest that there are
two ways in which it can come about that a device
(including, presumably, a person) understands a
predicate. In one case, the device has and employs
a representation of the extension of the predicate,
where the representation is itself given in some
language that the device understands. In the second case,
the device is so constructed that its use of the predicate
(e.g. in computation) comport with the conditions that
such a representation would specify. I want to say that
the first is true of predicates in the natural languages
people learn and the second of predicates in the internal
language in which we think. (: 65, 66)
So for Fodor, a computer "understands" machine code because
it is a straight representation if its own physical states, the
intrinsic properties of parts of it. Likewise, a person understands
a language of thought because it is a straight representation of
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that person's physical states. A language of thought could not
he other than it is because it is wedded to the brain which
instantiates it. But how could a language of thought be so
constrained, be a STRAIGHT representation of physical states
unless it itself were a physical facet of the brain? And if it
is a physical attribute of the brain, then it is an intrinsic
property of the brain. Presumably, a person understands sensory
input to the brain because a language of thought represents such
input in a way that relates directly to physical states of the
brain, i.e. it is a physical, and, therefore intrinsic,
property of the brain that such and such input should be
represented in a certain way and in no other way. Thus the
connection between sensory input and representation is a
straightforward physical one. But if this is so then there are
in the terms discussed above no non-formal properties of a
language of thought and therefore, no semantics in Fodor's
sense of that term in Representations. Fodor's use of the term
semantics in The Language of Thought is, as I shall briefly show
shortly, much less clear and more equivocal.
Defining semantics as Fodor has done in Representations
and adhering to his language of thought (and there is no
suggestion that he has fundamentally changed his mind on this)
commits Fodor to a world without semantics. If Fodor wishes
to accommodate semantics, then he must allow that at least a
subset of formal properties are semantic properties too. The
formality criterion could not then, of course, by itself be used
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to delineate the semantic from the non-semantic.
In the quotation from Representations given earlier,
Fodor lists among semantic properties, meaning. This is, of
course, only to be expected for what would semantics he without
meaning? In The Language of Thought. Fodor uses the term
message for what I can only conclude is meaning, where meaning
is distinct from reference. Fodor talks of "...wave forms
corresponding to given messages..." (: 111), of "...an adequate
representation of a message..." (: 111), of messages as having
to "...exhibit a systematic relation to structural descriptions..."
(: 111), of messages as specifying "...the information communicated
in verbal exchanges..." (: 111), and of the recovery of a
message which "...constitutes understanding a sentence..." (: 114).
From these several examples and others which could he cited,
it seems reasonably clear that Fodor is using the term message
where others would use the terra meaning. Now what turns on this
is that a little later, Fodor claims that "...messages must BE
formulae in the language of thought..." (: 115). Is this just a
slip of the pen or is Fodor really arguing that meanings
(i.e. messages) are formulae in a language of thought? If
it is not a mistake, then something very semantic, viz meaning,
lies at the heart of Fodor's thesis. On page 122 there is some
further evidence to suggest that there is no mistake, for there
Fodor talks of "...internalized computational procedures which
associate token messages with token sentences and vice versa."
But within a few lines doubts are again raised when Fodor claims
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that, "Messages must be so represented as to provide appropriate
domains for the computations involved in encoding and decoding
speech" (: 122), So, on the one hand, messages are formulae in a
language of thought and, on the other hand, they are what is
represented in the operands of internal computations. Fodor's
choice of the word message instead of some restricted use of the
term meaning and his apparent equivocation on whether a formulae
of a language of thought is or just represents a message, gives an
impression of an over all equivocation toward meaning and,
therefore, semantics in general, in The Language of Thought.
Fodor is at some pains in The Language of Thought to defend
what he called a translational theory of meaning from an attack
made in general on such theories by Lewis (1972). While Fodor
admits that a translational theory of meaning, i.e. one that gives
the meaning of an object language in terms of a metalanguage, does
not provide a theory of reference, he still feels that "...it would
be plausible to think of a theory of meaning for a NATURAL language
(like English) as a function which carries English sentences onto
their representations in the putative internal code." (: 119).
And while Fodor accepts that the "real" semantics being
advocated by Lewis as he sees it has to be part of the theory of
the internal code, he seems to feel that it comes as part and
parcel of the internal code:
Moreover, if a 'real' semantic theory is one which says
how formulae in the INTERNAL code relate to the world,
then speaker/hearers do NOT have to learn any such a theory;
1.1 Where are meanings? 36
presumably the internal code is not learned but innately
given. (: 122, footnote)
5
By the time of Representations , however, translational
semantics seems to be semantics no longer and Fodor appears to be
advocating classical semantics which he associates with Frege,
Tarski, Carnap, and contemporary model theory (: 204, footnote).
The basis of such classical semantics is the notion of reference,
and to overcome the difficulty of the lack of referents for
many terms in a language (unicorns and golden mountain, for
example) possible worlds of one kind or another are introduced.
The difficulty is that if one is concerned with how meaners
operate, the only place for possible worlds to be is in their
heads and this seems to leave Fodor with some explaining to do.
There appear to be two alternatives: (a) Fodor could claim that
semantic theory proper deals only with the relation between the
internal code and actual objects in the world. Such a claim would,
of course, deny any prior place for meaning over reference and
really amounts to just a particular theory of reference. Even
this limited theory would not be possible unless, of course,
Fodor allowed that some of his formal properties were "semantic"
since, as the above quotation shows, Fodor believes the internal
5
One of the difficulties with Representations is that it is a
series of articles rather than a concentrated development of one
topic as is found in The Language of Thought. This makes it
difficult to be sure that one is getting a clear view of Fodor's
over all position.
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code relates to the world because of the way it is: nothing is
learned. (b) Accept that, after all, meaning is the key element
in a semantic theory and that there seems little other choice
than to make meaning essentially internal to the meaner and a
pre—requirement for a theory of reference. If a semantic theory
is to do the work one expects of it, then it mil not do to
abandon meaning; and however recalcitrant the notion of meaning
is, some account of it must he given which accords with the way
the world seems to be.
If the arguments against Putnam's position and Fodor's
terminology are correct then this merely goes to show that
one could do semantics and that meanings could be in the head:
they do not show how one could do semantics or how meanings
could be in the head. One may earnestly believe with Searle
(1983 ! 200) that meanings are in the head because there is
nowhere else for them to be, but such a belief needs support.
Such support can be given, I think, by giving an account of how
meanings are in the head. The burden of this essay is to
attempt to give just such an account.
1.2 Semantic Systems and Semantic Apparatus
I wish to draw a sharp distinction between semantic systems
on the one hand and semantic apparatus on the other. Such a
distinction, although perhaps uncommon (at least explicitly so)
in semantics, is strongly parallelled by the distinction between
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particular grammars and universal grammar in Chomskyan linguistics.
Just as English or French or Chinese has its own particular
grammar^, so each has its own particular semantic system. If
one wishes to say something quite general about grammars in the
sense that x is a possible grammar but y is not, then one is
putting a general constraint on the type of possible grammars.
Such generalisations about grammars are called bjr Chomsky
universal grammer. But such a universal grammar can only
"control" particular grammars to the extent that it is inherent
in individual users of particular grammars. Hence universal
grammar exists in some form in all users of (natural language)
grammar and as such amounts to a partial characterisation of
those users. In parallel, if one wishes to say something
general about semantic systems, one is claiming both that the
possible systems are constrained and that there is something
which operates such constraints. As with grammars, the most
plausible place for this "something" to be is in the users of
semantic systems. Such a "something" is a physical realisation
of the semantic apparatus.
Chomsky restricts the notion of universal grammar to
natural languages. My notion of semantic apparatus is not so
^
The term grammar is sometimes used in a narrow sense to exclude
semantics and sometimes in a wider sense to include it. Chomsky,
in general, uses it in the wider sense, but I ignore this
complication here in order to bring out the parallels sharply.
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restricted, but is intended to apply to all semantic systems
wherever found. The description of the semantic apparatus,
although given in abstract terms, attempts to use predicates
which could be applied in biology, chemistry and physics. The
description of universal grammar is not couched directly in
such predicates, but Chomsky maintains its connection with
biology: "Linguistic theory, the theory of UG ^universal
grammar], construed in the manner just outlined, is an innate
property of the human mind. In principle, we should be able to
account for it in terms of human biology." (1976 : 3M
The desire for full generality for the semantic apparatus
stems from a felt need to attempt to produce some theory in which
it makes sense to talk about meaning in cross—species terms. The
term species here is intended to embrace machines and aliens as
well as the normal and known biological species. The most
pressing need comes, perhaps, from artificial intelligence where
the requirement for some neutral description of meaning is great.
The theory to be proposed is, it is hoped, a start in producing such
a description.
The study of universal grammer is general linguistics. By
analogy, I call the study of the semantic apparatus, general
7 A qualification concerning a criterion for the semantic apparatus
will, in fact, be introduced later.
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semantics, (The term general semantics used in this way will
have little to do with the General Semantic Movement started
by Korzybski's Science and Sanity (l933))«
1.3 Semantics and General Semantics
Somewhat paradoxically, the terms general linguistics and
general semantics are narrower in meaning than are the respective
terms, linguistics and semantics. In each case the former terms
refer to a subpart of that which the latter terms refer to.
The notion of general semantics parallels that of general
linguistics in other respects too. General semantics will
restrict the range of possible semantic systems, but it will not
predict their occurrence. Less obviously, but more importantly,
perhaps, particular semantic systems might invoke more
assumptions than does general semantics. For example, in
dealing with the semantics of natural, human languages, there
will be the additional assumptions that there are such things
as humans, that humans have certain characteristics, that
humans exist in a world of a particular type, and so on.
Just as the investigation of particular grammars is
important for general linguistics, so the investigation of
semantic systems is important for general semantics. If, for
8 There is a precedent for using the term general semantics
in a non-Korzybskian way, cf. Lewis' "General Semantics"(1972).
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example, something was to be found in a semantic system which
was not "permitted" by the semantic apparatus, then this would
be grounds for holding that the description of the semantic
apparatus was wrong. It is not the case that all phenomena
found in semantic systems are consequents of the semantic
apparatus alone. Frequently, other assumptions will need to be
added to derive such consequents, hut such consequents cannot
violate constraints imposed by the semantic apparatus itself.
It is in this sense that the term permit is used above. This
may be a stronger condition than Chomsky puts on his universal
grammar since he seems to allow that other faculties of the
mind, in particular, wThat he calls the conceptual facility,
may do some, but not all, of the work of the language faculty
(cf. Chomsky 1980 : 56-57).
1,4 Ontology and Terminology
The general semantic theory to be proposed is a claim
about ontology. (Despite protestations to the contrary all
theories, being theories about something, involve claims about
ontology in one sphere or another.) It is a conditional claim
of the form: If there are meaners then there is such and such.
Since it seems reasonably agreed that the antecedent is true,
then, the theory claims, there is such and such. What the theo
does is to give a description of the such and such, but the
description given is partial, only those characteristics or
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properties which the theory requires are described. This has
the consequence that in applying the partial description of the
theory one could find that it applied to a number of things
which were quite different in nature except in the required
respect. The situation may be likened to the case of the
instruction: "Stir with a wooden stick". Now in any actual
stirring one will be using a stick made of a particular timber
which may have very different properties to a stick made of
another timber, but these other properties are not important
for the instruction. Perhaps, so much is well understood, but
it has important consequences which in view of the generality of
the proposed theory are worth spelling out.
A general semantic theory is intended to be entirely
9
general , applying to meaners wherever they are found, be
they animal, human animal, alien, or machine. As such, meaners
might turn out to be composed of very different things. Aliens
might have silicon chemistry instead of carbon chemistry.
Meaning machines might function electronically instead of
electro-chemically, as humans appear to do. Such differences
could be allowable in the theory since such differences might
involve properties not characterised in any way by the theory.
Such properties will in fact be non-semantic properties.
9 In fact, in the next chapter, a criterion will be applied
which limits the generality of the theory. This will not,
however, affect the substance of what is being claimed here.
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In order to talk about what exists (as far as the theory is
concerned), the theory must use language, and for economy and
convenience names are used most of the time instead of
description. These names are the terminology of theory. The
theory to be proposed has a considerable terminology and, like
most terminology, it is tedious to acquire. However, the
conciseness, clarity, economy, and convenience of using terms
instead of descriptions is such, I hope, as to make the effort
of acquiring the terminology well worthwhile.
The terminology of the theory will be introduced as the
theory is developed; however, I think that it would be useful,
if somewhat daunting, to the reader to have the majority of this
terminology collected in one place, and I have, therefore, given
an alphabetical listing in the appendix. This will provide a
lexicon to which the reader can refer, and is urged to refer, as
necessary. Much of the terminology is novel to avoid the
unwanted connotations of traditional terms; however, there are
three terms which have extensive use which may be felt to
strongly invoke the ghosts of their former and other uses.
These terms are associator. associate, and association, and
at least the latter two have been and are used in connection with
associationism. General semantics should, I believe, be neutral
with respect to associationism, and although it is in some
ways unfort\inate that there are no more suitable terms available,
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a short digression to consider the essential features of
associationism will demonstrate that the use of the above terms
does not impugn this neutrality, whilst forearming the reader
against importing unintended and rejected connotations into my
use of the terms.
Long before the emergence of the independent discipline of
psychology, associationism was a position in philosophy with
respect to the formation of complex ideas from more basic
elements, such as simple ideas, sensations, images. Complex
ideas were held to come about by association, and this is one
of the two central theses of associationism. The other thesis
is that association of simpler mental elements into more
complex ones is governed by principles. The object of
associationism was then, in fact, to establish just these
principles. It is to be noted that strict associationism
implicitly denies any purposive activity in the process of
association. The reason for this is not hard to see: if
one allows purpose to enter the picture, then the principles
of association would be principles no more for the simple reason
that purpose implies something doing the purposing and the whole
point of associationism was to explain away the homonculus -
the little man inside one's head who does the seeing, hearing,
purposing, etc. and requires, of course, a little man inside his
I am largely indebted to Marx & Ilillix (1963), Neel (l97l)» and
Volman (i960) for the following account of associationism.
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head to do the same, and so on ad infinitum - not to co-exist with
it. From a strict associationism point of view, the principles
of association are intended to be a complete explanation of how
associations come about. In such a scheme, the mind is purely
passive, obeying mechanically the principles of association in
arriving at complex ideas.
The history of associationism is a long one, and one can
most readily get a flavour of the subject by considering three
principles of association proposed by Aristotle.
1. Similarity Ideas will be associated if they are similar
in some respect. So, for example, the ideas
of fire and the sunset will be associated
because of their similarity of colour.
2. Contrast Two ideas which oppose each other will be
associated. Hence, for example, the idea of
up will be associated with the idea of down.
3. Contiguity Ideas which are contiguous in time or space
will be associated. So, for example, the
idea of a whistle followed by the idea of a
train will be associated with one another.
Of course, many difficulties arise in connection with these
principles of associationism. For example, how contiguous do
ideas have to be to be associated? Does one idea have to follow
the other immediately, or can there be a gap in time, and if so
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how long? More problematic, if two principles of association
equally apply, say contrast and contiguity, which has priority?
In the model of general semantics which I shall he developing
in the ensuing chapters, the associator is the person or thing
in which associations take place. I shall offer no suggestions
as to why some associations rather than others occur: it is
sufficient for the model that certain associations can occur and
the why of particular occurrences can he safely ignored.
Associationism can be seen as an attempt to explain the why of
associations, and since general semantics as perceived here does
not attempt and need not attempt to explain the same phenomenon it
remains impartial with respect to the Tightness or wrongness of
associationism.
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2. The Lonely Meaner
2.0 Meaning Communities and the Lonely Meaner.
I have assumed thus far that what makes a meaner a meaner
will turn out to he something intrinsic to individual meaners,
hut one answer to the question: "What makes a meaner a meaner?"
might he that a meaner is a meaner because he/she/it is part of
a meaning community, i.e. meaning is a purely social occurrence
which arises, and only ever arises, in a society. Such a view
will entail one or other of the following positions.
(a) Individuals of a meaning community have a potentiality
for being meaners which can only he realised in a meaning
community. Such a potentiality is present in individual
would-be meaners in the form of properties or equipment,
which can only he activated in a meaning community.
(h) Individuals of a meaning community have only a potentiality
for being meaners in the sense that they have n
potentiality for being members of a meaning community.
There is nothing about individual members considered
alone which tells us anything about meaning.
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Despite the apparent implausibility of (b), I know of no a priori
way of showing it to he false. The main argument against it is,
I believe, methodological. Adopting position (b), one has to
say that meaning can only be found in meaning communities (not,
of course, in all communities, however constituted), and that no
features of the individuals of a meaning community are relevant
to its being a meaning community. On such a view, meaning is a
truly emergent property^ and by definition is therefore beyond
all attempts at explanation. The most that could be said is
that meaning is a property of some communities. Looking for and
failing to find explanations of meaning will provide some
evidence in support of position (b) and, indeed, perhaps this is
the only way to find evidence in support of this kind of
position. From a methodological point of view, it would
seem, therefore, that concentrating on position (a) provides
both the best prospect for showing position (b) to be false
and the best (only?) prospect for showing it to be true. I
shall from now on assume that assuming position (b) to be
false is a reasonable methodological strategy to adopt.
Position (a) is rather different in that individual meaners
do have equipment which they use in a meaning community for
^
A truly emergent property is one that lacks causation and,
therefore, cannot be predicted. See, for example, article on
emergent evolutionism in Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (1967). Note that if causation was involved, then
there would be something about the individuals of a meaning
community that contributed to there being meaning, i.e. position
(a) would be correct in some sense.
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meaning, but such equipment cannot be used or activated by
a meaner alone. Position (a) would be falsified by the
discovery of a lone meaner, but the practical problems are
very great. First, the lone meaner would have to survive away
from his/her/its community (there are cases, however, where
children have been claimed to have been brought up by wolves),
and, second, one woiild have to discover that such em individual
was a meaner without the discovery being the means by which the
individual's meaning apparatus actually came to be activated.
Itshould be clear that position (a) is not the claim
that the semantic system employed by a lone meaner would
be very impoverished in comparison to those used in a
meaning community. Such a claim would, I think, be the
subject of wide agreement and I do not demur from it. The
claim of position (a) is rather that there could not be a lonely
meaner, however impoverished the semantic system utilised.
There are, in fact, arguments of considerable prominence
against the possibility of a lonely meaner and these are to be
found in arguments against private language. In order to see how
arguments against private language bear specifically against the
possibility of a lonely meaner, it will be necessary to defer
discussion of the private language problem until after a model
of a lonely meaner has been presented. I shall in the meantime,
however, assume the conclusion of that discussion, viz. that the
arguments against the possibility of a private language and,
therefore, against the possibility of a lonely meaner are inconclusive.
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There is plausible reasoning, I believe, for why a
consideration of the meaning mechanism should begin with a single
meaner, i.e. a lonely meaner. Let us suppose a world, W, in
which there are just two items: a tree, which I call _T and the
sound of the word tree, which I call ST. (The unreality of W, for
example, the fact that a sound needs something through which it is
propagated, is not an argument against the claim to be made
here since given time and space W could be fleshed out with all
the consequential paraphanalia of a tree and a sound, but such
additional assumptions would not alter the substance of the
claim being made in any way at all). In describing such a world,
one might describe the causal interactions of T and ST, such as
they are. Let us call the set of such causal interactions CI^.
CI^ will, of course, contain only direct causal interactions
since there is nothing else in the world under consideration.
Nothing in CI^ will correspond to ST meaning T or T meaning ST
or T being the referent of ST or vice versa. Notice here that
the conventions referred to in the introduction cannot be used
because W does not contain any names, but only the items T and
ST. In saying that meaning and referring are not among the
relations in CI^, I take it that I am not saying anything
controversial. The relations of meaning and referring only arise
when a meaner is present. The claim is, although it could only
be substantiated once a theory of a meaner had been worked out,
that neither T nor ST is a meaner; therefore, there are no
relations of meaning (in the sense of meaning outlined in 1.0)
nor of referring in W.
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To W, a meaner, A, is now added. We may suppose that A
has sensory apparatiis, like eyes and ears, and that along with A
we add to W such things as light and air in order that A may use
such sensory apparatus (the details are very unimportant). T and
ST will have a causal effect on A, and because hy supposition A
is a meaner, ST could come to mean "T" for A and have as its
referent, T. If one now looks at the set of direct causal
interactions, CI^, between T and ST in this augmented world, will
it he the same as CI^? The answer, I think, that one would
normally give is Yes. We do not expect and have no reason to
believe that tree meaning "tree" alters the direct causal
relationship between the sound of the word tree and trees.
The relations of meaning and referring between T and ST are not,
therefore, to he found in CI^, but, nonetheless, for A there are
such relations between T and ST and since they are not in CI^
they must be in A; however, ST and T are not in A, so the relationships
of meaning and referring cannot hold between ST and T, rather
they must hold between states of or in A caused hy T and ST.
Thus the relationships of meaning and referring which apparently
hold between ST and T are in fact relationships which hold between
two things, call them TI and STI, internal to A. But if this
is the case, then one can talk about the meaning mechanism
independently of objects external to A, for in general terms
in describing the phenomenon of meaning it matters not whether TI
or STI are caused hy trees and sounds or trains and trams or
even by the tinkering of some Cartesian demon: what matters
is the relations that can come to hold between them. Hence,
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one can remove from W, T and ST and even the sensory apparatus
of A and still be left with a meaner, a lonely meaner.
Viewing the meaning relation as a phenomenon internal
2
to the meaner is not, of course, at all new. Saussure was
quite explicit on this point: "The linguistic sign unites,
not a thing and a name, hut a concept and a sound—image."
(1916, English Edition, I960: 66). It is to he noted that
Saussure speaks of a sound-image and not of a sound. A
sound-image is internal to the speaker/hearer, a sound is not.
Less explicit on the internal relation, but still very much
on the same line of reasoning is Ogden and Richards' meaning





Figure 2.0.0 Ogden & Richards' meaning triangle from
The Meaning of Meaning (1923, Tenth edition 19A9 '• 11)
Cf. Ullman (1962) where other references will he found and
where some traditional criticisms of such an approach are
briefly reviewed.
/
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For Ogden and Richards, the thought or reference is an
indistinguishable whole, hut on the relation between symbol
and referent (ST and T in W) they have this to say:
Between the symbol and the referent there is no relevant
relation other than the indirect one, which consists in
its being used by someone to stand for a referent.
(Op. cit. tenth edition: ll).
Neither Saussure nor Ogden and Richards pursue the nature
of the internal relation of meaning directly, all, apparently,
preferring the route via a "thorough-going investigation of
language". (Ogden and Richards, op cit.: 14). A thorough-going
investigation of language is a worthwhile goal, hut however long
and deep the study of language, this will not by itself bridge the
gap between the observable language behaviour of meaners and the
underlying and concealed means by which they use language to
mean. To bridge that gap, one must attempt a theory of how
meaners are able to mean.
In this chapter, I shall be concerned with the lonely
meaner. In later chapters, the world, W, of the lonely meaner
will he enriched, so that an account can be given of public
language and public meaning and, hence, of meaning communities.
2.1 An Outline of a Model of the Lonely Meaner
In proposing a model or theory of the lonely meaner I shall
he giving a description of the abstract semantic apparatus. The
claim will then he that an actual lonely meaner or anjr meaner
must possess a physical realisation of such an apparatus
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otherwise it would not he a meaner. The semantic apparatus
described is abstract in the sense that the description given is
only concerned with semantically relevant details. In any
realisation of the apparatus many other properties (what I
called earlier, comcomitant properties) will he apparent. For
example, if the semantic apparatus could he and was realised in
some electronic machine, then all the properties of that
machine and of all its parts would he comcomitant properties
of the semantic properties realised in the machine. I stress
this point because in considering a model of the lonely meaner
I shall he interested only in the abstract semantic apparatus,
and in outlining this I make no claims as to what would he
necessary to maintain any particular physical realisation of
the semantic apparatus.
Before attempting a description of the semantic apparatus,
it is necessary to consider what criterion or criteria it must
meet, i.e. what type or types of semantic systems it must he
able to handle, for while it may he the case that I as a human
being can conceive of no more powerful apparatus than one which
can handle the semantic systems of natural language, there seems
to he a distinct possibility that semantic apparatus of lower
power could he conceived of. The criterion adopted here and
to he understood as applying throughout the text unless otherwise
specified is that the semantic apparatus must he of sufficient
power to handle all natural—language semantic systems. This
is both a useful and a convenient criterion. It is useful in
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the sense that of printe interest are the semantic systems
utilised by humans; it is convenient in the sense that the
only real data available on semantic systems are data concerning
human semantic systems.
In section 2.0, it was claimed that it seemed reasonably
plausible to believe that the meaning relation, whatever it is,
was internal to the meaner. In particular, the situation
sketched was a world, W, containing just three objects:
a meaner, A, a tree, T, and the sound of the word tree. ST.
In such a situation, if ST came to mean "T" for A then, since
there seems no plausibility in the suggestion that the direct
relationships between ST and T have changed, one concludes
that the relationship must be internal to A. ST and T are not,
of course, in A, so whatever the relation of meaning holds
between it must be something other than ST and T. These
something elses I called TI and STI, and the thought was that
TI and STI were states of or in A which were caused respectively
by T and ST. Finally, I said that one could abstract away
from what caused TI and STI and just deal with meaning as a
matter wholly internal to A.
The last move might appear to go too far, an objection
being that T and ST as causers of TI and STI are intrinsic to
TI and STI being what they are, i.e. if there were no T and ST,
then TI and STI would never occur. I do not think that this
objection carries a great deal of weight. Such an objection
amounts to claiming that experience of something or at least the
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first experience of that something is always veridical.
Hallucinations are, I think, sufficient to show that this claim
is wrong, since once one admits the possibility of hallucination,
then one has admitted the possibility of experience without the
inferred cause of that experience.
The assumption is, then, that meaning is a relation within
a meaner and that the entities that relation relates are also
within the meaner. To make a start on the ontology of the model
of the lonely meaner, it is necessary to give some description
of what it is within the meaner that can be related, i.e. the
semantically relevant features of TI and STI must be described.
The semantically relevant features required here are not the
specific semantic features which would be of interest in describing
a semantic system, for example, the fact that the English word
man has as some of its meaning components'5 or features "male"
and "adult"; rather, the concern is with those features or
properties which make the apparatus a semantic apparatus rather
than something else and which underlie the generalisations that
can be made about semantic systems.
In describing TI and STI, one wants to be as economical
3 There has been a considerable amount of work carried out on the
idea that the meaning of language items consists of a set of
semantic components or features drawn from a pool of such
components or features. See Katz 1972 and Leech 197^ for
examples of two somewhat different approaches, and Biggs 1982,
Kempson 1977» Lyons 1968, 1977 for some general criticisms
of componential semantics.
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as possible and, at the same time, account for certain semantic
properties which they exhibit. The major semantically important
properties which objects such as TI and STI exhibit is that of
being similar and of being different. Similarity and difference,
as will be seen later, underlie all the sense relations and
analyticity. To see clearly what is meant by similarity and
difference in the context they are being used in here, consider
again the world, W, consisting of the three objects A, T, and ST.
To W is added a biish, B, and the sound of the word bush (SB).
In such a situation, SB could come to mean "B" for A, and the
relevant objects internal to A will then be SBI and BI.
Now trees and bushes have quite a lot in common, i.e. they are
similar in certain respects, but also different in certain
respects. TI and BI will therefore have a certain similarity
as well as a certain difference. The question is: "IIow can
this be explained?" To say merely that TI and BI are similar
in certain respects is not to offer any explanation at all.
The notion of similarity remains utterly mysterious.
The notion of similarity can be fully explained, I believe,
if one considers TI and BT to be complex, made up of subcomponents.
TI and BI will then be similar to the extent that they contain
the same subcomponents, and different to the extent that they
contain different subcomponents. As simple as this proposal
sounds, it will give the model considerable explanatory power
in the area of sense relations and analyticity.
If TI and BI are in fact complex, then what the model should
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describe are not these complexes but, rather, the basic building
blocks out of which these complexes are made and the operations
by which they are constructed. The basic building blocks will
be called discriminators and their formal specification is
given in (l). I am attempting here to introduce the components
of the semantic apparatus in an explanatory way. Since, however,
the formal specifications are constructed from a logical
perspective of the whole semantic apparatus, they often contain
terms which have not thus far been introduced. (l), for example,
contains the novel terms associator and focal. Such terms will
be considered in due course, and the reader is asked not to
worry over them until they are considered.
(l) Discriminator (d): A "bit" of and within an associator
which is distinct in respects other
than spatio-temporal ones and which
may be associated with focals, but
no proper subpart of which can be
independently associated with a focal.
What (l) says is that a discriminator is a part of an associator
and that it is distinct not merely by being in one position rather
than another but intrinsically so. Further, a discriminator is
not a complex in the sense that parts of it can be separately
associated with a focal - the whole discriminator has to be
associated or not associated.
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A discriminator is the basic building block out of which
objects like TI and BI are made. This does not mean, however,
that discriminators are not complex in their own right. They may
in fact be of any order of complexity whatsoever. Whether they
are simple or very complex will depend on the job they do and
their physical realisation. Discriminators are only basic in the
sense described, viz. that they come as a whole and cannot be
broken up for regrouping in other complexes involving focals.
This view of discriminators carefully avoids taking a
discriminator to be necessarily a single unit and, hence, avoids
a problem in brain science which Dennett (1978) has termed
the grandmother-neuron problem. Dennett expresses this problem as
follows:
Many otherwise plausible theory sketches in brain science
seem to lead ineluctably to the view that the "representation"
of each particular "concept" or "idea" will be the
responsibility of a particular neuron or other small part
of the brain. Sui)pose your "grandmother neuron" died;
not only could you not SAY "grandmother", you couldn't
SEE her if she was standing right in front of you. You
couldn't THINK about grandmothers at all; you would have
a complete cognitive blind spot. Nothing remotely like
that pathology is observed, of course, and neurons
malfunction or die with depressing regularity, so for
these and other reasons, theories that require grandmother
neurons are in trouble. (: XIII)
If discriminators were characterised as single atomic units, then
the grandmother-neuron argument could be used against them;
however, no such stipulation is made or needs to be made: the
number of one kind of discriminator may vary greatly and all that
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is required is that however many there are they are indistinguishable
in the way they operate.
Additionally, it needs to be observed that Dennett
over-emphasises the argument against grandmother neurons, for
whilst pathologies of the kind he describes do not seem to be
observed, pathologies that are REMOTELY similar, like, for
example, being colour blind, are regularly observed.
The name discriminator is intended to be indicative of the
fact that a discriminator is the smallest unit which is available
for interacting with the environment and being available to build
into complexes. Discriminators, however, should not be thought
of like the cone or rod receptors of the retina. There is no
presumption that they are the direct detectors of external
causation. It is quite likely that between discriminators and
external causal influences there is a great deal of sensory
machinery. Further, some discriminators might be the recipients
of internal causal influences generated by other parts of the
semantic apparatus.
So far, I have talked about TI and STI as being states
caused by T and ST, and of being objects independent of
T and ST, and of being composed of discriminators which like
TI and STI may themselves be the subject of internal and
external causal influences. With such loose talk, the notions
of TI and STI must be in danger of losing their coherence or,
rather, of not having an}*- in the first place. The excuse for
such a loose wray of talking is that in trying to get some grasp
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on the theoretical notions one uses any ammunition to hand, but
a reckoning must come and unless a somewhat more precise
pre-theoretical conception of TI, STI, and discriminators can
be given the theoretical concept expressed in (l) will be
muddied rather than clarified.
A discriminator in its realisation will be a piece or
pieces of physical matter, simple or complex in structure, and
perhaps interwoven with other physical matter which is not part
of it. Being a piece of physical matter, a realised discriminator
can enter into causal interactions Airith other pieces of physical
matter. The realised discriminator will change state according
to causal influences, but it is always in some state or other.
Associations between discriminators are not associations between
states, but associations between the physical loci of the
states. An analogy might make this clearer. Suppose one
considers a light bulb connected to a power source through a
dimmer switch. Such a light bulb can be in a large number of
states: it can be off, on very dimly, on very brightly, and so on.
It is always in one state or the other and to identify it as
the same light bulb we need some constant which does not change,
such as location. Suppose now that one wishes to hang a lamp
shade on the bulb, it is not the case that one hangs it on a
state of the bulb, rather one hangs it on the bulb even though
the bulb is always in one state or another (off, dim, bright,
etc.). So it is with discriminators. A discriminator is
always in one state or another, but in talking about discriminators
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per se the talk is neutral as to the state of the discriminator.
Since TI and STI are made up of discriminators (in a way to
he discussed shortly), it was an imprecise way of talking
earlier when I said that they were states; rather they are
what is in those states, even though as with the light bulb
one could not separate the thing from its being in some state
or other.
TI and STI are, then, complexes of discriminators. The
model needs to specify how, hut not why, such complexes arise.
The basic operation in the model will be that of association,
formally specified in (2).
(2) Associate/ To connect in some manner so that access
Association
to one item in the association gives access
to all the others in that association.
Each use of an associative link is
distinctive and ordered.
The notion of access as used in (2) is realisation-dependent.
In the case of a realisation in chemical terms it might mean
the possibility of a chemical reagent moving from one item to
another; in electrical terms it might mean the possibility of
an electrical ciirrent passing from one item to another.
The complexes of discriminators which constitute TI and
STI are, therefore, to be constructed by associating discriminators,
but it will not do to associate them in just any old way because
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this will introduce hidden structure into the model. This
can he seen in figure 2.1.0, where four discriminators are
indicated by the notation d^, d^, d^, d^, and the associative
links between them are shown by lines. Whichever discriminator
one starts with one enters a different configuration of
associations, and such configurations amount to structure.
It is not the case that one does not want structure in
the model; quite the reverse. But any structure specified in the
model must have a precise function, and the complexities of
structures generated by a process of association, as depicted
in figure 2.1.0, seem to be far richer than those required in
the model and beyond any straightforward specification. What is
needed is a way of associating discriminators which, although it
yields a structure, yields a neutral one. This could be achieved
if instead of a discriminator associating directly with another,
it associated with a neutral element which in turn was associated
with another discriminator. The starting point for accessing a
group of discriminators associated in such a way would then be
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this neutral element, and from that point the structural configuration
of the discriminators is completely uniform since it is not
possible to get from any one discriminator to another except via
the neutral element, as figure 2.1.1 shows. The neutral
element is rather like a junction box, mediating the associations
between discriminators, and for obvious reasons I call it a
focal. Formally, a focal is as specified in (3).
(3) Focal (f) A "bit" of and within an associator which
is not necessarily distinct in respects
other than spatio-temporal ones and which
may be associated with discriminators and
other focals, but no proper subpart of which
can be independently so associated.
It is of no concern in the model that focals be intrinsically
distinct; like junction boxes, they are required to be all the
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same or very similar. Once they are associated with discriminators,
they will become distinct because their associated discriminators
are distinct.
It is useful to have a name for complexes of associated
discriminators like that in figure 2.1.1 and I use the name
collect. The formal specification of a collect is as in (4).
(4) Collect (c) An association of one or more
Collects, in fact, can turn out to be quite complex things
and involve structure, hut for simplicity and ease I shall
assume that the collects which are TI and STI are simple ones
like those shown in figure 2.1.2.
discriminators with a focal or an
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The assumption here is that TI and STI are not at all similar,
therefore, they do not share any discriminators.
An associative link is shown between TI and STI in figure 2.1.2,
can this be used to indicate the meaning relation? Clearly not
as matters stand because TI and STI are precisely the same
kind of objects. TI does not mean STI and STI does not mean TI.
In fact, TI and STI as shown in figure 2.1.2 do not mean
anything at all. Nonetheless, the assumption has been that in A
a meaning relationship holds between STI and TI, i.e. one is
going to have to say, if this approach is correct, that STI
means TI in A, and that TI is the meaning of STI for A.
What characteristics would TI or STI need for such a relationship
to hold? If the words red book are uttered it is the case in
normal circumstances that one pays no attention whatsoever to
the sounds of the words, but only to their meaning. It is as
4
though once the sounds had been recognised , attention is
switched straight through to the meanings of the words. This
is the essential feature of all signs: they point to something
else and, in so doing, away from their other properties. If
STI is going to have meaning in the required sense, therefore,
it must act in the same way as a sign, it must point away from
itself and towards TI. Clearly if STI is to have this property
^ I am not implying here that recognising the sounds of words as
the sounds of words is a straightforward matter. Indeed it is
very complex and may involve the meanings of some words in order
to decipher the sounds of others.
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and TI is not then they cannot be the same kind of objects.
STI needs the property of being a sign of something else. This
property, or rather what possesses or brings it to a collect,
I call a sign-marker, a formal definition of which is in (5).
(5) Sign-marker (SM) A distinguished discriminator or collect
associated with a collect to indicate
and effect that that collect be taken
as a sub.
In constructing the model, one is not concerned with the
particular physical realisation of its contents - although should
it turn out that some item of the model is not a plausible
candidate for any physical realisation, this would be good
reason to revise the model; however, it is often helpful to
consider in a very approximate way the physical counterpart to
the formal object of the model. Such is perhaps the case with
the sign-marker. The sign-marker can be thought of rather like
a switching mechanism in that once associated with STI,
whenever a signal, say, arrives at STI it is immediately switched
along the associative link to TI. When STI is associated with
the sign-marker, then, it acts like a sign. However, since the
word sign is used of signs external to A, such as ST or SB, a
different name for a collect associated with the sign-marker
will be employed, viz. sub. To distinguish a collect which is
not associated with the sign-marker, one can simply call it a
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non-sub. Formally, one has:
(6) Sub (s) A collect associated with the sign-marker.
(7) Non-sub (ns) A collect which is not a sub.
Most talk of collects will in fact be talk about subs or
non-subs, so the terms sub and non—sub are important terms in
understanding the model being developed.
The meaning relation, then, as characterised by the model
is a sub, s, being associated with a non-sub, ns. We shall
then say that s means ns and ns is the meaning of s. Although
one has an object, viz, ns, as the meaning of s, one cannot
speak of non-subs in general as being meanings: they only
become meanings when associated with a sub. This is why it
makes sense to talk of meanings arising or obtaining in a
particular meaner. There is no object one can hold up out of
the context of a meaner and say that this object is meaning.
A non-sub becomes a meaning in the context of a particular
meaner; out of that context it is not a meaning.
All this is quite abstract and a firmer grasp of what is
going on might be had hy embedding the notions discussed so far
in a natiiral language context. This will be a little rough and
ready and it will involve a few notions not yet introduced,
but it will serve its purpose if it makes the picture a
little clearer. The claim so far is that inside meaners
there arc elements which I have called discriminators. These
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discriminators may be associated together via focals into collects.
There is a particular discriminator or collect which has the
effect when associated with a collect, c, of making that
collect act like a sign pointing to something else. This
something else can he another collect, c-^, with which c is
associated. In such a case, I say that c means c^, c being a
sub and c^ a non-sub.
Now in the case of a natural language meaner, subs will
usually correspond to elements of the language of that meaner.
Indirectly, mediated by other organs, the sound waves which make
up elements of the language will stimulate the subs of the
meaner. It just happens, of course, that most natural languages
are sound based, but the signs of a language could just as well,
though not with the same practicality, be light patterns on a
pond or clothes on a washing line. Subs, then, if one likes, are
the internal elements in the meaner corresponding to the external
signs, the sound waves or ink marks, of language, and linked
to them by an indirect but nonetheless causal connection.
Non-subs, which may be the meaning of subs, too may be
stimulated directly by objects external to the meaner. Hence
it is possible that for a meaner, A, the non—sub, ns, which is
indirectly stimulated by a tree might become associated with
and, therefore, become the meaning of, a sub, s, which is indirectly
stimulated by the sound of the word tree. Hence, for A, s
will mean ns, and correspondingly tree will mean "tree".
It will now be apparent that quite a lot of associating
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*
goes on in this model. For this reason, I call the something
in which all the other "bits" of the model are to be found and
where the associating goes on the associator. formally specified
as in (8).
(8) Associator (A) Someone or something in which discriminators
may be associated with focals, collects
with collects via focals and markers
with collects.
For the obvious reason of not wanting to beg the question, the
term meaner does not appear in the formal description of the
model, and from now on the term associator will be used
frequently to stand for and locate the semantic apparatus.
It may be asked whether the use of the term associator
begs the question of what constitutes a meaner any less, or
significantly less, than the use of the term meaner itself.
The answer is, I believe, that the use of the term associator
does not beg the question at all providing that one sees clearly
the question that general semantics attempts to answer. In
posing questions about the general nature of meaners, one must
sharply distinguish two questions:
(a) How is it that meaners are able to mean? Specifically,
how is it that x is able to mean y for a meaner?
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(b) Why do meaners mean? Specifically, why is it that x
came to mean y for a meaner?
The use of variables x and y in (a) and (b) is somewhat vague.
In terras of the theory developed so far, the variable x would
range over subs and the variable y over non-subs. However,
questions (a) and (b) are intended to be pre-theoretical
questions, so the notions of sub and non-sub cannot really
be introduced into them. Approximately, x ranges over signs and
y over their meanings, but, of course, a sign will be something
which has a meaning and since, pretheoretically, the nature of
meanings is vague, the nature of what it is that the variables
5
x and y range over will be equally vague . Such pretheoretic
vagueness is only to be expected if it is the case that precision
comes only with a theory.
Here, I am concerned with attempting to answer question (a),
and not with attempting to answer question (b). In terms of
the model developed so far, (b) type questions amount to asking
why the sign-marker was associated with STI and why STI was
associated with TI and even, indeed, why the discriminators
which compose STI and TI were ever associated together in the
first place. Although no general answers to such questions will
be attempted, occasionally, granted a particular environment,
suggestions will be made concerning partial answers to some
aspects of these questions.
5 Cf. Grice's use of the variables x and something in "Meaning", 1957.
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The notion of an associator would only he question-begging
if one were trying to answer question (b), but since no general
attempt is being made to do that, the term associator may be
used freely without implying that the question of what guides
the workings of the associator in malting one association rather
than another is being answered by the proposed model. In
attempting to answer the question of how it is that a meaner
means, it is hoped and expected that the nature of what would he
required in the way of an answer to why it is that a meaner
means will become clearer.
So far, the type of meaning that the model depicts is all
non-structural. This follows from the fact that it has been
assumed that discriminators can only be associated in a
structurally neutral way. A great deal of meaning, however,
involves structure. Not only is this true of sentences, but
also of many single words. By the term structure here is meant
the relationships which hold between smaller bits of meaning
which are themselves structurally neutral. Structure may be
exemplified by considering the world, W, again. Suppose to W
an ordinary cat, C, and an ordinary dog, D, are added. Being
an ordinary cat and an ordinary dog, they chase each other, and
so in W one has the event of the dog chasing the cat, call
this DChC, and the event of the cat chasing the dog, call this
CChI). To W are also added the sounds of the words cat. SC,
dog, SD, chase, SCh and of the utterances Dog chases cat,
SDChC, and Cat chases dog, SCChD. The internal correlates in
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A of these animals, sounds and events one may suppose to be
CI, DI, Chi, SCI, SDI, SChI, DChCI, SCChDI, DChCI, and CChDI.
Suppose further that SCI comes to mean CI for A and SDI comes
to mean DI for A, and so on in the usual way so that the sounds
of the English words and sentences have their usual meanings
for A. Now the meanings of SDChCI (Dog chases cat) and
SCChDI (Cat chases dog) for A will be DChCI ("Dog chases cat")
and CChDI ("Cat chases dog") respectively, but if DChCI and
CChDI are different, and by supposition they are, then there are
only two ways in which this can be accounted for: either they
contain different discriminators or they contain the same
discriminators arranged in different structural patterns. The
first alternative is to be rejected on grounds of economy and
plausibility. If events like dog chasing cat or cat chasing
dog were to be distinguished as wholes, i.e. they corresponded
simply to one complex discriminator and had nothing in common
as far as discrimination was concerned with cats and dogs and
chasing in other circumstances, then there would be a vast
explosion of the number of discriminators needed in the
realisation of the model. Coupled with this consideration of
economy is one of plausibility. If such events were discriminated
as a whole then there could be no discernment of cat or dog
objects as objects or individuals in such events and hence
whatever was going on in these events would have no relationship
whatsoever with the objects or individuals discriminated
outside of such events. This seems highly implausible. Only
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the second alternative remains, therefore, and this requires some
way of building structure.
It will he recalled that it is non—subs, i.e. collects
without the sign-marker associated, which can be meanings within
an associator. There is, however, as yet no way to associate
non-subs in anything except a structurally neutral way. What
is needed is a general mechanism whereby structures of a well
defined kind can be built. The method adopted in the model
is what might he called the plug and socket method. Every
non—sub constitutes a single plug which fits a more or less
universal socket (the qualifying "more or less" will be spelt
out later). Some non—subs have sockets (one or more) into which
the plugs can fit. Non—subs which have sockets are called
relators, those that do not, non-relators. It is important
to note that ALL non-subs are plugs, be they relators or
non-relators. The term relator is intended to he indicative
of the fact that a two or more socket relator relates the
plugs that fit into those sockets. However, the term
relator is still used even when the relator has only one
socket and there are, therefore, no relations in the
ordinary sense. As an example of the plug and socket method
of construction, consider the meanings: "cat", "black",
"chases", "dog", and suppose one wants the meanings "black cat"
and "cat chases dog". This can be achieved by assuming that
"black" has one socket into which "cat" plugs, and that
"chases" has two sockets into which to plug "cat" and "dog".
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It will be seen immediately, however, that the two sockets of
"chases" must be ordered in some way otherwise there will be
no difference in the structure of "cat chases dog" from that of
"dog chases cat".
In the technical language of the model, I shall not use
the terms plug and socket but the more traditional terms of
argument and argument-place respectively. Such terms are
familiar from mathematical functions and predicate calculus.
Indeed, relators could be described using predicate calculus
notation so that a one argument—place relator is indicated Rx,
a two argument-place relator, Rxy, a three argument-place
relator, Rxvz, and so on, where the variables x, y, z, indicate
argument—places. Built into the notation of predicate
calculus is, of course, the ordering of argument—places. More
usually in treatments of predicate calculus, the one place
relation, llx, is treated as a one place predicate, Fx, but
there is no significance in the nomenclature here. The
similarity between predicate calculus and the model does not
extend very far. Strictly, predicate calculus is an uninterpreted
language, whereas the model is not a language at all. When the
predicate calculus is given some interpretation, as when, for
example, it is used to give translations of some parts of
natural language, then some of the terminology, such as
predicate, relation, can be viewed as interpretations of items
in the syntax of the calculus rather than the names of the
syntactic items themselves. The terminology of the predicate
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calculus so used appears to be talking about meaning in a general
way and is, therefore, addressing the same area as general
semantics as here conceived is. For brevity and convenience,
I shall call the use of predicate calculus in this way Pred CI.
and I shall discuss some aspects of it as occasion demands in
the ensuing text.
Significant structure is to be achieved in the model,
then, by associating arguments with argument-places. Sometimes,
I shall speak loosely of arguments being associated with
relators and this is to be understood as an abbreviated way
of saying that arguments are associated with the argument-places
of relators. If a relator has more than one argument—place, then
those argument—places must be ordered. That this is so has
already been seen with "cat chases dog" (CChDl) and "dog
chases cat" (DChCl). If CChDT and DChCI are to be different
structures, as they are required to be, then the argument-places
of "chases" must be different in some way so that when "cat",
for example, is associated with one argument-place of "chases"
it means something different to that which it means when
associated with the other argument-place of "chases". In
^
I say "appears" because even when the terminology is used in
an interpretative way, it still seems that often it is intended
to pick out syntactic subclasses leaving the "real" semantics for
some model theoretic interpretation. The assumption that this
can be done has to do, I believe, with the claim that there
is some given sharp divide between semantic features and syntactic
ones. I do not believe there is such a divide and I shall discuss
this further in Chapter 3«
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the model, a relator can have any number of argument-places
and these are considered to be ordered: first argument-place,
second argument-place, etc. Argument places are created and
ordered with one fell swoop by associating an order-marker,
together with perhaps other discriminators, with a focal.
Such an argument-place is then associated with a non-sub
to form a relator. Precisely how order-markers order arguments
is unclear, but it probably has to do with some form of primitive
(in the sense of "basic") structure building mechanism.
Argument-places could be viewed as place holders for arguments,
once present, which have been abstracted away. Such a view is
quite plausible, but it forms no part of the basic theory here
being developed. Formally, order-markers are specified as follows:
(9) Order-marker (o) A distinguished discriminator or collect
which is associated with a focal to form
an argument-place which may be associated
with a non-sub to form a relator. The
order-marker indicates and effects the
ordering of any argument associated with
the argument-place in respect of any
relator of which it is part. Order-markers
are, therefore, of various degrees, and
this may be indicated by adding subscripts
like so: o,, o_,...o , where o, is to be an1' 2' n' 1
argument-place marker for the first argument
of the relator, o^ for the second, and so on.
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For completeness, the formal specifications of argument-places,
relators, non-relators, and arguments can now be stated.
(10) Argument- An order-marker associated with a focal
place (ap)
together with some or no other discriminators.
(11) Relator (r) A non-sub associated with one or more
argument-places.
(12) Non-relator (nr) A non-sub which is not a relator.
(13) Argument (a) A relator or non—relator which is
associated with the argument—place
of a relator.
The difference in structural configuration that the presence
of ordered argument-places allows in the case of "cat chases dog"
and "dog chases cat" can be seen in figure 2.1.3, where ns^ is
"dog", nSg is "cat", ns, is "chases", ns^ is a relator and has
two argument-places, ap^ and apg. In .such circumstances,
7two structures can be built out of the three elements, ns^,
ns„, and ns„, the difference between them depending on whether
ns^ is associated with ap^ or ap^, nSg being associated in each
case with the remaining argument-place.
7 In fact by iteration an indefinitely large number of structures
can be built, for example, that corresponding to "cat chases dog
chases cat chases dog". Such iteration of non-subs will be
seen to be important later, but for the moment it may be ignored.
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Figure 2.1.5
It will be a convention of diagrams in the text that a single
pointed arrow will indicate that the thing on the blunt end
is the argument, whilst that on the sharp end is the argument-place.
So far in the model of the semantic apparatus there are
ways of associating discriminators to form collects, of associating
the sign-marker with a collect to form a sub, of associating a sub
with a non—sub to give the relationship of meaning, and of
associating non-subs with argument-places of other non-subs to
form non-neutral structures. Such a model is quite powerful,
but it fails to make one systematic distinction which is
present in the semantics of natural language and which has
far-reaching consequences concerning the notion of truth in the
model. I shall not have much to say concerning truth in this
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section since this will be dealt with more fully when considering
meaners existing in an ontologically richer world than W.
Rather, here I want to concentrate on a systematic distinction
made in the semantics of natural language, taking it for granted
that it is a distinction that the model must capture. This
distinction concerns that between proper nouns or, at least,
some proper nouns and common nouns.
There is a traditional distinction between particulars and
non—particulars or universals, and these notions are generally
g
explicated by saying that particulars are particular objects,
events, people, shadows, whereas non—particulars are properties
and qualities. The distinction between particulars and
non-particulars is captured in natural language by the distinction
between proper and common nouns. I am not, of course, claiming
that the distinction between particulars and non-particulars
is clear cut, nor am I claiming that there is a clear cut
distinction between proper and common nouns in natural language.
There are difficult areas when considering these notions, but,
at the same time, there do seem to be central cores of clear cases:
clear enough, at least, to make the distinctions important.
In the model so far presented, there is one systematic
distinction among non-subs and that is that between relators,
which have argument-places, and non-relators, which do not
g
See, for example, Strawson, 1959 : 15 > who states that he is
reiterating familiar philosophical uses.
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have argument—places. Since so far these are the only two
classes of non-subs, asked to say to which the general meanings
of the form classes of a natural language like English correspond,
one would have to plump for corresponding each form class with
either relators or non—relators. If the distinction between
proper nouns and common nouns is one that general semantics
wishes to capture in a completely general and systematic way
using only this twofold classification of non-subs, then either
proper nouns must correspond to relators and common nouns to
non—relators or proper nouns must correspond to non—relators
and common nouns to relators. To the extent that one can talk
about Pred CI in these terms, Pred CI adopts the latter course,
making common nouns correspond to predicates (one place
relations). Pred CI accomplishes this by identifying individuals
as primitives. This is done in two ways: First, Pred CI
contains proper names (usually indicated by small letters from
the beginning or middle of the alphabet) which are interpreted
as naming individuals. Second, Pred CI has variables (usually
indicated by small letters from the end of the alphabet) which
are interpreted as ranging over individuals. Common nouns are
then interpreted as predicates, taking as their arguments names
or variables. Hence to translate, "Some black dog exists" one
would have a formula of the form, "3x (Dx & Bx)" ("There is
at least one individual such that that individual is a dog
and that individual is black").
Pred CI is not in fact powerful enough to handle the semantics
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of natural language, and some kind of type theory which allows an
indefinite number of types, and hence an indefinite number of
types of constants and variables, is utilised in formal
semantics (cf. Montague 197'±» Dowty 198l). Nonetheless, it
remains the case in treatments involving type theories that
variables over individuals remain basic and common nouns are
treated as predicates. The relative success of formal semantics
might be taken as showing that common nouns ought to be treated
as predicates and, therefore, ought to correspond to relators in
the model of the semantic apparatus. Since I shall treat common
nouns differently, some comment is in order.
I know of no knock-down argument as to why common nouns
should not be treated as denoting predicates requiring
individuals as arguments, but the evidence, such as it is, does not
support such a treatment. Suppose one naively takes what is
going on in Pred CI and more sophisticated theories as indicating
that in the model of the semantic apparatus, common nouns should
correspond to relators (cnr) and individual variables to
non-relators (vnr) which could then be arguments for cnrs.
Now what evidence is there for vnrs? Language provides none:
no terms occur in language which correspond just to vnrs. The
terms, thing, individual, object are sometimes held out as
variables in natural language, but as with all common nouns
these are treated as predicates in Pred CI, so cannot be the
variables sought. But if language has nothing which corresponds
to vnrs, why do vnrs ever get associated with cnrs at all? The
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relation between cnrs and vnrs seems to be much closer than
their distinghishing suggests.
In addition to the lack of evidence for vnrs, there is
also a specific problem if they are introduced into the model.
It will be recalled that the justification for introducing
relators and arguments into the model was that it provided a
way of building significant structure. No restriction was placed
on which argument could be associated with which relator, for
however incongruous the result, significant structure resulted,
i.e. the relator unassociated with the argument is different to
the relator associated with that argument. But cnrs and vnrs
do not preserve this principle except when associated with each
other, for suppose a vnr were associated with a relator
corresponding to a verb, no significant structure results and
the verb relator is just as it was unassociated. Now all this
suggests that vnrs are of a different kind to other arguments
and not at all like the non-relators corresponding to proper
nouns as Pred CI would suggest.
Although these objections to the Pred CI interpretation of
common nouns in the model of the semantic apparatxis are not
conclusive, they arc sufficient to warrant a search for an
alternative which seems to jar less with the facts as presently
understood. To avoid the specific problem mentioned above, I
shall take it that both proper nouns and common nouns correspond
to non-relators in the model.
The assumption is now, then, that the general meanings
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of the form classes in English of proper nouns and common nouns
both correspond to non-relators in the model, in the sense that
heing a common noun or proper noun is at least being such that
the meanings of such elements will always turn out to be
non—relators for an associator. Such an assumption raises two
questions in particular: (l) Does the distinction between
relators and non—relators for non-subs correspond to any such
distinction in natural language semantics? (2) If the distinction
between particulars and non-particulars as partly mirrored in
natural language by the distinction between proper and common
nouns is an important one, how is the model to capture this?
The answer to question (l) is, I believe, a "Yes", but
it is difficult to make the distinction in precise terms. Both
proper and common nouns have to do with particulars in a way
that other form classes do not. Strawson (1959) brings out
something of this distinction in his threefold division of,
particulars, sortal universals, and characterising universals.
With reservations, Strawson says that particulars can be
referred to by the use of some proper names (: 16), sortal
universals can be introduced by the use of certain common
nouns (: 168), and that characterising universals can be
introduced by the use of certain verbs and adjectives (: 168).
According to Strawson:
A sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing
and counting individual particulars which it collects. It
presupposes no antecedent principle, or method of
individuating the particulars it collects. Characterising
universals, on the other hand, whilst they supply principles
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of grouping, even of counting, particulars, supply such
principles only for particulars already distinguished,
or distinguishable, in accordance with some antecedent
principle or method. (: 168)
The use of terms such as man, dog, hook, will introduce sortal
universals. Such sortal universals may he used to distinguish
and individuate particulars, so that it makes sense to say such
9
things as "Three men", "A dog", "The hook". In contrast,
terms such as run (verb), red (adjective) will introduce
characterising universals, and it does not make sense to say:
"Three red", or "The red", because the characterising universal,
red, (as opposed to the sortal one), requires that what is red
be distinguished apart from any distinguishing principle it
itself supplies. Hence one must talk of three red things or
items and of the red thing or item, where thing and item
introduce sortal universals. Some such distinctions as that
between particulars and sortal \iniversals on the one hand,
and characterising universals on the other seems to correspond
to that between non-relators and relators. However, it is
important to stress that the distinction between relators and
non-relators in the model is not based on such a correspondence,
but rather on the requirement for a way of forming well
defined structure. If the distinction chosen correctly describes
9
The articles are in fact ambiguous in these contexts, having
both a particularising (the intended reading above) and a
generic reading. Of generics, a little more will be said later.
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the semantic apparatus, then one might expect to find some
correlate in the semantics of natural language. Strawson's
division of sortal and characterising universals hints at what
this correlate might be.
In response to question (2), I introduce another marker,
called the particulariser. which is formally defined as:
(14) Particulariser (p) A distinguished discriminator or
collect associated with a non—relator
to indicate and effect that that
non-relator he taken as a particular.^
The particulariser allows non-relators to be divided into two
groups: those that are particular and those that are not.
Roughly, particular non-relators correspond to the general
meaning of proper nouns and non-particular non-relators to the
general meaning of common nouns.
Common nouns can be incorporated into phrases which themselves
are particular in the sense that they could be used to talk
about individuals. For example, the man, a woman (where the
article is particularising), one hundred soldiers, some dogs.
all cats, are all phrases which can be used to talk about
The use of the word particular here is perhaps in need of
some clarification. It is, of course, true that every collect
is particular in the sense that it is one thing rather than
another. However, particular as used in (14) and its opposite
non-narticular have to do only with whether the collect is
associated with the particulariser or not.
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individuals and one might, therefore, term them particular phrases.
The structures which correspond to the meanings of such phrases
in the model are particiilarised by the particulariser being
associated with the non-relators they contain. Hence, what is
usually a non—particular non-relator becomes a particular one
in the context of these structures. One is tempted to suppose
that what triggers this particularisation is the presence of
quantificational items, "the", "a", "some", "one hundred", "all",
in these structures hut this can hardly he the whole story since
some languages do not have articles, and even in English
quantifiers are not always overtly indicated. So neither in the
Latin sentence, "Vires ad urbem venerunt" nor in its English
translation, "Men came to the city" is there an overt quantifier
for "men", yet it is beyond doubt, I take it, that "men" is
particular. It seems reasonable in such cases to propose that
there is some suppressed quantifier, such as "some";
however, while this seems likely, the clues to there being
such a suppressed quantifier seem to be quite subtle since it
cannot he held in general that unquantified common nouns indicate
a suppressed quantifier because of generic"^ terms, or, more
^
What phenomena in semantics the term generic covers varies
from writer to writer. See Smith 1975 for a brief survey of
the scope of the term. Here I shall confine my attention to
the generic use of noun phrases and largely ignore another
important use of generic in generic tense. For some
interesting suggestions on the latter see Lawler 1972 and
Dahl 1975. The interaction between generic tense and the
generic use of noun phrases is unclear, hut it may he that they
have to go in parallel. The only example of a tense which
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accurately, of generic uses of terms. Generics form a puzzling
and difficult area to make sense of but they have some interest
here for the possible light they throw on the normally hidden
nature of the semantic apparatus and, for this reason, a short
digression to consider them may prove worthwhile.
By generic use of terms I mean the use that is made in (15) - (23)
of noun phrases, where no particular lions, children, or
sweets are being referred to.
(15) Lions are gregarious.
(16) A lion is gregarious.
(17) The lion is gregarious.
(18) Children like sweets.
(19) A child likes sweets.
(20) The child likes sweets.
(21) Dogs bark.
(22) A dog barks.
(23) The dog barks.
probably cannot have a generic meaning seems to be that of the
progressive, but even here there are doubts: can Lions are
being friendly at the moment have a generic reading? Surely
it can.Lyons (1977 • Vol.I, 19*0 suggests that generic
propositions, and hence, presumably the meanings of the
sentences that express them are tenseless, timeless and aspectless
and he claims that such examples as: "The dinosaur was a friendly
beast" do not refute this suggestion because the past tense is
not being used to imply that dinosaurs are no longer friendly
but rather that they are extinct. In the example chosen,
this may well be the case, but in examples of generics such
as "Children liked hoola hoops, but now they do not", such
a suggestion is not convincing.
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In construing the sentences with articles as generic, one
must take the articles in their non-particularising mode.
Examples (20) and (23) are perhaps somewhat unfamiliar in this
mode, though they seem acceptable after one or two repetitions.
12
Some writers suggest that the correct interpretations
of generic sentences of the forms (15) - (23) is that of
construing them as having suppressed universal quantifiers —
"all" in the case of plural nouns and "any" in the case of
13
singular nouns; hut such an interpretation, as other writers
have pointed out, does not do justice to the meaning of generics
This can he seen by considering (24).
(24) All children like sweets.
A statement of (24) could he refuted by finding just one child
who did not like sweets (and surely there are such children),
hut it does not seem to he the case at all that a statement of
(18) can he similarly refuted. If this is so, then it is
incorrect to suppose that (24) is a translation of (l8), and
whatever (18) means it does not mean "All children like sweets".
12
For example, Perlmutter 1970 in a long footnote, page 239ff,
and Kuno 1973> also in a lengthy footnote on page 42ff and
another footnote on page 44. As Smith (1975) remarks, much of
what is said about generics is contained in footnotes and asides
13
Smith, 1975, Lyons 1977* an(i Carlson 1977> for example.
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Now it might be claimed that whilst the meaning of (18)
does not contain the suppressed quantifier "all" it does,
nonetheless, contain a suppressed quantifier, such as "most"
or "majority", but I think that this can be shown to be wrong.
Consider the two expansions of (18) in (25) and (26).
(25) Children like sweets^, but some (children) don't.
(26) Most/the majority of children like sweets, but
some (children) don't.
(25) seems odd, whereas (26), though seemingly providing
superfluous information (because the use of most or the majority
already implies "not all"), is not at all odd in the same way.
However, if (18) did contain a suppressed quantifier, then (25)
should not be odd at all because it would be equivalent to (26).
One explanation for the peculiarity of (25) has already been
dismissed, viz, that there is a suppressed universal quantifier.
If indeed there were such a suppressed quantifier in (l8), then
this would account for the oddness of (25) as (27) testifies.
(27) All children like sweets, but some (children) don't.
Assuming, however, that the argument against (l8) having a
The use of sweets is generic here, but I shall not consider
it further in this discussion.
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suppressed universal quantifier is cogent—and I believe it to
be so— then another explanation is called for.
Tentatively, I suggest that the oddness of (25) derives from
the fact that the meanings of the two occurrences of children
are not co-extensive in the sense that the meaning of the first
occurrence of children is non-particular, whilst that of the
second occurrence is particular, being made so by the quantifier.
Thus children in its first occurrence in (2p) does not refer to
individual children, whereas in its second occurrence it does.
This difference appears to be captured by the traditional
15distinction between a term used collective^ to refer to a
class of objects and a term used distributively to refer to the
individual objects of that class; however, a class or collection
is just as much a particular as far as the model is concerned as
a table or chair. Taking class in a rather literal sense, (25)
then translates as (28) which, if it makes sense at all, does
not seem to mean what (25) means.
15 -Such a distinction has connections with the traditional
logical fallacies of composition and division. The fallacy of
composition occurs when, for example, one argues from being
able to lift every component of a car to being able to lift the
whole car. Here a property of the parts is taken to be a
property of the whole. The fallacy of division is the converse,
taking the property of the whole to he a property of each part.
See Copi 1978 for some details of these fallacies.
There are also connections here with the mereology developed
by Lesniewski in response to Russell's paradox of the class of
all classes. See Luschei 1962.
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(28) The class of children likes sweets, but some (children)
don't.
Carlson (1977) considers in detail and rejects the notion
of some tuirealised quantifier in generics involving what are
known as hare plurals, (l5)» (18), (2l), for example. As an
alternative, he proposes that generic bare plurals be interpreted
as referring to kinds. Hence, a gloss of (21) would be something
like "This kind of animal barks". A kind, for Carlson, is
realised by objects which in turn are realised by stages. A
series of stage may be related to an object and a set of objects
may be related to a kind (: 117)- Both a kind and an object
for Carlson are what bind, on the one hand, objects together,
and, on the other hand, stages together.
Carlson is working within a general framework of truth-
conditional semantics and within a particular form of it called
Montague grammar, which uses type theory as a basis for an
intensional logic. Carlson demonstrates that taking bare plurals
(whether generic or not) to refer to kinds allows a formalisable^ more
or less uniform account of bare plurals to be given. However,
as useful and suggestive as Carlson's proposals are, they are
philosophically limited in the sense that we are no clearer
about the truth conditions for kind terms than we are about
the truth conditions for generic ones. What I want to suggest is
that the very uniformity that Carlson seeks may not in fact
exist and that true generic statements (not just those involving
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bare plurals) may have as their chief characteristic that they are
not candidates for truth, i.e. they do not, taken at face value,
have truth conditions. Such truth conditions as are assigned
to them rely, I suggest, on reinterpretation. Because generic
statements lack truth conditions, however, it does not follow
that they lack meaning. The wedge between truth and meaning,
here inserted, will be driven deeper in chapter 4.
It was suggested above that the first occurrence of
children in (25) was non-particular, i.e. that its meaning did
not have associated with it the particulariser. Now roughly, and
pre-empting the more careful formulation given in chapter 4,
one may say that what can be non-analytically true or false is a
representation of something. The representation will be true if
it represents truly and false otherwise.What is represented
must be particular for otherwise there will be nothing which
can sanction the truth of the representation because everything
that occurs is a particular.
Now if it is the case that the true characterisation
of the meanings of generics is that they are non—particular, then
it will be the case that statements containing generically used
noun phrases will not and cannot be judged true or false, i.e.
they simply are not the right type of thing of which such
There are a whole host of problems here as the reader will
recognise, but these, I believe, are circumvented in chapter 4
and the reader is asked to be indulgent until then.
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judgements are made. The consequence of such a view is that
statements of any of (l5) - (23) can he neither true nor false,
and at first glance these seems to he clear evidence against
such a view, since one normally takes such statements as
things which can have a truth value. If one looks, however,
at what happens when such statements are judged true or false,
then it seems that a reinterpretation of them occurs and what
is judged true or false is not the original statement hut an
altered, and particularised, form of it. In the case of (18),
for example, quantifiers such as all, some, most or qualifying
phrases such as on the whole, in general are introdiiced. Such
introduced items have one thing in common, they all serve to
particularise the meaning of children so that a judgement as to
the truth and falsity of the statement can he made. Indeed, the
reinterpretation may sometimes involve talking ahout the species
or kind of something, rather than the individuals, hut this is
far from saying that all hare plurals should be so reinterpreted
as Carlson seems to.
If such a view of generics is correct, then there are
three important consequences: First, statements involving
generics cannot have a truth value and, hence, this is one
way in which generics can he detected. Second, it is mistaken
to attempt to translate generic statements into statements
which do or could have a truth value, since no such translation
could render equivalent meanings. Third and perhaps most
important, generic terms give us a direct glimpse of the semantic
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apparatus in the sense that they are the pure manifestation of
the non-particular non-relator.
The meanings of generic statements can he viewed in this
scheme of things as a possible product of the semantic apparatus,
but one which in terms of usual statement meanings is incomplete
in that it lacks the possibility of having a truth value. The
question then arises as to why language utilises generics, given
their defectiveness in this respect. One can only guess at an
answer, but there may be a number of reasons which conspire to
preserve their usage. Their construction parallels constructions
in other non-generic statements and, hence, usage may be
preserved by analogy. Thus, Lions are coming is very similar
to Lions are gregarious, but the first is not generic whilst
the second is. Here I dissent from Lyons' (1977) use of
generic in generic reference. His examples of this
(vo1. 1 : 309) are:
(29) It is man that is responsible for environmental pollution.
(30) Men have lived on this island for ten thousand years.
Lyons claims that man in (29) and men in (30) are used as generic
referring expressions. But if they were generic in the sense
employed here, then they would be non-particular and, hence,
could not refer. At the same time, of course, statements of
(29) and (30) without alteration could not be true or false if
they were generic, but it seems to me that they are perfectly
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capable of having a truth value and so are not generic. Thus
Lyons' use of generic in generic reference is not to be
confused with the use of generic here, for if it were
17lions in Lions are coming would be generic . Another reason
why generics may be preserved in language is that they are
very easily modified to non—generics and, therefore, their
peculiarity is readily explained away by some paraphrase.
One possible objection to treating generic terms as
non—particular arises in connection with a distinction of
two types of generics made by Smith (1975). He exhibits two
paradigms (op. cit. : 28, 29) of generics which he claims
distinguishes two kinds of generics. The important examples
from these paradigms are (3l)a and (pl)^ from the first
paradigm and (32)a and (32)b from the second paradigm.
(31 )a the squid lives on seaweed,
b a squid lives on seaweed.
(32)a the dodo is extinct.
*b a dodo is extinct.
(31 )a, (3l)b, and (32)11 are all generic for Smith, but (32)b
is not only not generic, but, according to Smith, is not even
17
Lyons' use of generic comes close to meaning "unspecified"
in (30) because the men who did the living were actual individual
men but it is not specified which men they were.
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an acceptable English sentence. The difference between the
types of generic exhibited in (3l) and (32) arises because in
(31) "... the expression 'lives on seaweed' is predicated of
each arbitrary member of the class of squids"| whereas in
(32) "...the expression 'is extinct' is predicated of the
class qua class" (op. cit. : 29). It is this difference,
according to Smith, which causes (32)b but not (3l)b to be
unacceptable.
Now both Smith's use of arbitrary member and class qua class
might be taken to argue for an interpretation of generics which
involves particulars. In respect to (31), which I take to be
truly generic in the sense employed here, Smith appears to be
trying to smuggle in universal quantification, as may be seen
by considering (33) and its equivalent ( 3'± ) •
(33) Each arbitrary member of the class of squids
lives on seaweed.
(3M Any squid (you care to mention) lives on seaweed.
But both (33) and (3'i) are refuted by finding one squid that
does not live on seaweed, whereas (31)a and (31)b are not so
refuted. The argument here, of course, is that (3l)a and
(31)b could not be refuted in any event because they are not
candidates in their present form for truth values.
Concerning (32), I want to argue that this paradigm is
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not a generic paradigm at all, and that this explains the
peculiarity of (32)b. The first thing to notice about (32)a
is that one live dodo falsifies it: one cannot maintain that
the dodo is extinct faced with a live dodo. Hence, unlike (3l)>
counter—examples cannot be tolerated. (32)a, then, can have a
truth value and this suggests that it is interpreted straight
away as a quantified sentence, such as, Every dodo is extinct.
Why should this be?, One possibility is this: extinction
is a definite event, a particular, and what is extinct must
have been, and so must have been a particular or partictilars.
On such a view, it is not surprising that (32)a should
immediately be taken to be about particulars, all the particular
dodos. (32)b, then, is odd because it is not generic but has
the form of a generic.
Examples like (32)a would suggest that whether the
particulariser is associated with the meaning of a common noun
depends on rather complex considerations. Such examples also
indicate that the definite article is not just ambiguous as
between indicating particularisation and non-particularisation
but also with respect to indicating universal quantification.
This conclusion is necessitated by the consideration that (32)a
means unequivocally, "All dodos are extinct" or "Every dodo is
extinct".
The tentative claim so far has been that generic
statements are non-particular and as such cannot have a truth
value. There seem, however, to be counter-examples to this
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claim. Consider, as one such counter-example, (35).
(35)a Bachelors are unmarried,
b The bachelor is unmarried.
In the relevant sense of bachelor statements of (35) are all
true, and hence have truth values. Therefore, it would seem
that either (35) is not generic or generics can, after all,
have truth values. I reject the first possibility and concede
that (35) is generic. I also accept that statements of (35)
are true, but what I wish to point out is that a special kind
of truth is involved. (35) exemplifies what are usually
called analytic truths. Unlike (32), there is no question of
going out into the world and finding a married bachelor
(in the relevant sense of bachelor) as a counterexample to
(35)> there just could not be such an individual given that
bachelor means what it does. Thus while statements of (35)
are true they are not truths about the world (contingent truths)
but truths in virtue of the meaning of the terms. Contingent
truth carries with it the implication of particulars; analytic
truth has no such implication. It is for this reason that
generic statements can be analytically true or false: such
analytic truth values do not depend on particulars.
In view of examples such as (35)» a more careful
characterisation of generics needs to be made: Generic
statements are statements which cannot have a contingent truth
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value, though they may, but need not, have an analytic truth
value.
Adding the particulariser to the model of the lonely
meaner allows a systematic difference in the meanings of
common and proper nouns to be captured, while at the same
time suggesting a solution to the puzzling phenomenon of
some generics. As yet, however, the model is not powerful
enough to meet its criterion, viz. that it be able to handle
the semantics of natural language. Some of these inadequacies
will be removed as the model is developed in ensuing chapters.
The relation of the semantic apparatus to language will be
considered in the next chapter, whilst negation will be looked
at in chapter 4, and sense relations in chapter 5. Enough of
the model has already been constructed, however, to make evident
that if Wittgenstein's arguments against private language are
convincing, then the course adopted here of seeing the key to
meaning as being the individual meaner is a gross mistake.
Before turning to a consideration of the private language
argument, however, there is another general criticism of the
model that might be raised and it will be as well to forestall
this at this point.
In setting out the basic mechanisms of the semantic apparatus,
I have been concerned to construct a model which could capture
the meanings and meaning relationships of the semantics of
any language (including, natural language). However, in its
very capacity, its general capacity, to do this it may be
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objected that there is a weakness: the weakness of being too
general, of being equally able to handle the semantic structures
18
associated with Jane wore a green dress and The of of the of
with the same facility. But such an objection confuses the
aims of grammarians with those of general semantics. A
grammarian seeks to establish what is grammatical for a
particular language at a particular time; however, all that is
ungrammatical and all that will ever be ungrammatical that
can be talked about will be utterable and will correspond to
semantic structures or fragments of a structure or structures.
The fact that such structures or fragments of structures do
not make sense is no bar to their existing. Indeed, if they
did not or could not exist, then what would it mean to say
that something made no sense or was nonsense? The semantic
apparatus has a capacity to generate both sense and nonsense
and the fact that humans, as possessors of realisations of
the semantic apparatus, can utter both sense and nonsense
bears witness to this. This is the serious point in the joke
about the linguist who claims that an utterance, x, in a language,
y, is not possible despite his constant uttering of it.
A nonsense "sentence" coined by Sampson 1975.
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2.2 General Semantics and the Private Language Debate.
Ludwig Wittgenstein held and argued forcefully that there
could not he a private language. The model of a meaner
presented in the previous section suggests that, under certain
definitions of private language, there could indeed he a private
language. Arguments against the possibility of private language
may, therefore, be seen as an argument against the view
expressed in the last section, and for this reason some
comments are in order at this point.
Since language itself has not been discussed in the
previous section, it would be as well to make it clear where
the model that has so far been presented bears on language.
To the extent that language involves meaning, then to that
extent language involves the semantic apparatus which the
model attempts to describe. Without the semantic
apparatus, there would be no meaning. It does not follow, of
course, that the semantic aj)paratus itself provides sufficient,
conditions for there to be language, but since virtually all
of the private language debate is in terms of meaning in
language, its relevance to the position adopted here cannot be
in question.
Rather than introduce yet a further interpretation of
Wittgenstein's position regarding the impossibility of a
private language, I shall use two somewhat different
interpretations presented by authors who have strong views on
what Wittgenstein meant. The authors were chosen for their
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reasonable clarity and their different viewpoints, but no
claim is made that they by any means cover the complete
spectrum of views on Wittgenstein's position. This they
certainly do not do since they are both what might be called
pro-no-private-language interpretations. But then it is only right
and reasonable to consider views which appear to be the
least favourable to our model.
We begin by considering Anthony Kenny's interpretation
of Wittgenstein on private language (1973). Kenny holds
that a private language in Wittgenstein's sense is one
whose words refer to what can only be know by the person
speaking such a language, that is, such words refer to sensations
or experiences which are private to the experiencer and
cannot be otherwise. If one accepts that experiences and
sensations are private, then the possibility arises that
when I use the word red I mean"red" but that when you use it
you mean "green". This in turn leads to a scepticism about my
being able to know what you mean. Kenny claims that it is
part of Wittgenstein's purpose to refute this kind of
scepticism. It is important to note that the scepticism
involved here is an epistomological scepticism: the problem
is not that you could not have the same meaning for words as
I do, but that I could not know that you do have the same
or a different meaning.
Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of private in respect
of sensations or experiences. Kenny labels these different
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senses as inconimunicab 1 e and inalienable. According to Kenny,
a sensation is incommunicable if only the experiencer can know
about it. A sensation is inalienable if only I can have my
sensation. Kenny's view is that Wittgenstein denies both
that sensations are incommunicable and that they are inalienable.
Denying that the particular sensation of pain is incommunicable
involves denying the disjunction that I can know that I am in
pain or other people cannot know that I am in pain. Wittgenstein
maintains, according to Kenny, that the first disjunct, viz
"I can know that I am in pain", can only be uttered as a joke
because it is inconceivable that I could doubt that I was in
pain if I was in pain, and where there is no possibility of
doubt, there is no sense in talking of knowledge. The
second disjunct is rejected on the ground that I can know
that you are in pain if, for instance, I see you fall into
a fire, and whilst you may pretend to be in pain, it is
senseless to imagine that young children and animals feign
pain. There are, of course, many objections to these reasons
for rejecting the disjuncts, but here I am only concerned
to give Kenny's interpretation of Wittgenstein's position in
order to see where it does or does not bear on the question
of the semantic apparatus.
On the question of inalienability of sensations, and
in particular pain, Kenny is much less clear. Kenny claims
that Wittgenstein holds that the possessor of pain, that is,
the one that feels pain, is the one that gives or could give
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expression to it. My pains need not be restricted to my body.
Wittgenstein conceives that it is possible that I could have
my pain in your body. For Wittgenstein, the questions:
(i) Whose pain is it? (ii) How do we identify pain? must
be kept separate, for if we allow that the identity of a pain
involves its possessor, then there is no possibility that I
can have your pain or you mine. Kenny finishes discussing
inalienability by holding that Wittgenstein maintained that
pain had no special inalienability. This is a rather cryptic
way of putting the matter, but I take it that Kenny is saying
that Wittgenstein denied the inalienability of sensations.
We move on to what Kenny regards as "the kernel of the
private—language argument". This concerns Wittgenstein's
consideration of a private-language user keeping a diary in
which is recorded occurrences of some private sensation. We
are to imagine, according to Kenny, that a sensation S is
called S_ by its experiencer, and each time S occurs the
experiencer records S in a diary. Now the difficulty for
the experiencer is, as Kenny sees it, not remembering rightly
the sensation S, but rather remembering rightly what _S means.
In order to give meaning to S_, the experiencer must use
memory, that is, the memory of having associated S_ with S.
But suppose, as 'Wittgenstein did, that memory deceives, how
can the experiencer check that he has the right memory in
respect of S? Since all public criteria are denied in the
private language case, only memory is left, and if this
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cannot be relied on then the experiencer can't be said to
know what he means from one instant to another, that is, he has
no way of maintaining constancy of meaning even if not desiring
to do otherwise.
It may be felt that the diary argument would infect public
language to the same extent that it infects private language,
but in the case of public language, it is claimed, users can
correct each other. This, of course, is not satisfactory
because each would—be corrector has to rely on memory and this
could deceive. This is a difficulty that Kenny does not pursue,
but Wittgenstein certainly offers a solution and we shall look
at an interpretation of his soltition when considering another
author's view on Wittgenstein in a moment.
We need now to consider the consequences of the private-
language argument as depicted by Kenny in relationship to our
model. The fact that our associator is alone in the universe
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a language, L,
using such a semantic apparatus is a private language. Firstly,
19
we need to ask if meanings in L would be incommunicable in
principle, that is, if there were other associators around,
could such associators plus whatever other apparatus, if any,
is needed for knowing, know whatever our associator suitably
19 What precisely is communicated is somewhat problematic.
Kenny talks of "incommunicable sensations" which is, perhaps,
a little odd, but incommunicable meaning seems similarly odd.
This oddness goes away, I suggest, if one construes communicate
in these contexts as meaning something like "share".
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adapted could know? In the everyday sense of the word know,
I believe the answer is "Yes". This stems from the fact that
we have correspondence in apparatus (cf. Wittgenstein's
sharing a form of life), and the possibility of external objects
creating stimuli. So if an external object creates a stimulus
in one associator, then there is the possibility that it will
stimulate the very same type of discriminators in another
associator. This possibility is enough to refute the claim
that meanings in L are intrinsically incommunicable.
If we eqviate sensations with stimulations, then we can
ask if stimulations are inalienable. It should be clear that
the answer will be identical to that for pains. If we make
the possessor part of the identity specification for
stimulations, then stimulations are inalienable. If we don't
then we could imagine, as Wittgenstein appears to do with
sensations, that a stimulation could occur in one associator
and invoke a sub in another. Whether we would accept such
a possibility would depend on a careful examination of underlying
metaphysical principles. The same is true, I suspect, of
Wittgenstein's position. The case of inalienability of
stimulations is, then, like that of sensations, an open one.
The diary-keeper argument, unlike those of incommunicability
and inalienability, sajrs that the accidental property of there
being no other associators is enough to deny the possibility
of language because a single associator could not maintain
constancy of meaning. The diary-keeper argument if successful
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refutes the possibility of any language, private or potentially
public, in the case of a single associator. Now we can see at
once that the semantic apparatus could malfunction, the
association between sub and non-sub could be erased by such
a malfunction and the old association so obliterated that no
trace of the original association remain. All this is, I think,
perfectly possible and it would be true in such a case that the
sub concerned had no meaning. It could also happen that a
malfunction caused that very sub to be associated with
another non-sub. The sitxiation is now parallel to a memory
which deceives. It certainly is not the case that the apparatus
malfunctions all the time, no more than it could be the case
that ALL the money in the world was forged and we did not
possess at least a description of what non—forged money was like.
For something to malfunction or to be a forgery there must be
things, or at least a description of things, which don't
malfunction all the time or which are not forgeries; otherwise
20
the terms malfunction and forgery become meaningless . But
Wittgenstein's point seems to be that whatever thing operated
with our semantic apparatus it would have no way of telling
whether or not there had been a malfunction and, hence, no way of
20
This, of course, is using Wittgenstein's argument about know
against his position as depicted by Kenny. 'Wittgenstein
maintained that it makes no sense to speak of knowing unless
there can be doubting. Know used in such circumstances is just a joke.
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telling whether the meaning of a sub now was what it was
before. But why should this matter? It matters because the
hallmark of language is that it is a rule-following activity.
This rule following extends to meaning in the sense that a
sub means a particular non-sub unless this is specifically
changed, that is, the meaning rules can be changed, but there
are still rules.
The notion of rule in Wittgenstein as Kenny makes clear
(although not in reference to the private-language argument),
is complicated. Wittgenstein sees a rule as being a practice
or custom, able to be repeated in an indefinite number of
cases. In order to be said to be following a rule, one has
to be aware when one is following the rule and when one is
not following it. The point about the diary-keeper argument
is that the diary-keeper cannot be said to know whether he
is following a rule with regard to S_ and S since he can only
aupeal to memory and by assumption memory deceives. Let us
summarise the diary-keeper argument as follows:
(1) All language, including the meaning component, involves
rule-following behaviour.
(2) To follow a rule it is necessary to be aware when one
breaks the rule.
(3) The diary-keeper could have a memory which deceives him.
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(4) Memory is the only possible check one could have
on a rule in the case of a private language.
(5) Therefore the diary-keeper cannot he said to be
following rules since his memory could be playing
a trick on him so that he thinks he is following
a rule when he is not.
(6) Therefore the diary-keeper does not have a private
language because language involves following rules.
It is not suggested that the above set of premisses and
conclusions accurately reflects Wittgenstein's position.
Indeed, there is considerable difficulty in and contention
about formulating Wittgenstein's argument (see in particular
A \
Castaneda, Chappell, and Thomson in Jones 1971J• The point
of setting out the argument in this way is to see the sort of
refutation that would be necessary if one is going to insist
that a private language is possible. It majr be worth
emphasising again here that the diary—keeper argument in
respect of a single associator is a claim that the
associator could not form part of a "language machine"
even though the privacy of the language would be accidental
rather than logical. This follows from the fact that the
only check on whether a meaning rule between sub and non-sub
is being followed is the associative link itself, and this
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is not logically infallible.
To reject the argument as formulated, we need to reject
at least one of the premisses of the inferences. Premiss (l)
has fairly wide acceptance. The precise nature of a rule is
a matter of debate, but the general notion of language being
rule governed seems beyond reasonable doubt. To see this in
respect of meaning, consider a case where every time you say
blue I give this a different meaning, sometimes it's "red",
other times "house" or "car", and I do not realise that I
do this. For me, blue could be just what comes into my head,
but I never realise that the last time I heard it it meant
something different to me. Now extend this to all words and
language seems to disappear because the line between language
and non-language cannot then be drawn. So premiss (l) is
acceptable.
Premiss (2) can be justified too. An organism could
exhibit a regular pattern of behaviour and we may be inclined
to say that the organism was following some rule or other, but
the regular pattern of behaviour in itself does not provide
firm evidence (although statistically it may provide some
evidence) that a rule is being followed. The regular pattern
of behaviour might just be a coincidence. We can only talk
of a rule being followed where the organism becomes aware
(in some sense of aware - this sense may mean no more than
record) that its regular pattern of behaviour is not being
followed, that is to say, that we can only speak of a rule
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where it can he said that this occurrence is not that
occurrence: if there is no comparing of occurrences (of
behaviour or internal state or the like), then it does not
make sense to talk of rules. Therefore premiss (2) is acceptabl
Premiss (3) is straightforward and I think acceptable.
It surely is logically possible that memory could deceive.
We need, of course, to note the qualification mentioned
earlier in respect of deceive. Memory could not deceive
all the time otherwise it would not be deceiving. This point
has, I believe, important implications.
Premiss (4) follows from the fact that if the diary-keeper'
language refers to logically private meanings, then only
memory could provide the evidence for the current meaning
being that of the past meaning of some word or symbol. Thus
premiss (4) too is acceptable.
Turning to the conclusion at (5)» we need to note carefully
its conditional nature. Memory MAY be deceiving and therefore
the diary-keeper MAY think he is following a rule when in fact
he is not, but, equally, memory MAY NOT be deceiving and the
diary-keeper MAY think he is following a rule and in fact be
doing so. Thus it is not the case that the diary-keeper cannot
be said to follow rules at all, but rather it is a situation,
where he sometimes thinks he is following rules but is not.
Because the diary-keeper is wrong (without, of course, being
aware of it) some of the time this does not, and in view of
the qualification on premiss (4) cannot, mean that he is wrong
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all of the time. A likely riposte to this is that since the
diary-keeper will not be aware of his memory deceiving him,
he will not be aware of when he is following rules or not.
This is true but alters nothing since the position will be
that the diary-keeper will think that he is following rules
all the time. Mien his memory deceives him then he will
think wrongly: when it does not, he will think rightly and
in fact be able to tell whether he is following a rule or not.
But, it may still be argued, even when his memory is deceiving
him, the diary—keeper will claim that he is following a rule
correctly when in fact he is not; so doesn't this show that
the notion of correctness or Tightness, and hence rule
following, is meaningless in this context? If context is
restricted to those times when the diary-keeper's memory
is deceiving him, then to talk of following a rule is indeed
meaningless because whatever concurs with what memory provides
in the way of a check will be seen as correct; but the fallacy
occurs if one extends context to periods when the diary keeper's
memory is not deceiving. To insist that because the diary-keeper
is sometimes wrong about following a rule, he cannot be said
to follow rules at all, is to introduce a doctrine of
infallibility into the private language argument. Nobody, I
take it, is proposing that.
The conclusion at (6) does not now follow, and the
most that does seem to follow is that at times parts or
conceivably all of the diary-keeper's language will be either
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not language at all or the first occasion on which a new
rule is used.
What this means in terms of the semantic apparatus discussed
in the last section is that if a malfunction disassociates
entirely a sub and non-sub, then that sub will have no meaning;
and if a malfunction changes the sub or non-sub in an
association, then from then on the meaning of that sub will be
whatever non-sub it is associated with.
I want to turn now to a rather different interpretation of
Wittgenstein's private language argument. This is the one
expressed in Kripke 1982. Indeed, Kripke's views are so
different from other interpretations of Wittgenstein that
Ronald Suter (1978) calls such a view a Saul Wittgenstein one.
It is no part of my intention, however, to consider the
faithfulness of Kripke's interpretation. Rather I wish to
consider very briefly his argument on its own merits.
Kripke's view is interesting, it seems to me, because of
a particular conclusion it leads to. This conclusion amounts
to saying that language does not after all involve following
rules, at least not in the way we have used this phrase to date.
Kripke, it is true, still regards language as a rule-following
activity, but this only goes through, I believe, if the notion
of a rule is changed substantially. To see how this position
comes about I need to outline Kripke's argument.
Kripke takes as an example of a rule that of addition,
but he intends his argument to apply in particular to linguistic
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rules. Kripke argues for what he calls the sceptical paradox.
He identifies two functions: normal addition - the plus
function - and quaddition - the quus function - which is like
addition hut for any addition where both arguments are greater
than or equal to a certain number the answer is 5« For
argument's sake he takes this number to he 57. Now we are to
suppose that I meet for the first time the sum 57 + 68, to which
I offer the answer 125. A sceptic rejoins, however, that I
have no evidence that my answer should be 125 since it could
equally he the case that in the past I have been using the
quus function in reality and not the plus function at all
(on the assumption that I have never added together numbers
greater than 56 - nothing rests on the particular number,
of course). In such a situation Kripke claims, not only can I
not produce any evidence that I have in the past been doing
addition instead of quaddition, but, indeed, there is no such
evidence available even to an omniscient god, that is, there
is no fact of the matter: all my past states and behaviour
have been entirely consistent with my carrying out quaddition.
Hence I don't know whether I am following a particular rule
or not. Kripke, of course, presents this argument in some
detail and considers and rejects a number of objections to it;
however, here, I am not going to consider these details, but
simply accept Kripke's argument and see where it leads.
The essential difference between the diary-keeper's
argument and Kripke's is that whereas in the former the
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argument relies on (to the extent it is supported by) imperfections
in memory, in the latter it matters not at all that memory be
imperfect since Kripke's argument does not involve a memory
that deceives at all. Let memory be one hundred percent
reliable, it is still the case on Eripke's view that an
individual cannot be following a rule. This follows from the
fact that according to Kripke, there is no fact of the matter
concerning which rule was being followed in the past:
therefore, there is nothing for memory to remember.
So the individual cannot be said to follow a rule. True,
the behaviour of that individual may accord with a rule but
then so does a stone tossed into the air in respect of
gravity. Can the language community then be said to follow
rules? No, because who would or indeed could be the keeper
of the rules. I cannot, according to Kripke, follow a rule,
nor can you, nor can anybody else. But there are language
communities, so language cannot be a rule-following activity.
IIow then is language possible?
Kripke's answer is that when I give the answer 125 to the
sum 57 + 68 I am answering as the plus rule strikes me at that
moment. If the way the rule strikes me at that moment accords
with the way it strikes you and perhaps other people at that
same moment then I have got the "male" right. In other words,
language depends on agreement at the time of use between
individuals. This agreement Kripke calls a brute fact which
we must accept. He suggests that this is connected with
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Wittgenstein's "forms of life". By the use of the word brute
Kripke is suggesting that we should not look for an
explanation of this fact because there isn't one. Whether
Wittgenstein meant this by forms of life is like many things
in Wittgenstein open to debate (cf. Black's suggestion (1978 : 330)
that by such a term Wittgenstein may have been marking unexplored
rather than no-go territory.)
Now as mentioned earlier, Kripke still wants to talk about
a language community as following rules, but this, I feel, is
very misleading. What Kripke aims to show is that there are no
rules in the sense discussed earlier. Having purported to do
this, Kripke then uses rule in a new or, at least, very
different way. Following a rule for Kripke then becomes not
knowingly conforming to some past behaviour pattern but a
coincidence of behaviour patterns. Kripke has moved from
following a rule to merely according with a rule, and in the
latter case rule is really a term in the metadescription.
If it is the case that Kripke has show that rule-following
behaviour is not a criterion of language, then if he has show
that individuals cannot follow rules, then this is no bar to a
private language. If it is a brute fact that the language-community
members nearly always agree, then it will surely be the case
that an individual with his ow language will nearly always be
"right" in his use of language unless it can be show that such
an individual stops being so agreeable when deprived of companions.
Further, on Kripke's view, being wrong seems to amount to
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exhibiting linguistic behaviour not in accord with one's fellows.
Now if my linguistic behaviour is wrong, in this sense, on a
Monday, then it seems logically possible that the language
community could adopt this very behaviour on a Tuesday, and
then it would be right and not wrong. Hence, no particular
linguistic behaviour is absolutely wrong, only relatively
wrong with respect to one's language community. The
individual with a private language cannot be relatively wrong
in this way, but why should the possibility of being relatively
wrong be seen as a criterion of language now that this notion of
being wrong is divorced from that of following a rule? Kripke
offers no evidence. In closing, I want to suggest that this is
so because its being possible to be relatively wrong is not a
criterion of language in Kripke's sense at all; it is a
consequent of his explanation of how public language is possible.
If Kripke shows that language is not a rule following activity
(in the usual sense of rule) then there is no difficulty at all
with private language, but, on such a view of language, an
explanation of how public language is possible becomes necessary.
Public language is to be explained in such a case by a
coincidence of linguistic behaviour. This has the consequence
that it is now possible for an individual to be linguistically
relatively wrong. Because being possible to be relatively
wrong is a consequent of public language, it does not follow
that it must be a consequent of private language.
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There remains much to say about private language as the
very wide literature on the subject hears witness, hut it is
hoped that what has been said is sufficient to indicate that
at the very least the argument against private language is open
to a number of substantial objections, some of which have been
mentioned above.
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3. The Semantic Apparatus and Language
In chapter 2, a criterion for the semantic apparatus was
set up, viz. that it he powerful enough to handle the semantics
of natural language; however, little was said about the
relationship of language to the semantic apparatus or indeed
about the nature of language itself as perceived in the
present approach. This chapter is intended to correct this
deficiency.
3.0 Additional Assumptions on What There Is.
In section 2.1, a highly impoverished world, W, was
posited. So impoverished, indeed, that in the end W
contained only an associator, a lonely meaner. The purpose
of considering the lonely meaner was to emphasise that the
semantic apparatus is logically presupposed by language,
reference, and truth, by showing that considerable progress
could be made in its description without considering in any
detail the latter notions. In practice, of course, these
latter notions were always in mind, being the only tangible
evidence available for the semantic apparatus. From here on,
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the world of W is enriched to contain all those things in our
world which most of us take as facts: language; reference;
truth; other associators, including humans; causation; and the
myriad of concrete objects, such as planets, trees and mountains
which we generally accept litter the universe. ¥hen not wishing
to discriminate among these assumptions, I shall lump them
altogether and speak of the assumption of external objects.
Here, it is intended that external be taken in a sense given
by Ayer (1956 : 127; 1973 : 83). This sense is that such
objects are inferred as being the causes of sense data.
However, in place of sense data I wish to put a particular
state of discriminators: the state of being stimulated. It is
not implied by this substitution that sense data are in fact
discriminators in a particular state and it is not intended
that the theory here being developed should be viewed as
saying something about sense data. Rather, Ayer's sense of
external is taken in this vay: In the semantic apparatus,
discriminators may be in various states, one of which is the
state of being stimulated. It is inferred that this state is
induced by some object or objects; however, all that is present
in the apparatus are stimulated discriminators, hence, the
inference that there is some object causing the state goes
beyond the ontology of the apparatus. The assumption that
there are external objects, objects which cause this state in
discriminators, amounts to the claim that such inferences are
usually correct. The qualifying usually is important. The
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apparatus might malfunction and discriminators become stimulated
when there is no causal agent other than the discriminators
themselves. It is this very possibility^ that makes the
existence of external objects an inference.
Above, for the sake of clarity, I have spoken rather loosely
about external objects caiising the stimulated state of
discriminators in a direct manner. More carefully it should
be said that such causation might be mediated by various sensory
organs rather than the causative influences of the external
objects acting directly on discriminators. This having been
said, I shall, for brevity, often talk in the looser way.
There are two ways in which a discriminator may become
stimulated (a) Via its associative" links with other
discriminators. (b) By means other than those involving
associative links. This latter way may appear somewhat vague,
but (a) and (b) set out precisely the dichotomy required here
and I shall not speculate on what means are involved when
associative links are not. Suffice it to say, that I assume
that it is possible for external objects to stimulate (via sense
organs, etc.) discriminators by means other than the use of
^
In philosophy this is known widely as the argument from illusion.
Once one admits that it is possible to hallucinate and to see,
hear, touch, or smell, something which is not in fact there, then
one seems committed to concede that even when something is there,
one's knowledge of it is indirect in some manner and that it is
the malfunction of the mediating substance which is responsible
for the hallucination. For various formulations of the argument
from illusion, see Ayer 19;i0, 1956, and 1973.
2
It will be recalled that the hallmark of association is that it
affords access from one item of an association to all the others
in that association.
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associative links. If this were not the case, then prior to
association a discriminator could not he stimulated.
Pretheoretically, hoth stimulation via associative links
and non-associative stimulation are stimulation, but a great deal
will in fact turn on distinguishing these two, and for clarity I
shall retain the name stimulation for the latter and call the
former invocation. The verbs stimulate and invoke are to share
the restrictions on their congeners. Stimulation is now to be
specified as follows:
(l) Stimulation The stimulation of a discriminator,
discriminators, or collects other than by
association. Stimulations are distinctive
and ordered.
In contradistinction to stimulation, there is invocation which is
specified in (2). The terms stimulata and invocata are borrowed
from Latin and will be defined shortly.
(2) Invocation The stimulation of a discriminator,
discriminators, collects, stimulata or
invocata via associative links.
Invocations are distinctive and ordered.
With both stimulation and invocation it is now possible for
discriminators to be in one of four states: (i) being stimulated;
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(ii) being invoked; (iii) being both stimulated and invoked;
(iv) being neither stimulated nor invoked. States (i), (ii) and
(iv) are clear enough, but (iii) may cause a moment's disquiet
since it appears that a discriminator may be in two different
states at the same time. There is no real difficulty, however,
once it is appreciated that the states as described are not
mutually exclusive unless their description says so. Hence,
a discriminator cannot be in the state of both being invoked
and not being invoked, but it can be in a state of being both
invoked and stimulated. A simple analogy may make this clearer.
Suppose one likens the discriminator to a glass box in which
there are two lights, one red, one green. If one then likens
the red light being on to stimulation and the green light being
on to invocation, then one can see straight away that nothing
prevents both of the lights being on at the same time. In
terms of actual realisations of discriminators, the situation
is akin to hearing the word ball and understanding it and seeing
or touching an actual ball at the same time.
Uses of associative links, stimulations, and invocations
are both distinctive and ordered, and since these characteristics
are to be relied on in making talk about particular uses of
associative links, stimulations, or invocations, coherent, it
will be as well to spell out at this point what is intended
by the terms distinctive and ordered. In doing this, I do not
attempt to describe how any such characteristics would be
realised in any physical apparatus, but it appears immediately
plausible that they could be so realised because humans and
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other animals seem perfectly capable of keeping memories of
events quite distinct and ordered.
(5) Distinctive Each invocation, stimulation, and use of
an associative link, is distinct, numerically
different from any other. This is to say
that the use of an associative link
between two non-subs, ns^ and ns9, at a
time Tj, is distinct from a use of an
associative link between ns^ and ns^
at a time, T9, and that an invocation or
stimulation of ns-^ at a time, T^, is
distinct from an invocation or stimulation
of ns^ at a time, T^.
(4) Ordered: Invocations, stimulations, and uses of
associative links, are ordered or
simultaneous. Hence an invocation of a
non-sub, ns^, at a time, T^, is ordered
with respect to both an invocation of ns^
at a time, T^, and a stimulation of or
the use of an associative link to ns^ at
unless such stimulation or use of an
associative link is simultaneous with the
invocation.
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Roth (3) and (4) need to he interpreted with regard to
the individuating of invocations, stimulations and uses of
associative links. The individuation of invocations and
stimulations is basic, that of uses of associations derivative.
An invocation or stimulation of a discriminator is a single
invocation or stimulation just in case there are no interruptions
in the stimulation or invocation, i.e. there is one invocation,
for example, of a discriminator rather than more than one if
the discriminator is in the state of being invoked and there
is no time within that invocation at which the discriminator
is not being invoked. A use of an association between two
discriminators, d^ and d0, is a single use of that association
if the associative link is being \ised to sustain a single
invocation of either d^. or d^. In the case of association,
it is important to bear in mind that a discriminator may be
being both invoked and stimulated at the same time; however,
an association is only being USER if it is involved in invoking
one of its end points. Associations between d^ and dQ are not
necessarily distinctive and ordered, but the use of such
associative links is. This is of prime importance in
explaining how it is that the same structure, involving the
same non-subs, may occur again and again in the semantic
apparatus but each occurrence remain distinct and ordered.
Thus far, stimulations and invocations of a discriminator
and the uses of an associative link are distinctive and either
ordered or simultaneous. From this basis it is a valid
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extension to talk of collects being stimulated or invoked.
The way the extension is carried out is quite straightforward.
A collect is stimulated or invoked if all of its discriminators
are being stimulated or invoked and all of its associative
links are in use. The latter detail is crucial otherwise
one has a lot of discriminators being stimulated or invoked,
but they do not form any kind of unit. It is the use of the
associative links between them which establishes the unit.
The use of the word all is probably too strong since a collect
may contain hundreds or thousands of discriminators and
associative links and something less than total involvement of
even;/ one of these would probably be justification for talking
of a collect being stimulated or invoked. Exactly
how many of the discriminators and associative links would
need to be involved in any particular case might well depend
on the nature of the physical realisation of the semantic apparatus
and I merely record here that it seems implausible to require
total involvement. It will be useful to have names for particular
stimulations or invocations of collects and here I borrow from
the Latin.
(5) Stimulatum A collect in a single state Of stimulation.
(6) Invocatum A collect in a single state of invocation.
Stimulata and invocata will be distinctive and ordered or
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simultaneous because stimulations and invocations are. From
this it follows that a stimulatum or invocatum may he happening
3
now or may have happened in the past. Each single state of being
stimulated or invoked that a collect has been in will constitute
a single stiniulatum or invocatum. A consideration of the earlier
analogy of the glass box containing red and green lights will
perhaps be helpful here. Again it is assumed that the red
light being on indicates stimulation and the green light being
on indicates invocation. Now assume further that the complete
history of the glass box consists in the red light alone being
on twelve times, the green light alone being on six times, and both
lights being on together three times. In order to count the number
of stimulata in this example, we simply count the number of
times the red light has been on irrespective of what else was
happening. Hence, in the history of the glass box, there are
fifteen stimulata and nine invocata. Further, all the stimulata
are distinctive and ordered and all the invocata are distinctive
and ordered. The invocata and stimulata considered together
will be distinctive and either simultaneous or ordered.
The essential difference between stimulata and invocata
is that whilst the stimulation involved in a stimulatum is
3
It is a little odd to use Latinisms which mean "having been..."
for events happening now, but it may be noted that a discrete
stimulation or invocation can only in fact be individuated once it
is passed. The more neutral terms of stimulation event and
invocation event could be substituted for stimulatum and invocatum
respectively without any loss except brevity.
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assumed usually to he caused bj^ an external object, that
involved in an invocatum is produced within the semantic
apparatus, although it might well have been triggered by a
stimulation elseAv'here in the apparatus. Such talk of external
objects and of things within the semantic apparatus will
mislead, however, if they are taken in a spatial sense. I have
already defined the way in which external is to be construed,
and if this construal is taken literally, as intended, then
many external objects will be inside the physical realisation
of the associator and even inside the semantic apparatus itself.
The first situation is quite obvious since the associator will
have a body of some kind, but that body will not be part of the
apparatus. Less obvious is the fact that if a discriminator or
4
part of a discriminator, d-^, was claimed to be the cause of
a stimulation of another discriminator, d^, it would be just
as much an inference as it would be to claim that via sensory
organs a tree caused the stimulation of the "tree" non-sub.
It will be assumed that operations, events, occurrences
or states of the semantic apparatus can be the cause of
stimulation in some discriminators. Again, malfunction
could produce the same result without these causes being
involved, but the assumption will be that usually the
4
It was assumed in chapter 2 that discriminators could be of
any complexity, but that the proper subparts, i.e. parts which
are not the whole, were not available as separate units for
association.
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inference that there is an x such that x is causing this
state is correct. The assumption that the semantic apparatus
interacts with itself in this way is just a special case of
the assumptions that there are external objects and that such
objects have a causal effect on the semantic apparatus,
but its particular importance lies in the possibility it opens
up of the apparatus partly monitoring itself. This, in turn,
allows some meanings to be about internal processes of the
apparatus. An understanding of the importance of this rests
on understanding how truth is handled in the semantic apparatus,
hence I shall not attempt any illustration of the point at
this stage.
5.1 Non-symmetric Relational Lang-gape.
A relational language is one that is capable of expressing
relations, whereas a non-relational language is one that is not.
If English were a non-relational language then Jane hit Jill,
Jill hit Jane, hit Jane Jill, hit Jill Jane. Jane Jill hit,
and Jill Jane hit, would all mean the same because no
relationships would hold between the various expressions of
meaning. In contrast, in an English that was relational but
did not have the stronger requirement of being able to express
non-symmetric relations, Jane hit Jill and Jill hit Jane would
mean the same: "There was a hitting between Jane and Jill".
A relational language without the non-symmetric relation requirement,
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lacks the power of being able to express who did what to whom:
relations hold between arguments but always symmetrically. All
natural languages have the capacity to express non—symmetric
relations and henceforth the unqualified use of 1anguage is
to be understood as meaning"non-symmetric relational language" (NSRL).
The aim here is to give the minimum, general specification
for non-symmetric relational language and then in section 3.2
to add the conditions necessary, firstly, for a realisation of
an associator to utilise that language and, secondly, for a
public non-syrnmetric relational language.
5
What is language? Many definitions have been offered,
but here I shall just briefly consider three before making my
own offering. Sapir defines language thus:
Language is a purely human and non—instinctive method
of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means
of a system of voluntarily produced symbols. (1927 : ?)
Such a definition is problematic in a number of ways. First,
it arbitrarily restricts language to humans and this has the
peculiar consequence that if, for example, aliens were
discovered who spoke perfect English, one would have to deny
under this definition that they were using language at all.
5 All the authors of the definitions to be quoted were undoubtedly
dealing with non-symmetric relational language and language here
is to be construed in this sense.
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It is to be noted that it will not do to respond by saying
that Sapir was defining human language and not just language
per se since this would amount to claiming that the aliens did
not have human language because they were not human. This
is true, but uninformative concerning what language is,
or indeed what human language is. Sapir is, I believe, trying
to be informative with regard to the nature of language, but
an empirical observation, viz. that it appears that only humans
have language, intrudes. Second, if by communicate, Sapir
intends, as normal, that something is communicated to another
part}*-, then clearly Sapir has in mind public language. Again,
in its given, strong form, this has the unfortunate consequence
that a being alone could not have language. This is a logical
claim and, as was seen in chapter 2, such a claim appears to
have been made by Wittgenstein; however, there is no indication
that Sapir intended to make such a claim, and his definition is
perhaps better construed as requiring language to be a potential
method for communicating. Here, once more, an empirical
observation that humans don't or can't live alone from
birth and have language intrudes and gets mixed up with the
definition of language itself. Third, the notions of
communicate, idea, and symbol are no less in need of
explanation than the notion of language itself and this has
the effect of limiting the usefulness of Sapir's definition.
Saussure offers a number of definitions of language,
of which perhaps the clearest is:
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Language is a system of signs that express ideas... (1916 : 16)
Later (op.cit: 66), Saussure will use sign to indicate the
combination of a sound image, the signifier, and a concept or
idea, the signified, hut at this stage he is using it in the
way he describes as "current usage" (op. cit: 67), to indicate
only the sound image. The important thing to note is that a
sound—image for Saussure is not a sound, nor is it a public
thing, hut rather it is ".... the psychological imprint of a
sound, the impression that it makes on our senses." (op. cit: 66).
Two items at least, then, in the ontology of language in
Saussure's definition are internal to the individual and this
is worth emphasising since, so often, it is the social side of
language as construed by Saussure which appears dominant.
Saussure's definition of language is quite abstract
and avoids some of the major pitfalls encountered in Sapir's
definition. This definition, of course, still relies on
rather vague notions, viz. "ideas" and "express", and the
connection of signs with sound-images is unnecessarily
restrictive and an intruding empirical observation which is
readily refuted even among humans by the phenomenon of sign
language. Nonetheless, Saussure's definition has, I believe,
much to recommend it, and my own offering, using the model
developed so far, can be seen as being in the same vein.
As an example of a present day view of what language is,
consider the following definition offered by Ilalliday:
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A language, then, is a system for making meanings:
a semantic system, with other systems for encoding
the meanings it produces. The term 'semantics' does
not simply refer to the meaning of words; it is the
entire system of meanings of a language, expressed
by grammar as well as by vocabulary. In fact the
meanings are encoded in 'wordings': grammatical
sequences, or 'syntagms', consisting of items of both
kinds - lexical items such as most verbs and nouns,
grammatical items like the and o_f and if, as well
as those of an in-between type such as
prepositions. (Halliday 1985 : XVII)
It will be noticed that all three of the definitions quoted
employ the word system, but it is lialliday who has given
perhaps the most precise definition of what is meant by
this word in his work, although in some of his definitions
important criteria seem to be missing, for example:
A closed system is a set of terms with these characteristics:
(a) the number of terms is finite: they can be listed
as A B C D, and all other items E... are outside
the system.
(b) each term is exclusive of all the others: a given
term A cannot be identical with B or C or I).
(c) if a new term is added to the system this changes
the meaning of all the others. (l96l : 247).
A system for Halliday is not in fcict determined by these
As Ilalliday notes, the inclusion of the word closed is
redundant in a sense but kept to distinguish a system from
the category of grammer he calls system.
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characteristics and later he offers more succinct and complete
definitions, for example:
A system is a set of options with an entry condition:
that is to say, a set of things of which one must he
chosen, together with a statement of the condition under
which the choice is available. (1969a : 3)
In his definition of language, however, Halliday appears to be
using system for what he elsewhere calls system network.
The system network is the grammar. The grammar of any
language can be represented as a very large network of
systems, an arrangement of options in simultaneous and
hierarchical relationship. (1969a : 3)
Language for Halliday is, therefore, a phenomenon such that
it can be described as or represented by a system network
in which meanings can be "made" and encoded. Although in
his definition, Halliday goes on to speak of meanings being
encoded in "'wordings'", he prefixes this by the words in fact,
and I take it that this, therefore, marks the observation as
being an empirical one rather than part of the definition
itself.
Halliday's definition relies on the vague notion of
meaning and as such remains vague unless this notion can
itself be made more precise. In "Categories of the.Theory
of Grammar" (1961 : 244/5), Halliday divides meaning into
formal meaning and contextual meaning. "Formal meaning is
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the 'information' of information theory..." (: 244) and,
"The formal meaning of an item is its operation in the network
of formal relations" (: 24p). Whilst, "Contextual meaning... is
quite distinct from formal meaning and has nothing whatever
to do with 'information'. The contextual meaning of an
item is its relation to extratextual features; but this is not
a direct relation of the item as such, but of the item in its
place in linguistic form: contextual meaning is therefore
logically dependent on formal meaning". (: 245). Contextual
meaning for Halliday is, therefore, referential meaning, the
connection between language and the world, whilst formal
meaning is determined by relationships to other linguistic
items.
Now, however, a difficulty arises for it seems that on
the assumption that JIalliday is not using meaning in a
pretheoretical way in his definition of language, we have two
interpretations of the definition, both of which are unsatisfactory.
First of these interpretations is that in which the vagueness
of contextual meaning is assumed to be unimportant in the sense
that it logically presupposes formal meaning and since formal
meaning is made precise, formal meaning can do all the work in
the definition. This interpretation, however, makes Ilalliday's
definition circular, for meaning is defined in terms of systems,
system networks, and linguistic items, and language, and hence
linguistic items, are defined in terms of meaning and systems.
Therefore, either meaning and semantic should not appear in the
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definition of language, or else they mean something over and above
"formal meaning". The second interpretation is, therefore,
to count contextual meaaiing as being an important element over
and above formal meaning. In this case, however, since
contextual meaning is left vague and in its pretheoretic
state, the definition of language inherits this vagueness.
Halliday, of course, might he \ising meaning and semantic
in a pretheoretical way, hut then, as noted, this is to define
1anguage in no clearer terms than the term language itself.
Central to the notion of language is the notion of meaning.
An objection to this view might he this: It is possible to
construct an uninterpreted formal language strictly according
to the shape or some other intrinsic property of its
primitive elements. No meaning is involved in such a language;
therefore, is it to he discounted as a language? I think there
are two responses possible here. One is that of claiming that
formal languages are not really lcinguages at all and that
one is attempting to characterise "real" or "natiiral" languages
and for these purposes formal languages do not count. Such a
response would, I believe, be a mistake for the same reason
that characterising human language as language used by humans
is a mistake: it is uninforraative. The other response is to
insist that if a formal language is indeed a language,
however deficient in terms of natural language, then central
to it will he the notion of meaning. I believe in fact that
however austere the characterisation of a formal language is,
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it meets the meaning criterion. To see how this comes about,
consider how it is that one distinguishes the specification of
a formal language from that of, for example, the specification
of patterns in brickwork. Now it is quite conceivable that
the patterns of objects specified in the case of the formal
language and that of the brickwork are identical, i.e. nothing
in the pattern specification, the way of arranging the objects,
distinguishes the formal language from the brickwork. Notice
that there is no difference in abstraction here: the brickwork
specification is no more talking about particular tokens of
arrangement than the formal language specification is. So
how does one distinguish between the formal language and the
brickwork patterns? The answer, of course, is obvious: one
does so because in one case the specification is talking
about bricks and in the other about symbols. The types of
objects over which the patterns are specified count and, in
fact, determine what it is that is being specified. But
central to the notion of symbol is meaning. To be a symbol
is to be such as to be able to have meaning and to explicate
what a symbol is requires the use of the notion of meaning.
Still, it might be argued, a really carefully specified
formal language would make no claim about its objects being
symbols, but would just identify the types of object by their
shape or weight or colour, etc. Hence there would be no
symbols and thus no notion of meaning at all involved, and,
therefore, no language. The question then arises as to whether
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this loss to the language family is to he regretted. I think
not. Such a "language" would he sui generis and have
nothing particular in common with languages specified over
symbols. The only common element would he that there were
patterned elements, hut this feature would he shared by the
brickwork example and all other patterns of objects, and one
might just as well and just an inconguuously call such a
"formal language" a brickwork specification as a language.
If the notion of meaning is central to that of
language, then it should be possible to characterise
language, at least partly, in terms of the semantic
apparatus because relational meaning, i.e. meanings which
can stand in relationships to each other, or at least
relational meaning of a sufficient power to handle the
semantics of natural language, can only arise in the semantic
apparatus on the view taken here. This characterisation I
call The Language Criterion:
The Language Criterion
A non-symmetric relational language is a set of subs which
are associated with non-subs, both relators and non-relators,
some ordered or unordered subsets of which may be formed into
structures, and if a particular such subset may be formed
into more than one structure, then there is a principle or
set of principles which at least partially determines in
most cases into which structure that particular subset of
non-subs is formed.
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By the term structure. I mean a collect which contains some
significant structure in the sense of chapter 2, i.e. a collect
which contains arguments and relators and in which the arguments
are associated with the argument-places of the relators.
Specifically, a structure is defined as:
(1) Structure An association which consists of argument(s)
and relator(s) and in which the argument(s)
are associated with the argument-place(s)
of the relator(s).
The Language Criterion is intended to form the necessary
condition for non-symmetric relational language: without its
being met, there is no non-symmetric relational language.
Whether it is a sufficient condition is, I believe, a question
of what phenomena one wishes to embrace in the name of language.
Certainly the Language Criterion makes no mention of the external
objects (in vocal human languages, sounds) which are inferred
to be the stimuli of subs and without which, and indeed more, a
plausible account of public language seems not to be possible;
but I shall leave discussion of these matters until the next
section. Here, rather, I wish to consider whether this claimed
necessary condition of language has any undesirable consequences
in disallowing that certain languages are languages at all.
There are at least two possibly difficult areas that need
to be looked at. The first concerns the austere formal
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language defined over symbols, to which I turn in a moment.
The other, of much less importance, concerns dead languages
or, rather, dead and not understood languages, something like
Linear B before its decipherment in 1953. Since the Language
Criterion specifies that a language consists of a set of subs
etc. and since there were no realisations of subs and non-subs
instantiating Linear B in 1950 because all the Uinoans who
use it were long dead and nobody at that time understood it,
it would seem that in 1950 Linear B was not a language.
This result is not, however, at all undesirable since
Linear B was never strictly a language even when being written
onto the soft clay tablets which were to be found many centuries
later. Linear B was and is a writing system for a language, and
only derivatively and loosely can it be called a language
itself. The general point underlying the position here is
this: non-natural meaning does not exist without meaners
and signs or symbols which are so in virtue of their capacity
to have non-natural meaning lose that capacity in the absence of
meaners, and, so, are signs and symbols no more. The marks
I make on this page are just ink marks on a page in the absence
of meaners.
Although it was held earlier that even austere uninterpreted,
formal languages involve the notion of meaning in the sense
that they are defined over symbols and symbols can only be
explicated in terms of meaning, it does not follow that such
languages meet the Language'Criterion. Indeed, they clearly
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do not, for although one can view the symbols of such
languages as corresponding to subs, there appears to he nothing
which corresponds to non—subs. Such a conclusion will
occasion little surprise, I think, and the only surprise
might he the amount of mention that such formal languages are
here receiving. There is, however, I believe, a possible
misperception of the role of syntax in language which is fed
and nurtured by the role of syntax in such formal languages
and, therefore, a consideration of austere formal languages is
a prerequisite for clearing up this misperception. And cleared
up it must be for otherwise the role assigned to (and, I believe,
the true role of) syntax in the approach taken here is
likely to caiise some, and perhaps much, consternation.
It will be observed that The Language Criterion does not
mention syntax but does talk about principles which in part
might determine semantic structures when choice is available.
I am guilty of some dissembling here for I intend that such
principles are what are normally called in natural language
syntax. This claim concerning the role of syntax amounts
to this: The principles of syntax operate directly and only
on non—subs and hence directly and only on meanings as
construed here. It follows from this that any features that
syntax operates with will be semantic features, and syntactic
features, to the extent that they can be identified, will be
a subset of semantic ones. The syntax of austere formal languages
is defined over the intrinsic properties of the vocabularies
3.2 Public Language 143
and, as such, makes the above view of syntax in language
untenable if it is taken to be a paradigm of syntax in
language. Some discussion of syntax will, therefore, be
appropriate and I take this up in section 3.3.
3.2 Public Language
In this section, I consider what must be added to The
Language Criterion (repeated below for convenience) to obtain
public language. The first step in this process is to connect
language to the world external to the associator.
The Language Criterion
A non-symmetric relational language is a set of subs which
are associated with non-subs, both relators and non-relators,
some ordered or unordered subsets of which may be formed into
structures, and if a particular such subset may be formed
into more than one structure, then there is a principle
or set of principles which at least partially determines
in most cases into which structure that particular subset
of non-subs is formed.
In The Language Criterion, no mention is made of the
stimulation of subs and non-subs. Such stimulation is
assumed to be a causal effect of some object or other
on a sub or non-sub and, as pointed out in section 3.0, that
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there are such objects is inferred. Such objects are called
in section 3.0> external objects, and stimulation forges the
link between these external objects and the associator. The
causal effects of such objects on subs and non-subs may not be
(and almost certainly is not) direct, but mediated by all kinds
of organs and processes in an actual realisation of the semantic
apparatus.
Suppose now that an associator, A, is in our familiar
world and that under The Language Criterion A has language, what
connections with the world could that language have? There are
7
two possible connections. First, there could be objects
which stimulated A's subs, or some of them. Hence a sound
token of the word tree might stimulate a sub, s, in A.
Second, a tree might stimulate a non-sub, ns, in A. Should
s and ns be associated in A, then tree will mean for A what
it does for English speakers. It must be emphasised that
such stimulations are causal and not arbitrary. What are
arbitrary are the groupings of discriminators in s and ns,
the association of the sign-marker with s, so malting it a
sub, and the association of s with ns. The second of these
arbitrary occurrences has the consequence that had the
sign—marker been associated with ns instead of s, then a
7 These are only possible connections because perversely A
could be in a world where there were no objects which had
a causal effect on its discriminators or discriminators
could have been so associated as to be only stimulated as
a group by non-occurring concomitances of objects.
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tree would have meant the sound of the word tree for A.
It is these two possible connections between A's language
g
and the world which allow a plausible account of public
language to be given. The view of public language taken
here is perhaps somewhat controversial and it will be as well
to state at this stage two respects in which it is likely to
appear controversial.
(1) Although the view of public language taken here allows
as a natural extension coinmunication, communication
is not taken as a basic feature of public language.
Rather it is public similarity and sameness of
meaning which are taken to be basic and to underly
communication. Public similarity and sameness of
meaning are notions, however, which present certain
difficulties and these difficulties are considerably
exacerbated by the second respect.
(2) The view of public language adopted here assumes
that it makes sense to consider as a possibility that
two different species or a machine and a human
could have a common language. If this is so, then
the requirements for public similarity and sameness
g
The alternative, the implausible account, requires that public
language be just a coincidence of personal languages.
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of meaning need to be specified very carefully, since
one can no longer talk in terms of similar realisations
of semantic apparatus, that is to say, that the
idea that a public language must depend on shared
physiology is rejected.
(2) in particular, has surprising and perhaps unsettling
consequences which touch aspects of Quine's notion of radical
a
translation and the indeterminacy thesis . This will be
discussed further in the light of The Public Language
Condition to be given. This condition is rather involved
and first I state it, then I explicate it.
The Public Language Condition
A language, PL, is a public language if:
(a) There are at least two associators, A and B, such that
there is a set, EO, of external objects, each member
of which stimulates some sub in A and some sub in B.
(b) There is a non-empty subset of EO, the core subset,
such that each member, c, of that core subset
stimulates some sub, x, in A and some sub, y, in B,
and x is associated with some non-sub, m, in A, and
^ Quine i960
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y is associated with some non-sub, n, in B, and m and
n are stimulated by some external object other than c.
(c) The meaning of the members, if any, of the complement
set of the core subset with respect to EO are
definable in terms of the members of the core subset.
(d) The subs and non-subs of A involved in PL constitute
a language under The Language Criterion and the subs
and non—subs of B involved in PL constitute a
language under The Language Criterion.
It will he convenient to think of the set, EO, of external
objects as consisting of sound tokens since this is the case
in the majority of human languages; but in fact any external
objects meeting the criteria of The Public Language Condition
would do as well. Criterion (a) of The Public Language Condition
states that there has to he at least two associators for a public
language and that there has to be a set of external objects,
EO, such that any member of EO will stimulate some sub in A
and some sub in B. This amounts to saying that the objects in
EO have each to be a stimulus for subs in both A and B for
there to be a public language. This seems to be a necessary
condition of a public language involving A and B since
otherwise there could be tokens of the signs of the public
language which had no causal effect on A or B. Such signs
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could not be part of the public language. Criterion (b)
requires that there be a non-empty subset of EO, the core
subset, which meets certain conditions. A diagram may help
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/
Figure 3.2.0
In the diagram a member, Cg, of the core subset of EO is a
stimulus source (indicated by dotted lines) for the sub, s^,
in A and the sub, s^, in B. In turn, s^ is associated with
the non-sub, nsQ in A, whilst s^ is .associated with the
non-sub, ns^, in B. Finally, both ns^ and ns^ are stimulated
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by the external object, tree. Criterion (b) of The Public
Language Condition requires that a similar story can be told
for each of the elements of the core subset. The claim here
is that a public language cannot exist without there being
at least a subset of the signs of that language which refer,
or could be- used to refer, to external objects. Without
such a subset, there would be no basis for claiming that
a single language was common to at least two individuals,
since there woiild be no reason, except for coincidence, to
deem that those individuals had the same public or very
similar public meanings for the signs of the language^. This
follows from the assumption made in (2) above that sameness
or similarity of subs and non—subs between associators cannot
be directl?/ established. Criterion (b) sets up a kind of
functional equivalence between non—subs, but, as will be
seen shortly, it is only "a kind of" because it turns out
that nSg and ns^ of the Figure 3.2.0 could be responding
to quite different stimuli, although all the stimuli would
still be properties of the tree.
The purpose of criterion (c) of The Public Language
Condition should now be much clearer. Whatever objects of
the language are in SO but not in the core subset must be
definable in terms of the members of the core subset since
^
In practice, the fact that two speakers use all the same signs
is a good guide to them having the same language, but this fact
alters not at all the possibility that two speakers could have
all the same signs but have completely different semantic systems
for these signs.
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there are no external objects to guarantee their public
sameness of meaning for A and B. So, for example, if
tokens of the word unicorn appear in BO and have their usual
meaning, then those tokens will not appear in the core
subset of EO because there are no unicorns. Unicorn will
have to be defined in terms of the members of the core subset
of EO or in terms of members of EO themselves defined in
terms of members of the core subset. There are, of course,
iconic representations of unicorns: pictures, models, films,
and these complicate the matter considerably, but what is
clear and must be clear to a speaker of the public language
is that a picture or model of a unicorn is not itself a
unicorn. To establish precisely the role of iconic
representations in public language is beyond the scope of
this work, but prima facie two remarks can be made. First,
it would seem that a proper consideration of iconic representation
might lead to revisions in The Public Language Condition. These
revisions would not, I feel, alter its substance, but they
woxild make it more accurate. Second, a great deal of
definition does proceed without the use of iconic
representations. For instance, most dictionaries have very
few drawings or pictures, but function, nonetheless,
perfectly satisfactorily. This suggests that the reliance of
The Public Language Condition on non-iconic representation
is plausible.
Criterion (d) of The Public Language Condition requires
5.2 Publie Language 151
that the subs and non-subs in A and B which are involved in
the public language should constitute for each associator a
language under The Language Criterion. Bringing in this
criterion merely serves to avoid having to restate The
Language Criterion within The Public Language Condition.
I wish now to return to (2) above and to consider a case
which brings out its radical quality. The Public Language
Condition permits that two individuals having very different
realisations of the semantic apparatus might have a common
language. For example, one realisation might be in terms of
human brain cells and the other in terms of electronic
circuits. In such circumstances, the causal effect''""'"
upon the discriminators of a non-sub will be different in each
of the apparatus simply because the discriminators themselves
are differently constituted. It might be thought that the
difference is limited by the requirement that both sets of
12
discriminators must react to the same object ; however,
by postulating concomitant properties the difference could
in fact be very radical indeed.
Such effects will usually be mediated by other organs and
the constitution of such organs might well increase the
possible differences. Here, however, for clarity of presentation,
I ignore these details.
12
What it is for an object to be the sane or a similar object
for two associators can be made precise and will in fact be
made precise in chapter 5 where much depends on it.
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By concomitant property I mean a property which always
accompanies another. ITence the property of a tungsten filament
lamp of emitting light when supplied hy electricity is
accompanied by the property of heat emission. In this case,
light and heat are concomitant properties. Now imagine that
the property of being red has a concomitant property called
colouron and that there are two realisations of the semantic
apparatus such that one is human and can detect red but not
colouron, and the other is alien and can detect colouron
but not red. Under the Public Language Condition, the human
and the alien could have a common language because the
criterion for public similarity of meaning is met even though
for the human the word red (or colouron — only one will appear
in the language, of course) will mean something's being red
while for the alien it will mean something's being colouron.
Thus, the disquieting result is this: under The Public
Language Condition the word red will mean the same for both
the alien and human, although considered objectively red
means something different for each of them.
The colouron example pushes to the extreme the notion
that underlies what might be stated as Quine's (i960) thesis
of the possibility of objective^ divergent meaning of a
13
common language for two speakers. The word objectively
13 As can be seen from the quotation, Quine states his thesis
in terms of a single speaker, yet it claims show most clearly
in the case of two speakers. Quine himself recognises this
by illustrating the thesis in terms of translation.
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here and in the preceding paragraph is meant to indicate that
the divergence of meaning could only he divined by a being
outside the language and with powers greater than the
speakers of the language. Quine states this thesis like this:
(3) ...the infinite totality of sentences of any given
speaker's language can he so permuted, or mapped onto
itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker's
dispositions to verbal behaviour remains invariant,
and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of
sentences wnth EQUIVALENT sentences, in aity plausible
sense of equivalence however loose. Sentences without
number can diverge drastically from their respective
correlates, yet the divergences can systematically so
offset one another that the overall pattern of
associations of sentences with one another and with
non-verbal stimulation is preserved. The firmer the
direct links of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation,
of course, the less that sentence can diverge from
its correlate under any such mapping. (: 27)
This thesis has become knownas the thesis of the indeterminacy
of translation because Quine illustrates his thesis in terms
of radical translation, but it would be misleading to construe
Quine's thesis as being restricted to translations between
one language and another.
By radical translation Quine means the translating by a
linguist of a previously unknown language without the help of
interpreters, of whom it may be assumed there are none. The
fact that such translation is rarely if ever undertaken is,
as Quine notes, beside the point because the example is used
to illustrate a phenomenon which Quine claims exists
independently of the details of the example.
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The first step that the linguist takes in radical translation
is, Quine suggests, that of making tentative trailslations of those
native utterances which seem to be connected to events conspicuous
to the utterer. Quine offers the example (: 29) of a rabbit
scurrying by and the native speaker uttering Gavagai. The
linguist might guess that such an utterance means something like,
"There's a rabbit", but in order to test such a guess the linguist
must try to rule out other possibilities, such as, "There's
an animal" or "There's something white" (if the rabbits
happen to be white). To make such tests, the linguist must
be able to repeat the native utterance of Gavagai in varying
contexts and observe the native's assent or dissent. Quine
believes (: 29f) that it would be quite possible to establish
when the native was assenting or dissenting. Ey utilising such
tests, the linguist could establish the stimulus meaning for
utterances of such sentences as Gavagai. For Quine, the stimulus
meaning of a sentence, s, consists in an ordered pair such
that the first member is the affirmative stimulus meaning of s
and the second is the negative stimulus meaning of s. Quine
spells out what an affirmative stimulus meaning consists of
on page 32 (op. cit.): "...a stimulation cr~ belongs to the
affirmative stimuliis meaning of a sentence s for a given speaker
if and onlj^ if there is a stimulation cr-' such that if the
speaker were given o~ ' , then were asked s, then were given cr~ ,
and then were asked s again, he would dissent the first time
and assent the second". Hence if the linguist's guess about
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Gavagai meaning "There's a rabbit" is correct, rabbits will be
stimuli in the affirmative stimulus meaning of Gavagai. The
requirement that there be some stimulation that does not evoke
Gavagai from the native speaker or his assent to its use is
necessary to distinguish what Quine calls observation sentences
like Gavagai from stimulus analytic sentences like Pigs are Pigs
(: 67), the latter of which are distinctive in having no stimulation
which evokes dissent.
Observation sentences such as Gavagai might therefore be
fairly translated using the notion of stimulus meaning, for
if all stimuli which prompt the native speaker to assent to
the use of Gavagai are thosewhich prompt the linguist to
assent to the use of There's a rabbit, and all stimuli which
prompt the native speaker to dissent from the use of Gavagai
are those' which prompt the linguist to dissent from the
use of There's a rabbit, then it can be reasonably concluded
that Gavagai has the meaning "There's a rabbit" and
There's a rabbit has the meaning "Gavagai". Quine notes
certain difficulties with the stimulxis meaning of observation
sentences, such as the presence of rabbit-fly (: 37) which
might lead to the native speaker assenting to the use of
Gavagai because culturally the rabbit-fly is taken as a sign
of rabbits even though no rabbits are in fact to be seen; however
he concludes (: 40) that the discrepancies occasioned by such
causes will be overwhelmingly outweighed by the coincidences
of stimulus meaning between Gavagai and There's a rabbit.
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In comparison to observation sentences there are
non-observational sentences (: 46), and although both
observation and non-observational sentences are what Quine
calls occasion sentences, he often uses occasion sentence in
contrast to observation sentence to mean "non-observational
sentence". The term occasion sentence is in general contrast
to the term standing sentence. Assent to an utterance of the
former type requires an appropriate stimulation, whereas no
14
such appropriate stimulation is required for an assent to
the use of the latter kind. As examples of occasion sentences,
Quine offer's Gavagai, It hurts, and His face is dirty (: 35)»
and as examples of standing sentences, he gives There is
ether drift, and The Times has come (: 36). Only the
rather special kind of standing sentence, the stimulus
analytic, are further considered by Quine and it would seem
that all other kinds of standing sentences are subsumed under
occasion sentences (in the sense of "non—observational
sentences"^"').
In practice, Quine notes that occasion sentences grade into
standing ones and that assent to the utterances of some standing
sentences can be prompted by stimulations. So he notes that
assent to the utterance of the standing sentence The Times has come
can be prompted daily by the paper's appearance.
15 I shall use occasion sentence in this way from now on because
Quine appears to by and large and it will make references to
Quine i960 easier to follow.
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Quine points out that stimulus meaning is of little help
with regard to translating occasion sentences since the
stimulus conditions vary so much (: 46). So one speaker might
assent to the use of the sentence Bachelor prompted by the
appearance of a certain man, whereas for another speaker this
appearance prompts dissent or no reaction at all. Knowing
that someone is a bachelor requires knowledge not divinable
from the appearance of the individual, and this knowledge will
not be shared equally among the members of a community.
Synonymous sentences for a particular speaker can, however, be
established because any such speaker will assent to the use of
a sentence wherever she assents to the use of its synonym.
What cannot be done with occasion sentences is to translate
them via stimulus meaning.
Stimulus analytic and stimulus contradictory sentences
share with occasion sentences their untranslatability via
stimulus meaning. A sentence is stimulus analytic if the speaker
will assent (or, dissent, in the case of the stimulus
contradictory) "...come what stimulation may". (: 66).
Quine argues in addition that truth functional connectives in
the unknown language can also be established and translated. He
then sums up what the linguist can achieve in the field in
radical translation: observation sentences and truth functions
can be translated; stimulus analytic and stimulus contradictory
sentences can be recognised but, like occasion sentences,
cannot be translated (: 68). Leaving aside truth functions
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with which I shall not he concerned here, it is to be noted that
what the linguist has so far translated are obsei'vation
sentences, not the words or terms in those sentences.
The indeterminacj1- of translation arises for Quine when the
linguist attempts to translate the stimulus analytic, the
stimulus contradictory, and the occasion sentences of the
unknown language, for at this point the linguist must use
what Quine calls analytical hypotheses.
An analytical hypothesis is involved whenever the
linguist segments a sentence of the unknown language and
translates those segments into the words or phrases of his
own language. So as Quine points out (: 51 )> the stimulus
synonymy of the sentences Gavagai and Rabbit does not
guarantee that the terms gavagai and rabbit are co-extensive.
The term gavagai might in fact denote rabbit stages or undetached
rabbit parts and there is in practice no way of distinguishing
a rabbit stimulation from a rabbit stage stimulation because
one always accompanies the other. Here can be seen the
common ground between the colouron example and Quine's
position. Quine assumes by and large that the linguist
sees or could see the world much as the native speaker of the
unknown language does, but the colouron example, assuming no
necessary shared physiology takes Guine's point to the
extreme and suggests that it could happen that an alien and
a human could not have the same "picturd' of the world because
they were each stimulated by just one and a different
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stimulation of a pair of stimulations which always accompanied
each other.
The linguist's first analytical hypotheses will he about
observation sentences such as Gavagai and the translations of
the segments of such sentences will be used to make translations
of occasion sentences. The restraints on the formulation of
these analytical hypotheses are the requirement to conform to
usuage of observation sentences, stimulus analytic/contradictory
sentences, and stimulus synonymous sentences. However, as
Quine has shown by the gavagai example, the most accessible
items for translation, items, therefore, which offer the
greatest restraint on analytical hypotheses, are not necessarily
straightforward. A wrong choice made concerning gavagai can
be concealed by choices concerning other analytical hypotheses.
For suppose, as Quine does (: 72), that some construction in
the unknown language is translated as "are the same" then
by use of this construction the linguist could establish
that gavagai meant "rabbit" rather than "rabbit stage" by
seeing whether the same rabbit seen twice was one gavagai
or two; however, if on the other hand this construction of
the unknown language was translated as "are stages of the
same animal", then the linguist could not so distinguish.
Quine's point is not that there is a right and a wrong
translation, but rather that there is no way to make a right
translation, for always by compensatory adjustments in other
analytical hypotheses it is possible to find another translation
5.2 Public Language 160
which meets all the constraints of observation sentences,
stimulus analytic/contradictory sentences, and stimulus
synonymous sentences.
l6
Some have argued that Guine's thesis will not go through,
hut to the extent that they succeed, such success seems due to
the linguist having available the same range of stimulations as
the native speaker. The colouron example explicitly denies
this and, at the very least, increases the work that must be
done to refute Quine's thesis once it is generalised across
species. Quine, of course, being behaviourist in outlook is a
strange bedfellow for the theory of a meaner being presented
here, but there is a common notion, I believe, underpinning
both his thesis and The Public Language Condition stated
earlier which, roughly put, is that public meaning may bear
only a shadowy resemblance to private meaning.
Even if Quine's thesis should prove incorrect, the
colouron example remains. Are the consequences of the
colouron example unacceptable? V,licit makes the colouron case
a possibility - albeit it a remote one - is the fact that
The Public Language Condition does not specify a required
physical similarity in the realisations of the semantic apparatus.
The consequence, however, of adding such a requirement would be
that humans could have a particular public language, some
Bennett, for example, in Bennett 1976 : 257 ff.
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aliens could have a different public language, and perhaps
even some machines could have yet another different, public
language; but none of these public languages could overlap
and, hence, there could be no linguistic corumunication
between the species. This, I feel, is an unwelcome
consequence and one which should be avoided if at all possible.
In the end it is a question of choice, and I prefer to accept
the possibility of concomitant properties and all that this
entails rather than rule out a priori the possibility of our
establishing a common language with other life forms which
might exist in the universe or with our own machines.
5.5 Syntax
It will be useful to begin a consideration of syntax by
reviewing what the syntax of an austere formal language consists of.
Usually, the syntax of such a language is held to consist of
two components: the specification of the vocabulary (the symbols)
and the specification of the well-formedness rules, i.e. the
rules which specify which are the well-formed formulas or
strings of the language and which are not. Here, as is often
done, I shall speak of the wrell-formedness rules as syntactic
rules. As a concrete example of the syntax of particular austere
formal language, AFL, consider the following.
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AFL
Vocabulary; a, q □
Syntactic (a) A triangle or a square may occur alone or
Rules;
to the right or left, but not both, of a
circle.
(b) Nothing else is a well-formed formula of AFL.
Of the two syntactic rules, (b) is known as the exclusion clause
and is put in just to spell out what formulas are not well-formed
in AFL, viz. all the formulas which cannot be generated by
applying rule (a) to the vocabulary. Under rule (a), the
well-formed formulas of AFL are in fact:
a, ao, no, a on
a oa, on, noa
and nothing else.
The syntactic rules of AFL get a "grip" on the vocabulary
by being defined over intrinsic properties of the vocabulary.
Thus it is the triangleness, the roundness, and the squareness,
of tokens of the vocabulary which allows the syntactic rules
to pick them out and specify how and how not they may be
combined.
Modern svntactic theories have much in common in
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appearance with specifications of formal languages. Their
vocabulary is well defined and usually consists of category
symbols, such as, N, V, Ad.j, NT, VP, and possibly features,
such as, COUNT, SINGULAR, TRANSITIVE. Here I shall ignore
features and just consider category symbols for the sake of
simplicity. This is possible because I am not here concerned
with details of such syntactic theories but rather with
certain aspects of their common form. In addition to their
vocabularies of symbols, such theories have rules defined
over these symbols. These rules may specify ways of combining
symbols, of replacing one with another, of changing the order
of symbols, or even of deleting some symbol. In other words,
these rules specify the well-formed strings or trees or
formulas of the theory, and they do this by being specified
just as in the case of APL, with respect to the shapes of
the symbols. It is to be noted that syntactic theories
(at 1 east the formalised ones) do not in geperal specify-
directly the well-formed strings of the language being described
because such theories work with symbols not found in natural
language (except in the jargon added to natural language by
such theories). These theories make contact with natural
language via a lexicon in which words of the natural language
17
being described are assigned to one or more of the terminal
17 A terminal symbol is one that cannot be replaced under the
rules of the particular theory by another or other symbols.
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symbols of the syntactic theory. The words in the lexicon may then
function in the theory courtesy of this assignment.
What allows a formalised syntactic theory to be connected
to the natural language it claims to describe is, therefore,
the lexicon it employs. What underlies the assignment of words
to the categories denoted by terminal symbols of the theory is,
therefore, of vital concern. That the syntax of natural language
operates on words in some sense has been the traditional view, and
this tradition carries on into the present where typically
syntax is held to be "...a description of the various ways in
which words of the language may be strung together to form
sentences". (Culicover 1976 : 2).
For a syntactic theory to be about something, its symbols
must have meanings, and if one asks what the category symbol
N or V means, the answer will usually be "noun" and "verb".
Then, however, the question arises as to what nouns are. In
response to this a list of words which are nouns are proffered.
But look at or listen to this list of words as hard and as
long as one likes, one will not be able to divine from
18
any of their intrinsic properties that they are nouns . What
then makes them nouns and how can the syntactic rules pick them
out as nouns if they exhibit no property which characterises them
Of course, one can pick out by their shape some nouns in some
languages once one know what to look for, but in general this
is not a necessary characteristic of natural languages.
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as such? One stock response is that nouns, and word-form
20
classes in general, are identified hy distribution , i.e. a
noun is a word form which can occupy certain, and only certain,
positions in sentences or phrases. The other word-form classes
are identified distributionally in similar fashion. Syntax,
therefore, may be seen as defined in actual fact over form
and positions and only derivatively over word forms. A
category symbol in such a syntax would then denote a class
(unit or otherwise) of environments, where an environment
is a particular position among forms. But whilst this
is formally adequate for a description of language, it fails
21
to have the explanatory quality needed for a part of a theory
of language because it amounts to sayings that x fits into
slot z because x is found in slot z. Such a claim fails to
explain why x fits into slot z despite having no intrinsic
19 Word is several ways ambiguous and it is clearer to switch
to talking of word-form classes and word forms at this stage
rather than word classes and words. Cf. Matthews 197^.
20
I am not here concerned with the problems that occur in
using only distribution to identify word-form classes or in
the difficulty of identifying nouns, for example, as a
cross-language category. And I am not suggesting that anybody
attempts to go about these tasks in PURELY distributional
terms.
21
Explanatory is used here in both the Chomskyan sense
(Chomsky 1965 ! 26 -27) and in the more general sense of
explaining connections between the phenomena of the world
rather than merely describing their juxtaposition or
ordering.
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features which so constrain it. If syntacticiansare content with
mere description, this lack of explanatory quality will not,
of course, concern them, but if, as I believe and, as my use
of theory throughout suggests, they are concerned with explaining
natural language, then this circularity should give some cause
for concern.
My reason for pointing up this difficulty with syntactic
theories is that I wish to propose (and have to in view of the
model of the semantic apparatus presented) that syntax does not
operate on any formal property of word forms, but rather on
features of their meaning. Now this proposal, while it affects
not at all what formal theories of syntax actually describe - since
such theories say nothing about the non-syntactic properties of
the objects over which they are defined, may be felt to be
undermined by the supposed reliance of such formal theories on
criteria of form and shape. What the foregoing argument was
designed to show is that these criteria are simply inadequate.
It will be recalled that in the model of the semantic
22
apparatus a sub, once stimulated, immediately invokes the non-sub
which is its meaning and takes no further part in any semantic
structure involving this non-sub which is built. Wherever
syntax enters the picture, therefore, it cannot be at the
sub level. In fact, I assume that syntactic rules operate at
non-sub level where all meaning features are available, and
A sub may, of course, be ambiguous and be associated with
more than one non-sub.
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that syntactic rules operate on a subset of semantic features and
23
usually the order of occurrence of non-subs. The requirement
that semantic structure can only he built by associating arguments
with relators forms a general constraint on what structures can he
formed, but once there is a choice of structures, then syntactic
rules are needed to determine the choice. I assume that within
semantic constraints, syntactic rules are idiosyncratic.
I now want to consider the role of syntax as envisioned in
the model of the semantic apparatus in a little more detail.
This, it is hoped, will make that role quite clear and allow
certain implications that this view of syntax has to be readily
seen. Suppose that one had an unordered set of three non-subs,
-^"Jill", "hit", "Ann"^ then given that "hit" is a two
argument-place relator, the semantic structure building mechanism
permits two structures to he built, "Jill hit Ann" and "Ann hit Jill".
This occurs because either of the arguments, "Ann", "Jill",
may occupy either of the argument-places of "hit". The
unordered set, <^"Jill", "hit", "Ann"} , therefore allows a
23 It is difficult to imagine a syntax operating effectively on
unordered sets of non-subs although prosodic features in natural
language, which carry semantic information, of course, do not
seem to be ordered. However, a case of syntax operating on a
totally unordered set of input does not seem logically impossible
and one way in which this might be envisaged is that the syntax
counted some semantic features as having inherently higher order
than others and, hence, thereby allowing, for example, two
possible arguments for a single argument-place to be handled in
a regular way. I shall not consider unordered sets further in
any detail below.
The reader will recall that words in double quotes are
meanings and that those underlined are forms.
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choice of semantic structures to be formed and contains nothing
which determines which one is to he formed. Conversely, the
structural information concerning the order of arguments contained
in the semantic structure, "Ann hit Jill" cannot he conveyed
by the unordered set and since this set will correspond via
subs to the English words Ann, hit, and Jill, this structural
information cannot he imparted by the English language if only
unordered sets of its word forms are assumed. If it is now
assumed that there is an ordered set, "Cj'Jill", "hit", "Ann"/* ,
of non—subs, the choice of the two semantic structures which may
be formed from it still remains because it is not assumed that
25
there is any natural order of occurrence of arguments. To
turn the ordered set of non-subs into a semantic structure in
a consistent way, a syntax is necessary. Such a syntax will,
in this case have two inputs: order and the properties of the
item occurring at each point in the order. It seems reasonable
that in order to generalise in the most economic way over
non-subs, the syntax will only be sensitive to certain
widespread properties of those non-subs.
The point at which a non-redundant syntax becomes needed
in a language would seem to depend only on the occurrence of
sets of non-subs which allow a choice of structures to be
built. If, for example, one Latinises the names in the set
25 The proposal that there is in fact a natural word order in
human languages has been put forward by Jan Firbas of the
Prague School of Linguistics.
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of non-subs considered above, then only one semantic structure
is possible. Hence in the case of the set, ^"Jillam", "hit",
"Anna"~^ , of Pseudo-Latin meanings, there is no choice of
semantic structure since "Anna" being nominative can only go in
the first argument-place of "hit" and "Jillam", being accusative
can only go in the second argument place. Of course one would
not have to go very far in considering sets of Latin meanings
before both order and a non-redundant syntax became necessary.
Why should it be reasonable to think, however, as I claim,
that what syntax is actually defined over, i.e. what it operates
with, in the world are parts of meanings? I believe the thought
is reasonable on two counts: economy and plausibility. The
economy argument is not terribly strong but I think it has some
merit. It is essentially this: If it is the case that
syntactic features are other than specialised uses of certain
semantic features, then such features must be learnt and
stored in addition to meanings. This would be less economical
in terms of learning time and storage than the assumption
that certain semantic features did double duty. The
plausibility argument, I believe to be more substantial.
First, there is the problem of learning: if syntactic
features are not specialised uses of semantic ones then
somehow a child in acquiring its native tongue must learn
the syntactic features associated with each word form and
keep them separate from the meaning. Since clearly word
forms do not wear unambiguous indications of their syntactic
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features on their sleeves, this information must he deduced from
their position in utterances as well as their form, and so
deduced in isolation from meaning. It may he felt that the
latter requirement does not follow, but if semantic and syntactic
features are truly independent, then it does, for if there are
connections between them, then those connections must either be
arbitrary and add rather than decrease the learning burden, or
non-arbitrary, i.e. causal. But if they are causal, then how
does one know that there really are two objects causally
connected rather than a single object? Short of showing that
26
there are syntactic features without such connections , which,
of course, requires that syntactic category be learnt
independent of meaning, I do not see that this can be done.
Therefore, the supposition must be that if the syntactic features
are connected with semantic ones, then either they are arbitrarily
connected and probably increase the learning load still further,
27
or the possibility of them being one and the same features
clearly exists. It seems more plausible that first language
learners should utilise features of the very tangible meanings
they associate with word forms to mark out syntactic categories,
rather than go straight to a very abstract notion of such categories.
^
Any grammatical theory which makes a full-word/form-word
distinction may seem to make this claim, but I doubt it can be
upheld. See section 0.2.
27
This is not to say that the set of semantic features is the
set of syntactic features, since much turns on the notion that
syntactic features are only a subset of semantic features.
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Second, word forms which occur in word-form classes seem
to have something in common in terms of meaning. I do not
say that this is a particularly tangible something, but that
it is there seems beyond dispute. Robin Lakoff used what
28
she called semantic markers to subcategorise Latin verbs
into meaning-classes in order that their syntactic behaviour
might be specified. She has this to say about meaning classes
and the number of semantic markers utilised by the syntax:
We define a meaning-class in terms of both syntax and
semantics, as a set of semantic markers that can function
in syntactic miles. Not all semantic markers function in
syntactic rules. For example, the semantic markers that
define verbs of ordering will function syntactically in
a redundancy rule specifying that, for this semantic class,
one or more of the complementizer-changing rules must apply.
On the other hand, for verbs of eating there is no semantic
marker that functions syntactically or that distinguishes
a rule that applies to verbs of eating from one that
can apply only to verbs of drinking or verbs of
digesting. (1968 : 165).
It would be an implausible coincidence if main word-form classes
and subclasses of these exhibited meaning similarities and yet
semantic features played no part.
Householder (1962) showed the implausibility of the
thesis that word-form clases are independent of meaning.
Lyons (1977 : 375) sums up Householder's claim and draws
28
The term semantic marker was introduced by Katz & Fodor 1963
No harm will arise if it is thought of in the above context as
meaning "semantic feature".
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the consequence like this:
What cannot be done, it would appear, is to change the
distribution of all of the word-forms in a language whilst
holding constant the meaning of the lexemes of which they
are forms or to change the meaning of the lexemes^ without
affecting the distribution of the associated word-forms
(cf Householder, 1962). The theoretical conclusion to be
drawn from this fact is that there is an intrinsic
connection between the meaning of words and their
distribution; and it is for this reason that it is
difficult to draw the boundary between syntax and
semantics.
Third, there is, as Lyons points out, great difficulty
in drawing a boundary between semantic and syntactic
features, and this suggests that there is in fact no boundary
at all in reality, but rather a cline from semantic features
that have general use in syntactic rules to semantic features
which have only occasional use. In addressing the question
of the boundary between syntax and semantics, Chomsky (1965),
viewing this cline as a scale of grammatical deviance,
observes that:
If the distinction betx/een strict subcategorisation
rules and selection rules noted earlier is generally
29
Lyons holds that meanings belong to lexemes and not to
word forms. I do not share this view since this requires that
either inflexions do not have meaning or that a word form
such as girls is a form of the lexeme GIRL plus a form of the
morpheme PLURAL. The former option is, I believe, quite
wrong and whilst the latter might be true, it still requires
a way of referring to the combination of the meanings of the
lexeme find morpheme. Rather them proliferate terminology it
seems reasonable to talk of the meaning of the word form.
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valid, we might go on to superimpose on the scale of
deviance a split into perhaps three general types,
namely the types that result from: (i) violation of
lexical category (such as (6i); (ii) conflict with a
strict subcategorisation feature (such as (6ii)); and
(iii) conflict with a selectional feature (such as
(6iii) and (2). (: 153)
(6)(i) sincerity may virtue the boy.
(ii) sincerity may elapse the boy.
(iii) sincerity may admire the boy (: 152).
(2)(i) colorless green ideas sleep furiously
(ii) golf plays John
(iii) the boy may frighten sincerity
(iv) misery loves company
(v) they perform their leisure with
diligence (: 149)
Chomsky is claiming in the above that (6i) is the most
grammatically deviant because it breaks a category rule,
viz, using virtue as a verb, whilst (6ii) is somewhat less
deviant because it only breaks a strict subcategorisation
rule, viz. using elapse as a transitive verb. Finally,
(6iii) and (2) are still less deviant because they break
only selectional rules. To take the case of just (2i):
abstract things, like ideas, do not have colour, what is
coloured cannot be colourless, abstract things do not sleep,
and sleeping is not done furiously. What Chomsky is suggesting
is that the strength of grammatical deviation is an indication
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of the importance or centralness of the feature constraint
being violated, hut as he points out (: 150, and footnote 5s
227/228) the matter is in fact more complicated than this and
even low-level deviance inducing features in selectional
restrictions can produce "totally unacceptable" examples
The debate over what features are syntactic and the difficulty
of drawing a line between syntactic features and semantic ones
suggests that syntax shades into semantics. The most plausible
reason, I believe, why this should he so is that syntactic
rules "help themselves" to semantic features as the need
arises. Leech (l97^)» whilst only going as far as to
say that syntactic and semantic features "correspond",
nonetheless notes the close correspondence and suggests why
some features are utilised by the syntax rather than others:
Thus although the categories of syntax are much fewer
than those of semantics, they are given importance
(sometimes inappropriate importance from the semantic
point of view) through their obligatory status. These
syntactic categories generally correspond with semantic
features which are of particularly wide use either
because they are formators (e.g. definiteness, negativity)
or because they have a focal position in the taxonomic
'tree' of contrasts (p.121; e.g. countable/mass,
such as (l), where the feature is required to stop
its generation.
(l) the book who you read was a best seller (: 150)
singular/plural). (: 189)
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Assuming that syntax operates on semantic features does not
require that syntactic and semantic rules necessarily "respect"
each other in all cases. Usually, one might expect that they
would, but given that syntax uses only some semantic features
to identify its objects, it seems quite possible that it
should allow as the semantic rules do not, "Colourless green
ideas sleep furiously". To be explicit: Assume that "colourless",
"green", "friendly", and "bright" all share the semantic
feature, $\ , that "furiously" and "contentedly" both share the
semantic feature ft , and that "ideas" and "people" share the
semantic feature fy . Assume further that the syntax operates on
the features (/. , ft , and ^ among others. In such a case,
the syntax will just as readily "approve", "Colourless green
ideas sleep furiously" as it will, "Bright friendly people
sleep contentedly" because the syntax is "blind" to the
other semantic features that these meanings possess.
The mechanism which underlies the incongruity of certain
grammatically (i.e. syntactically) acceptable semantic
structures involves what I shall call semantic congruity
and this will be introduced in the next section.
The view of syntax taken here is that it is a device
for connecting meanings. This is a traditional view of syntax
according to Matthews (l98l): "Traditionally it £syntaxj
refers to the branch of grammar dealing with the ways in
which words, with or without appropriate inflections, are
arranged to show connections of meaning within the sentence"
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(: l) , and should not, therefore, occasion any surprise.
Where this approach goes further is in proposing that in fact
actual syntax is defined over aspects of meaning, semantic
features, and that it would be a misperception of what many
syntactic theories are about if it was felt that they offered
any grounds for rejecting this proposal out of hand. The
idea that syntax and semantics operate on something common is
not new and the tentative feelings of many are perhaps well
expressed by Hudson (1976):
...I think it is still an open question whether the
'separateness' of semantics and syntax lies in their needing
separate structures, or whether they could perhaps be
considered to be different aspects of the same structure,
each giving a different range of information about the
sentence, in terms of a different VOCABULARY of
features. (my emphasis). (: 178)
Before leaving the subject of syntax, I wish to raise a
problem for the view of syntax expressed here. This concerns
cases where one feels that one can identify a semantic
feature which is used by the syntax and then one is faced with
apparent counter-examples to the claim that this feature
is in fact being used by the syntax. Hudson (1976 : 6)
cites what he feels to be the clearest example where the
30
Matthews contrasts this view of syntax with that held by
Culicover (quoted earlier), calling Culicover's view of
syntax "distributional" (op. ci t.: 22).
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meaning of a form is semantically singular whilst it behaves
31
syntactically like a plural . Hudson gives two examples,
viz. bathroom scales and oats, but there are in fact many more,
especially connected with clothing, e.g. panties, tights. shorts.
briefs. trunks, trousers. The suggestion is that all these
terms are semantically singular, whilst syntactically they
32
are plural. Hence one does not say, "This panties is pink",
rather, "These panties are pink". However, the claim that
these terms are semantically singular is not straightforward.
In all the examples except oats, one cannot use the word one
without introducing the word pair. Thus "One panties" is
not acceptable but "One pair of panties" is, and one asks
for one pair of bathroom scales, not for one bathroom scales.
If these terms were really semantically singular it might be
expected that one would be able to use one directly with them
and that the use of pair would produce an oddity of meaning.
31 Hudson in fact cites also the converse of the phenomenon, but
I do not find his examples convincing. In particular, he talks of
verbs such as disperse which require a plural subject semantically,
but some of whose subjects are syntactically singular. Hence,
because of the acceptability of "The committee disperses", Hudson
believes that committee is semantically plural. However, this
does not seem to follow since a committee considered as a body
is singular. What might be required for using "disperse" is
that the body has parts which can disperse. This is not at all
the same as being plural.
32
The supplement of the O.E.D. does in fact cite examples
of the singular panty.
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Oats raises different issues because it involves mass
terms, the semantics of which are far from simple and have
33
been the subject of considerable debate . A discussion of
the complexities of mass terms is beyond the scope of this
work and it is an open question whether examples like oats
and perhaps other examples of a quite different type might
turn out to be genuine counter-examples to the thesis that
syntax operates on semantic features. What should be apparent
is that to say what semantic features such apparent counter-examples
have is not a straightforward matter and it might well turn out
to be the case that categories such as singular and plural
as presently conceived are too gross to capture the subtlety
of what is going on or are not in fact homogeneous and are
confusing matters by subsuming disparate things.
3.4 Semantic Congruity
It was noted in the last section that the syntax might well
allow semantic structures to be built which are odd or strange
from the point of view of meaning. Since Chomsky (1965), these
oddities have been largely viewed as arising from selection-
restriction violations and handled in the lexicons of grammatical
theories. The nature of the problem and the fact that it has to
33
For some idea of the range of the problem and the differing
views, see Pelletier 1979.
I
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do with specific items of vocabulary is widely agreed, and I do
not demur from that agreement. What I want to do here is to
suggest a way in which these selection restrictions can be
captured by the model of the semantic apparatus.
The semantic structures corresponding to sentences (l) to
(8) are all possible under the semantic-structure building
requirements and probably under English syntactic constraints.
Their meanings, however, are odd or strange in varying degrees
and semantic congruity is here put forward as a general





Persuasion drove the car.
34




These sentences are not in any order of the oddness of their
meaning. They are merely intended as a sample of the very
large number of sentences whose slightly odd, odd, or very odd
34
Originally appeared in Chomsky 1957 * 15
From Chomsky 1965 s 157
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meanings are to be explained by semantic congruity.
Before the notion of semantic congruity can be explicated,
some consideration of what a semantic feature is will be
necessary. Up till now the term semantic feature has been
used in a rather vague way. For the purpose of explaining
semantic congruity it is necessary to make it more precise,
although this precision will in no way affect what has been
said up to this point. A semantic feature in the model of the
semantic apparatus being presented is a discriminator or a
group of discriminators of a non-sub which is associated with
a sub.
There are two requirements to bear in mind when seeking
an explanation of the oddness of the meaning combinations
associated with sentences like (l) - (8). The first is that
the oddness of meaning combinations does not appear to be an
absolute: we may grow accustomed to an odd meaning combination
and it may thus lose its oddness. The mechanism which explains
oddness must also explain how oddness can come and go. Second,
closely associated with the first requirement and a consequence
of it is the requirement that, given the non-absoluteness and,
indeed, variability of oddness of meaning combinations, one
cannot postulate that oddness of combination of meanings is
an intrinsic property of those meanings, for if it were then
it would not be defeasible. What this second requirement
amounts to in fact is that one cannot say that the meaning
of (2), for example, is odd because in the meaning of rank
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there are semantic features which have some built—in natural
antipathy towards some semantic features in the meaning of
milk. Instead, some mechanism must be proposed which accounts
for the oddness of meaning and yet explains how that oddness
can be neutralised without requiring that either of the non-subs
corresponding to rank and milk lose any of their semantic features.
It will he recalled that an argument-place consists of an
order-marker associated with a focal together with some or no
other discriminators. Suppose now that one assumes that there
are other discriminators involved in a particular argument
place, then it could be the case that any argument which
"plugged in" to that argument-place would have to have discriminators
which were identical to those in the argument-place. Here,
being identical means that the discriminators are in fact the
very same discriminiators used twice over. Now suppose that the
argument did not have discriminators which were identical
to those of the argument-place, then it would be the case
that these different discriminators in the argument-place
would add meaning to the argument and this would account for
some of the oddness in meaning combinations. A diagram may
help to make clear what is going on.
In Figure 3.4.0, the circles represent the meanings
of the words printed inside of them, and the square box
represents the single argument—place of "died". In the
argument-place is a semantic feature AM (animate). If the
argument which slots into this argument-place is to he
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semantically congruous, then it too must contain or have the
semantic feature AM, but in looking among the many semantic
features that "rock" does have, no AM can he found and the
argument lacks semantic congruity with respect to that
particular argument-place.
Figure 5,4,0
It is to be noted that an argument can, and normally will,
have many more discriminators than an argument-place. The
first requirement of semantic congruity is that those
discriminators, apart from the order-marker, which are present
in the argument-place must also he present in the argument
associated with that argument-place. If this is not the case,
then the extra discriminators in the argument-place will extend
the meaning of the argument and a degree of oddness will result.
The first requirement for semantic congruity is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition on which to base a general
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statement of semantic congruity. This is because in many
languages form indicates argument function, i.e. part of the
meaning of a particular form is that it is a first or second
or third argument. An example from Latin should make this
clear.
(9) Caesar Juliam amavit.
(10) Caesarem Julia amavit.
In (9) the nominative ending of Caesar indicates that it is the
»r/T
first argument of amavit. whilst the accusative ending of
Juliam indicates that it is a second argument. In (lO), these
roles are reversed. The meaning of Caesar, therefore,
37includes the semantic feature of being a first argument ,
whereas the meaning of Caesarem includes the semantic feature
of being a second argument. This is quite unlike languages
which do not in general inflect for argument function. So
in the English sentence in (ll) the form Jane does not give,
independently of the sentence in which it occurs, an indication
(10) is in fact unusual Latin, but I have opted for less
elegant Latin to emphasise that in talking about first and second
arguments, I am not talking about order in the sentence.
Conventionally, I treat the subject argument as first argument.
37
It is not here being suggested that these arguments are not
complex: an argument can be as complex as one likes and have
as much structure as one likes. It would, therefore, be
perfectly consistent with the view expressed here to hold
that the meaning of Caesar is a structure composed of some
basic meaning and the nominative meaning.
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of its argument function.
(ll) Jane loved John.
Semantic congruity requires that an argument which
has a feature specifying argument function (first argument,
second argument, etc.), he associated only with an argument-place
having that same feature. This requirement is in contrast to
the first requirement of semantic congruity specified above
since in that case it is what is contained in the argument-place
which determines what the argument must have. In this second
requirement the converse applies with respect to the order-marker:
if an argument contains an order-marker, then it will only have
semantic congruity with its argument-place if in addition to
meeting the first requirement of semantic congruity, the
order-marker the argument contains is also present in the
argument-place.
More formally, semantic congruity and its dependent notion,
congruous argument, are specified as follows:
(12) Semantic Congruity Semantic congruity obtains between
an argument-place and its associated
argument if all the semantic features
apart from the order-marker present
in the argument-place are also
present in the argument and if any
I
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order-marker present in the argument
is also present in the argument-place.
(13) Congruous Argument An argument which has semantic
congruity with its argument-place.
Lack of semantic congruity does not, of course, prevent
semantic structures being built otherwise structures corresponding
to the sentences (l) - (8) would not arise. What the mechanism
of semantic congruity does give is a reason for their oddness.
If the sentences, (l) — (8) are syntactically well-formed
(and this is not beyond dispute), then it can be seen that the
syntax in these cases is operating with semantic features other
than the offending ones. In (3), for example, the syntax merely
requires that an argument of "addled" have the semantic feature
that common nouns have; however, the argument place of "addled"
has an apparent disjunctive semantic feature something like
"brain or egg", and hence since "words" does not have either
of these features, the meaning of (3) is odd. Similarly in the
case of the other examples there will be semantic features in
argument-places which extend the meaning of the arguments
because those features are not already present in the arguments.
Semantic congruity explains only certain meaning incongruities,
others like "The dead man is alive" depend on sense relations
and these will be discussed in chapter 5*
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k. The Semantic Apparatus and Truth and Falsity
In this chapter, I shall be concerned with how the notions
of truth and falsity are handled in the approach to general
semantics which is being followed here. Inevitably, this
will involve some claims about the nature of truth, but I
shall not attempt to discuss in any detail standard theories^
of truth because to do justice to these would require a
digression of disproportionate length. Rather I shall allude
on occasions to some of the standard theories and the
discussion they have invoked where this seems helpful or
relevant.
^
The most notable standard theories of truth are:
The Correspondence Theory This is by far the oldest theory
and a version of it was adopted by Russell (1912). For a more
recent account, see O'Connor 1975*
The Coherence Theory White (1970) traces this back, at least in
character, to Leibniz, although Rescher (1973) makes Hegel the
originator of the theory proper. See Rescher 1973 for &
present day approach to this theory.
The Pragmatic Theory This is largely associated with William
James. See his "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth" (1907).
The Semantic Theory This theory is or stems from Tarski's
(1936, 19^4) definition of truth for formalised languages.
The Redundancy Theory Ramsay (1927) originated this theory,
claiming that It is true that P means no more than P.
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The first task in treating truth and falsity will be to
identify in terms of the model of the semantic apparatus
what it is that can be true or false, i.e. what the truth
bearers are. Second, will be to show how it is that a truth
bearer can be held to be true or false. Third, will be the
task of attempting to resolve that puzzling triangle of notions,
truth, falsity, and negation. Finally, I shall look briefly
at some other attitudes.
In this chapter, only non-analytic truth and falsity will
be considered. A consideration of analytic truth and falsity
will be given in the next chapter. There is, however, one
aspect of the traditional view of analytic truth that must
be touched on here. An analytic truth is often described as
one which is true in virtue of its meaning alone, but this
seemingly innocuous way of putting it weds meaning to truth
by fiat and in the quite precise way I have defined meaning,
this union must be suspect for the following reason: It is
not clear whether some animals, such as squirrels, are meaners
2
in the sense of the term employed here , but the odds seem to be
against. Nonetheless, a squirrel has expectations or beliefs
and these may be true or false - not just for an observer
judging the squirrel's action, but for the squirrel itself:
2
Part of the aim of general semantics as here construed is, of
course, to set up the criteria on which such matters may be
judged, but collecting the data to match against these criteria
is no easy matter.
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a squirrel does not continue to look for a hoard of nuts in the
place once it discovers there are none even though it once
believed that there were nuts there. Since it appears that
there is at least some doubt as to whether truth and meaning go
hand in hand in all cases, it seems wiser not to make the notion
of truth dependent on meaning. I shall, therefore, talk of
analytic truths and falsehoods as being true or false in virtue
of their internal relations. What it is that can have such
internal relations, I now turn to.
4.0 Truth Bearers
What is it that can he true or false? An answer to this
question is a prerequirement for making any real headway in
the discussion of truth and falsity. Over the years, as
O'Connor (1975 s 28) says, a number of answers to these
questions have been offered including: beliefs, judgements,
propositions, statements, sentences, utterances. The latter
three can he dismissed as possibilities for primary truth
hearers if it is granted that non-articulate animals and
pre-articulate children can have true and false beliefs.
For example, a squirrel hides a cache of acorns at a spot, x,
and upon waking from hibernation mistakenly goes to look for
the cache at spot y. The squirrel's expectation or belief
that the cache is located at y is false and after arriving
at y, the squirrel will be aware that it is false. To the
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extent that sentences, statements, and utterances can be
truth bearers, it would appear that they are so only
derivatively and that they derive this capacity by expressing
in some manner things which are the real truth bearers.
In considering judgements and beliefs, it is important
to take as the candidate for truth bearer not the act of
judging or believing but the content of the judgement or
belief. Hence if Jane believes that Jill has red hair the
possible truth bearer is "that Jill has red hair" and
Jane's believing it or not makes no difference to its possible
truth bearer status. A similar position occurs with the
other attitudes; they, like belief and judgement are
directed towards something, hence one always supposes,
doubts, assumes, asks, SOMETHING. This something has
traditionally been called a proposition, and it is but a
short step, as Nuchelmans (1973 *2,3) notes, to see the
content of a thought, say, "Jill has red hair" which is
merely entertained in the mind without the entertainer taking
any attitude whatsoever towards it, as a proposition: for
why should a proposition stop being one just because no
attitude is directed on it; indeed why should a proposition
only exist in a single mind since any number of people might
have the same thought and what sense could be made of this
unless each of their thoughts had the same content? Thus the
proposition became the immaterial truth bearer and despite many
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3
problems remains perhaps the number one candidate for that title.
The approach adopted here is physicalist and, under such an
approach, whilst abstraction is perfectly possible, such abstraction
must always be reducible to its physical tokens or instantiations.
On such a view, propositions could only be entertained as a type
abstraction, and this it might be convenient to do, but this will
not give the hard physicalistic answer concerning the truth
bearers that is required unless attention is concentrated on the
tokens of the type. I shall, therefore, view propositions as a
higher-order abstraction than will be useful for the level of
this inquiry and I shall consider them no further.
Whatever a truth bearer is, it must be something which
can be held true and can be held false^ (analytic truths and
5 \ 6falsehoods apart J. This seemingly banal requirement places,
3
See Nuchelmans 1973 tor early theories of the proposition:
O'Connor 1975» White 1970» and some papers in Pitcher 1964 for
criticisms of the notion of the proposition and further references.
4
On a correspondence theory of truth every truth bearer will
have an invariant truth value, but this does not alter the
point being made since that point is that it must be possible
to hold what is true false and vice versa.
5
To avoid irksome repetition, all references to truths and
falsehoods in the rest of this chapter are references to
non-analytic truths and falsehoods unless otherwise stated. It
is to be noted that I observe the Kantian distinction between the
analytic and the a priori. These categories may overlap but it
is only the analytic which are referred to here.
^
Cf. Russell's (1912 : 70) claim that some truth theorists
have so constructed their theories that a place for falsehood
can only be found with the greatest difficulty.
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in fact, a strong constraint on the nature of a truth bearer
since it requires that it cannot be a feature of the truth hearer
alone which determines whether it is to be held true or false,
for if it were, one would infallibly know what was true and
what false (barring errors in identifying the feature). If it
is not a featui'e of the truth hearer alone which allows it to
be held either true or false, then there must be something else
which sanctions this. This something else might be some
principle of coherence between the truth values of a particular
set of truth bearers, as suggested by the coherence theory of
truth, or it might be some principle of correspondence of a truth
bearer with something else as suggested by the correspondence
theory of truth. I believe that both these suggestions may in
fact apply, but that in order to give coherence something to
work with and to constrain the possible sets of truths and
falsehoods over which it operates, some selection of basic
but not unrevisable truths must be arrived at by some kind of
correspondence mechanism. Therefore, there are now two
questions to be answered, each answer constraining the other:
"What are the truth bearers?" and, "What is the correspondence
mechanism and with what is there a correspondence?"
The answers to these questions will either have to be
found within the model of the semantic apparatus so far
presented or extra pieces will have to be added to supply the
answers. In fact, very little will need to be added to the
existing model. It will be recalled that there are four
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possible states for a collect to be in: (l) Neutral state,
(2) Stimulated state. (3) Invoked state, (4) Both invoked and
stimulated state. An invocatum is a collect or structure in a
single state of invocation, and since all invocations are
distinctive and ordered, invocata too are distinctive and
ordered. The proposal is that the truth bearers are invocata.
It will not be the case, however, that necessarily all invocata
are truth bearers; there will be many invocata which are not
suitable candidates for truth. Surprisingly, and perhaps
disconcertingly, there will be many invocata which will be
candidates for truth although these invocata will sometimes
represent items of language which we do not ordinarily think
of as being capable of being true or false. Such items will be
such things as proper and common names, pronouns, adjectives,
adverbs and indeed virtually any part of speech. This is
simply the consequence of treating some truths as depending in
part of some kind of correspondence. One could choose another
name to distinguish between the case where a statement or
proposition (in the ordinary sense) is true from that where
fragments of these are true, but this would only introduce a
distinction where none exists because the process of correspondence
is uniform.
The mechanism of correspondence and what truth-candidate
invocata are supposed to correspond to will be the subject of
the next section. Ilere the case of possible non—meaners, such
as the earlier example of the squirrel, needs to be examined
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in the light of the claim that some invocata are truth bearers.
First, for brevity and convenience it will be useful to have
a term for those invocata which are capable of having a truth
value. I call such invocata, representata and formally specify
a representatum as:
(l) Representatum. An invocatum capable in principle of
having a truth value.
More will be said in the next section about what capable in
principle means, but for the moment it can be noted that
invocata that correspond to such utterances as questions,
commands, war—cries, and the like do not seem capable of
having truth values although parts of them may.
Thus far, talk of invocation has tended to concentrate on
that brought about by the associative link between sub and
non-sub. This concentration is understandable because it is
this link which is the meaning link. However, there are
many other associative links which do not involve subs and
since it is absence of subs which distinguishes meaners from
non-meaners, the use of these other associative links for
invocation is important in allowing some non-meaners to
utilise the notion of truth and falsity while retaining a
single type of truth bearer throughout. For the squirrel,
the invocatum equivalent to "Acorns at y" might have come into
being through a chain of associations prompted by being hungry,
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utilising past associations of satisfying hunger with acorns and
of acorns being located at various places, etc. The details
are not of importance here but what is is that the choice of
representata as truth bearers does not preclude non-meaners
from having and utilising a notion of truth.
4.1 How Representata Can Be Held True or False
Russell (1912 : 69) identified two different questions
concerning consideration of truth and falsity: (l) What is
truth (falsehood)? (2) What beliefs are true (false)?
Concerning question (2), Russell thought it "...a question
of the very greatest difficulty, to which no completely
satisfactory answer is possible." (: 69). To question (l),
Russell believed a clear answer could be given. Rescher (1973)
claims that a theory which attempts to answer (l) is a
definitional theory of truth, whilst one which attempts to
answer (2), in giving a general means by which truths are
sorted from falsehoods, is a criterial theory of truth.
According to Rescher, the correspondence theory of truth
is a theory par excellence of the definitional kind and
the coherence theory of truth is a theory of the criterial kind.
Whilst a little will be said here of the definition of
truth and of the criteria of its application, the main purpose
will be to attempt an answer to a rather different question,
viz. "What general mechanism is involved in a truth bearer
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being held true or false?" To answer this, the more specific
question, viz, "What is the correspondence mechanism and with
what is there a correspondence?" of the last section must first
be addressed.
A collect can be in one of four states. When the
collect is invoked, it is an invocatum and it may, therefore,
be a representatum. If it is a representatum, with what
could it correspond as one step in attaining a truth value?
The answer is, of course, quite obvious; it could correspond
with the very same collect being stimulated, a stimulatum.
It will be remembered that a collect can be in both a stimulated
and an invoked state at the same time. Hence a stimulatum is
the something with which a representatum must correspond
7
if it is to meet the correspondence requirement of being
true. What then of the correspondence mechanism, that
which compares in some manner the representatum and stimulatum
to check whether they correspond? No such mechanism is in fact
required, for identity of both the representatum and the
stimulatum is given by the locus of the collect and both
stimulation and invocation are distinct states. There is no
more need to postulate something's doing the comparing than
there is to require some external connection between a poker
being made of steel and its being hot: the poker's being made
7
Here I am talking only of basic truths. Many others will be
arrived at by inference. Much inference will involve sense
relations and this will be discussed in the next chapter.
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of steel and, at the same time, heing hot is just the state
it is in, just as in the same way a collect being both invoked
and stimulated is in that state of being invoked and stimulated.
Where a representatum and stimulatum are in correspondence
with each other, I shall say that they match or are matched.
Specifically, a match is defined as follows:
(1) Hatch A representatum matches or is a match if^ its
time index, if any, agrees with the occurrent
time of a stimulatum and its contents, including
any augmentation, are contained in that
stimulatum except insofar as specified otherwise
9
by negative, quantifying or intensional
elements in the representatum.
To make (l) comprehensible it is necessary to explicate some
of the terms which occur in it. The time index of a representatum
is the time it represents. Usually, in natural languages,
this is indicated by tense or time adverbials, but there are
cases where the time index is omitted quite regularly, for
g
If could possibly often be strengthened to iff ("if and only
if"7 in this and many definitions in this and the following
chapter, but I shall refrain from doing so, being content with
the lesser claim of the conditions stated being sufficient rather
than necessary as well.
9
Many verbs take intensional objects. For example, the truth
of the utterance "Jane is looking for a unicorn", depends not at
all on there being a unicorn.
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example, in a number of languages in the copula construction.
In such cases, it seems likely that either a default time index
applies or some mechanism is at work to supply this from the
linguistic or non-linguistic (or both) context. Lack of an
explicit time index is, however, much more widespread in
spoken language than the grammars of languages would generally
allow, and utterances of one or several words occur frequently
without an uttered time index. A time index is not essential
for matching since an unspecified time is consistent with any
time, but a specified time index does reduce the matching
possibilities.
It will be recalled that all invocata and stimulata are
ordered. It is natural and useful to assume that the
dimension of ordering is one of time. Hence each
stimulatum is marked, as it were, with the time at which it
occurred, its occurrent time. The first requirement of
matching is that the time index, if any, of the representatum
agrees with the occurrent time of the stimulatum. This does
not mean that the time index has to be exactly the same as the
occurrent time. Rarely will this be the case because the time
index is a very gross measure of time, whereas occurrent time
can be very finely graded. What is meant by agrees in (l) is
that the occurrent time is consistent with the time index,
nence the time index may simply refer to a time past in
relationship to the occurrent time of the representatum. In
such a situation, the occurrent time of a stimulatum will
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agree with that time index if it is earlier than the occurrent
time of the representation.
By augmentation is meant any stimulata or invocata which
are associated with a representation prior to its trying to
he matched. Some items of language have minimal meaning when
taken out of any context, so need a great deal of "filling out"
or augmenting. Of particular interest are non-unique proper
names. Suppose somebody utters (2) to me in conversation.
(2) Jane put a book on the table.
On the assumption that I know several Janes, I am in no
position to consider the truth or otherwise of an utterance
of (2) until I can fix the identity of the particular Jane.
This I will normally do by various means: who my interlocutor
is, the previous conversation, the general context etc. If
none of these help, I shall probably ask the speaker for more
information. Any information I gain about Jane will be in the
form of invocata or stimulata and these will be associated
with the collect corresponding to Jane in the representation
corresponding to (2). Any collect of a representation may
be augmented^ in this way, and such augmentation has the effect
of restricting the possible matches of the representation.
^
The reader will realise that augmentation is the means by
which what is often called the discourse model is to be built.
4.1 How Representata Can Be Held True or False 199
To see that this is so, consider Figure 4.1.0, in which some
augmentation has been added to (2).
The girl who used to live next door
Figure 4.1.0
Why particular augmentations are made is an interesting question,
but it is not one that I address here or, indeed, need to address,
although contextual information, both non-linguistic and linguistic,
would seem to be important.
A representation of the sentence in (2) augmented as in
Figure 4.1.0 greatly reduces the matching possibilities. Now,
Jane has to be the girl who used to live next door, has blonde
hair, and is not liked by Jill. The table is also constrained by
augmentation, and now instead of being any old table it has to
be the dining-room table with the wobbly leg. Augmentation is
perhaps more usual in the case of proper names and definite
noun phrases, but it is not restricted to them and may, in fact,
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take place on any item in a representatum as the wide definition
of augmentation in (3) shows.
(3) Augmentation The association of any stimulatum or invocatum
with an invocatum.
The contents of an invocatum, stimulatum, or representatum
are its collects and any structurally significant arrangement
of those collects. Thus for a stimulatum and representatum to
share the same contents, it is necessary not only that they
have the same collects, but also that those collects are associated
in the same structurally significant way. However, the matching
specification does not require that the representatum share
the same contents as the stimulatum, but only that the contents
of the representatum are CONTAINED in the stimulatum unless
otherwise specified by negative, quantifying, or intensional
elements. The requirement that the contents of a representatum
be only contained in as opposed to shared with a stimulatum
arises because the "shared-with" demand seems to be far too
strong to be plausible. That there would be a stimulatum
that shared the contents of a particular representatum
without any deviation at all seems most unlikely, and the
upshot of this would be that very few, if any of what I
have called basic truths could exist because the matching
requirement would rarely be met.
To explicate the notion of "contained in" as used in
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(l), I tentatively introduce what I shall call the reduction
inference. This is a tentative proposal because the consequences
of the reduction inference are very broad and a long find
detailed examination of them would be required before one
could promulgate the reduction inference as anything more
than tentative. Be this as it may, the reduction inference
or something like it seems to be required if the matching
process is to be seen as plausible.
(4) The contents of a representatum are contained in
a stimulatum if either:
(a) The representatum and stimulatum share the same
contents.
or
(b) The contents of the stimulatum reduce by the
reduction inference to those of the representatum.
(5) Reduction Inference
(i) Any simple collect (i.e. one not involving significant
structure) of a stimulatum may be reduced to any part(s)
of that collect.
(ii) Any stimulatum may be reduced to any continuous part
of that stimulatum.
(iii) If a is any argument of a stimulatum or is an argument
included in an argument of a stimulatum, and a includes
another argument, b, then a may be reduced to b alone or
l
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to b and any or all of the relators which include b,
provided that a does not include another argument, c,
which neither includes b nor is included in b.
(iv) Any stimulatum or argument of a stimulatum or argument
included in an argument of a stimulatum which contains
a non-first argument may be reduced to the first argument
and its non-first argument relator alone.
The aim of the reduction inference is to preserve implications
of a stimulatum to which it is applied while ensuring that no false
implications are generated. If one considers the sentence in (2)
(repeated here for convenience), then it can readily be seen that
the experience, and hence the stimulatum, which verifies a
statement of this sentence will be vastly richer in information
than the statement.
(2) Jane put a book on the table.
For example, if one witnessed Jane putting the book on the table,
then as part and parcel of this experience, one is likely also
to have noted Jane's age, her appearance, her dress, the size
of the table, its colour, etc. A statement of (2), however, says
nothing about all of these things, and by some means the stimulatum
corresponding to having the experience of witnessing Jane putting
the book on the table must yield as a true implication that Jane
put a book on the table. The suggestion is that the reduction
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inference or something like is used to extract the implication
from the stimulatum and to remove the extraneous information.
The first two parts of the reduction inference ((5i) and
(5ii)) do not alter structure and, therefore, are quite
straightforward. (5ii), for example allows (6) to be reduced
to (7) since (7) (on the arrangement of non-subs assumed here)
will form a continuous part of the stimulatum corresponding to (6).
(6) Jill went to town and Jane had a bath.
(7) Jane had a hath.
The second two parts of the reduction inference ((5iii) and
(5iv)) are less straightforward because they allow for alterations
to structure. Central to these inferences is the notion of
inclusion, and inclusion and, for completeness, immediate inclusion
are defined as follows:
8. Inclusion A relator, r, includes its argument(s), and
if a is any argument included in r, then r
also includes any argument(s) of a.
9. Immediate A relator immediately includes its argument(s)
Inclusion
but not the argument(s) of its argument(s).
Inclusion and immediate inclusion are most easily understood
if it is appreciated that they are equivalent to dominance and
l
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immediate dominance in tree graphs. Hence in Figure 4.1.1, a^
immediately includes a^ and a^, but includes all of to a^.
Figure 4.1.1
Reduction inference (5iii) allows arguments to be simplified.
So it allows (10) to reduce to (ll) because (ll) is a true
implication of (l0).
(10) Big red reading book.
(11) Big book.
The somewhat complex nature of (5iii) arises on two counts:
First, it allows argument simplification at any depth of inclusion.
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Second, it has a provision to stop false implications being
generated. Both requirements can be readily seen on the tree
graph depicted in Figure 4.1.2.
It will be noticed that a arguments occur in the tree wherever a
node dominates another or others. This allows inference (5iii) to
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operate at any depth of inclusion providing there is an including
argument present. It will also he noticed that a c argument occurs
wherever branching does. (5iii) does not permit a^ to reduce to
b^ or b^ because in each case there is a c argument included in a^
which neither includes the relevant b argument nor is included
in it. Such a restriction is necessary to prevent the reduction
of (12) to (13) since clearly (13) is not an implication of (12).
(12) Jane paints the door of the house.
(13) Jane paints the house.
One final complication in (5iii) is that it permits, where
the conditions are met, a to be reduced to just b or b plus all
or any of the relators which include b. This allows the following
possibilities with respect to an argument corresponding to (14).
(14) This big red reading book.
(a) BIG RED READING BOOK




(f) THIS READING BOOK
(B) THIS RED READING BOOK
00 THIS RED BOOK
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(i) THIS BIG BOOK
(j) THIS BIG EED BOOK
(k) THIS BIG BEADING BOOK
(l) BIG RED BOOK
(m) BIG HEADING BOOK
(n) BIG BOOK
(o) RED BOOK
(Where no c arguments are involved, the number of possibilities
may be calculated by taking n as the number of relators and
applying the formula n —1. Hence in the case of (14) there are
2
four relators so n = 4, giving 4 -1 = 15.)
It will be recalled that a relator has its argument-places,
if more than one, ordered. One may talk, therefore, of the
first argument-place, second argument-place, and so on.
Derivatively, one can also talk of the first argument, the
second argument, etc. to mean the argument occupying the first
argument-place, the argument occupying the second argument-place,
etc. respectively. Reduction (5iv) works with first and
non-first arguments, specifying that any stimulatum or argument
in a stimulatum containing a non-first argument may be reduced
to the first argument and the relator of its non-first
argument alone. The relator may then be removed by (5iii) if
required because once a relator is reduced to having just one
argument, it may be reduced to that argument. It is important
here to distinguish between argument-places, which are a permanent
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feature of a relator, and arguments, which are temporarily-
associated with those argument-places. The proviso on reduction
(5iii) applies only to arguments.
Taking Figure 4.1.3 to represent a stimulatum corresponding
to "Jane painting the door of the house on the hill", with the
arguments shown on the blunt end of the arrows and the argument
places of the relators numbered, reduction (5iv) permits the
reductions shown at 4.1.4, 4.1.5, and 4.1.6, but blocks those
shown at 4.1.7, 4.L8, and 4.L9. This is the desired result since
Jane painting the door of the house is not Jane painting the
house or Jane painting the door on the hill or Jane painting
the hill. The arrangements of arguments and argument-places
shown in these figures are only possible arrangements. There
are other possible arrangements for most of the figures and it
is not claimed that the arrangements shown are necessarily
correct for the particular example. "Where by correct I mean
something like "corresponding to the actual semantic structures
built by meaners". Of course, some arrangements might invalidate
the reduction inference and this must he borne in mind when
contemplating alternative arrangements.
X lal Jt T_ III
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To arrive at Figures 4.1.7, 4JL8, and 4JL.9, reduction (5iii) Has
been used to remove the unwanted relators.
Matching a representatum is the first step in holding it
true. The need for the second step arises because of the
possibility of hallucination and illusion. Suppose on a
particular day that I have the experience of seeing a red
car at a certain point on a particular road, then such
information, mediated by various senses and processes
perhaps, will be held as a stimulatum. In view of having
this stimulatum, I will hold true the representatum corresponding
to I saw a red car at such and such a place at such and such
a time so long as I believe my experience to be veridical.
But suppose now that several people whom I trust state that
they were at that particular spot at the relevant time and
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it was a yellow and not a red car, then I should he inclined
in such a circumstance to doubt the veracity of my senses;
perhaps it was an illusion or I hallucinated or I put together
the car and a colour which I was experiencing at that time but
was not the colour of the car. The latter is always a
possibility since stimulations may be associated in any way. If
in the end I no longer believe my experience was veridical,
then I shall no longer hold true the representatum that I saw
a red car at such and such a place. The point of this example
is this: If I can change my mind about a possible basic truth
in the light of evidence about the veridicality of a stimulatum,
then it would seem that holding any representatum true rests
on some premiss that any stimulata (there could be more than
one in the case where inference plays a key role) invoked
are assumed to be veridical. This premiss or condition, as I
shall call it, is probably not to be seen as a positive test to
be passed every time something is matched, rather it is a
negative condition in that it only comes actively into
play when something occurs to cause doubts"'"''' about some
stimulatum or outright contradiction between two stimulata.
Whether the condition is a positive test or merely a usually
12
unchallenged assumption , it remains a condition. There may
11 12* The use of such terms as doubt and assumption should not be
mistakenly thought here to require something over and above
the semantic apparatus. I use this terminology because it is
in these terms that we speak of humans and some other animals,
but they can be replaced with neutral ones. One can think of
a process continuing until the conditions for its continuance
are no longer right.
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be other conditions on the truth of representata and it will be
useful to have a convenient way of collecting these conditions
together and of referring to them collectively. I shall,
therefore, talk of the set, Delta, as being the set of conditions
that must be met, passively or otherwise, and over and above
any matching, when a representation is held true. Delta is
thus specified as follows:
(l6) Delta The set of conditions, if any, which must obtain,
irrespective of matching, if a representation is
to be held true.
We are now in a position to specify formally what it is for
an associator to hold something true in a basic sense. Before
giving such a specification, however, it will be as well to
reflect for a moment on why the talk is always of holding
something true or false rather than something's being true
or false. If the requirements set out in (17) were sufficient to
guarantee truth, then, of course, one could speak of a representation
as being true, but there is no reason to believe that they are
sufficient in this sense: it would be quite remarkable if
they were, given the latitude for error which inevitably they
contain. Rather (l7) is a claim about what is involved when a
representation is held true; it is not a claim about a
representation's being true. To say what is involved in a
positive representation's being true is to give a definition
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of truth in Reseller's sense mentioned above. Essentially,
such a definition will amount to this: A positive representatum
is true if it matches a stimulatum and that stimulatum is/was
caused by external objects having properties or standing in
relationships to each other which are isomorphic to the
structure of the stimulatum. This definition will only be
adequate for basic truths. For those truths involving
inference, including inductive inference, some modification
is necessary.
The formal specification for holding a representatum true,
given at (l7)» is restricted in two ways. First, it is
restricted to positive representata, i.e. to representata
containing no negative elements. Negative representata will
be discussed in the next section. Second, it is restricted to
basic representata, i.e. representata that do not require
anything beyond the reduction inference, matching and meeting
the requirements of Delta to be held true.
(17) Hold True A positive basic representatum is held true if
it can be matched and satisfies the conditions,
if any, of Delta.
So far, I have been concerned with what it is to hold a
positive representatum basically true, now I turn to what it is
to hold a positive representatum basically false. What has been
said about holding a positive representatum true is, I believe,
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largely uncontroversial. In contrast, whatever is said concerning
holding a positive representatum false will inevitably be
controversial because it involves taking a position in the
debate on presupposition. Frequently in the discussion of
presupposition, negation is brought in almost at the very
beginning. This would be satisfactory and useful if negation
was a clearcut uncontroversial matter in its own right which
shed light on the presupposition debate; however, negation
is as controversial a topic as presupposition and to bring
in negation to throw light on presupposition is to risk
increasing the gloom instead of lightening it. Negation,
therefore, will be left until a basic position on presupposition
has been discussed and adopted, and all consideration in the
first instance will concern positive representata only.
There are now many twists and turns to the presupposition
debate, but its essential character can still be grasped from
a brief sketch of the positions of the chief historical
13
protagonists: Frege, Russell, and Strawson .
In his article, "Uber Sin und Bedeutung" (1892), Frege
held that the reference of a declarative sentence was its
truth value, either the TRUE, or the FALSE. Hence it follows
that if a sentence lacks a reference, then it lacks a truth
value. Frege claimed that many sentences lacked a reference
13
Neither Russell, nor Strawson used the term presupposition
in their original work in this area. The term was introduced
at a later date by Strawson.
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because parts of them lacked a referent and gave as an example
one concerning Odysseus:
The sentence "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while
sound asleep" obviously has a sense. But since it is
doubtful whether the name 'Odysseus', occuring therein,
has reference, it is doubtful whether the whole sentence
has one.
(From a translation by Black. Geach and Black 1952: 62)
Thus for Frege, if there was no such person as Odysseus, then
14
the sentence : "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while
sound asleep" is neither true nor false. The implications of
Frege's claim were not perhaps fully appreciated until
Strawson developed them much later.
In an article entitled "On Denoting" (1905) and later
in the fourth of his lectures on the philosophy of logical
atomism (1918), Russell considered the conditions under which
a sentence containing a proper name or definite description
was true or false. Essentially, Russell's proposal was
that a sentence containing a proper name or definite description
was replaced by one or more propositional functions, i.e. a
proposition containing a variable. Russell's well known
example is shown in (18).
(18) The present king of France is bald.
14
Neither is the utterance of such a sentence. Following Strawson,
I accept that properly speaking it is the uses of sentences which
are true or false and not the sentences themselves.
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Russell's claim was that (18) really consisted of the several
propositions set out in (l9)«
(19) There exists someone, x, such that:
(a) x is a king of France now.
00 x is bald.
(c) For all y if y is a king of France now then y = x.
For (18) to he true it was necessary that all of (19) should
be true. But what was if for (18) to he false? Russell said
that (18) could in fact be false in two ways. First, it was
false if the present king of France was not bald. Second,
it was false if there was in fact no present king of France.
The second way of being false follows from Russell's
insistence that in asserting (18) one is asserting the
conjunction of the propositions in (l9)» Russell, then, is
claiming in contradistinction to Frege that if part of a
sentence lacks a referent, then that sentence does still have
a truth value, and that truth value is "false". That Russell
thought it quite wrong to conclude that such a sentence lacks
a truth value can be seen from the following passage:
Therefore unless you understand how a proposition
containing a description is to be denied, you will come
to the conclusion that it is not true either that the
present king of France is bald or that he is not bald,
because if you were to enumerate all the things that
are bald you would not find him there, and if you were
to enumerate all the things that are not bald, you would
not find him there either. (1918 : 251)
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Forty-five yeara later, it was again claimed that a statement
of (18) was in fact neither true nor false if there was no present
king of France. This time the claim was made by Strawson (1950).
Strawson, contra Russell, held that a statement of (18) did not
entail an existence claim about the present king of France, but
rather it was a prerequirement of that statement's having a
truth value that there be a present king of France. If there
was no present king of France then a statement of (18) was neither
true nor false.
Strawson's claims about this prerequirement, what he later
called presupposition, have given rise to a great deal of
interest and debate which has not subsided. Closer
examination has brought to light all kinds of difficulties
and matters seem to stand further from a satisfactory resolution
than they did when Strawson first produced his suggestions.
One reason for the persistency of Strawson's proposals and the
fervour with which they are taken up and built upon by others
is, I suggest, due to their intuitive appeal. If one is asked
the truth value of a statement of (18) and one is not aware of
the republic status of France, then one is a little taken
aback to be told that the statement of (18) is false because
there is in fact no present king of France. This being taken
aback lends intuitive support to the idea that there is
something here to be explained, and since Strawsonian accounts
offer such explanations, they utilise this appeal. I shall
offer an alternative explanation shortly, but first I shall
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consider another example. For this, I use a variant sentence.
Consider (20):
(20) The king of France visited the exhibition.
Under which of the following circumstances is a statement of
(20) false?
(2l)(a) There was a king of France and an exhibition
hut the king did not visit the exhibition.
(b) There was a king of France, but no exhibition.
(c) There was no king of France, nor an exhibition.
(d) There was no king of France, but there was an
exhibition.
Russellians and Strawsonians are agreed in the case of (21a):
a statement of (20) is false if the circumstances of (21a)
obtain. Russellians take the same view with regard to all the
other circumstances. Strawsonians, on the other hand, hold a
statement of (20) neither true nor false in circumstances
(21c) and (21d) and there is a mixture of views concerning
the situation with regard to (21b) (cf. Strawson 1971»
Cooper 1974, Fodor 1979). Pace Strawson and followers, I
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think that Russell was right and a statement of (20) is false
under all the circumstances of (21). If this view is correct
then two things call for an explanation: (a) How is it that
an utterance of (20) can he false under such disparate
circumstances? (b) now can one explain the unease, the
intuitive unease to which Strawson's view appeals, that
temporarily occurs in assigning truth values in circumstances
(21b), (21c), and (21d)?
In answer to the first question, it seems to me to have
great plausibility that a statement is possibly true in a basic
sense if it corresponds to some situation or fact. This, of
course, is the core of the correspondence theory of truth and
it is beset by all kinds of problems once one starts to
investigate what corresponds means and what facts are.
Within the model of the semantic apparatus, it has, I believe,
been possible to give an account of the notion of correspondence
and of what it is that there is a correspondence with which
avoids these difficulties. A representatum is a claimed
representation of some situation or thing. If it fails
to match in any way at all, then it is a false representation,
a false representatum. That a representation is false if it
fails in fact to represent is, I believe, a fundamental tenet
for which very good grounds are needed if it is to be given up.
Now whilst it would be perfectly possible to distinguish
different ways of a representatum's failing to match, it is
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15
not clear that there are any transparent grounds on which to
categorise the various ways of a statement's being false and,
therefore, of a representatum's being false. In such
circumstances it is perhaps better not to make any distinctions
where no distinctions are clear. An utterance of (20), then,
can be false under the disparate circumstances listed in (21)
because it purports to represent a situation which does not
obtain in any of those circumstances.
With regard to the second question, it does seem to me
that even though one rejects Strawson's basic view, one is
still left with the feeling that he has hit on something.
The question is: "What?" There are in fact two things to
be explained. The first is the intuitive appeal of Strawson's
explanation in some cases. The second is the lack of such
appeal in other cases. To explain this varying appeal,
Strawson himself has spoken of "centres of interest" (see
footnote 15), but such an explanation explains little.
Among the phenomena that we are concerned with are the
following:
Strawson (l97l) talks of various degrees of "squeamishness"
and "centres of interest" to explain the varying acceptability
of a statement's having a truth value where there is radical
reference failure, i.e. a failure to refer by use of an identifying
referring expression (: 75). So, for example, Strawson allows
that "The king of France is bald" is false despite radical
reference failure of the identifying referring expression:
The king of France, when it's in reply to the question:
"What bald notables are there? (: 91» 92). N. Burton-Roberts
discusses some of the implications of this view in "Thematic
Predicates and Non-descriptive Definition" (unpublished paper).
4,1 How Representata Can Be Held True or False 221
(22) The king of France is bald
(23) The king of France visited the exhibition
(24) The exhibition was visited by the king of France
Strawson maintains both that as a plain statement (22) is
without a truth value if there is no king of France and that
(22) is false as a statement in response to the question:
"What bald notables are there?" (1971 J 91» 92) if there is
in fact no king of France, In the cases of (23) and (24) the
appeal of the presuppositional account varies as one varies the
circumstances. If there is no king of France but there is an
exhibition, then the appeal of an absence of truth value seems
much stronger in (23) than in (24). What one would like is
some unified account which explains both the basis of the
intuitive appeal of absence of a truth value in some cases,
and the high variability of this appeal.
It has long been noted that the use of the definite
article in languages like English indicates that the hearer
should in some way be already familiar with what the expression
in which the definite article occurs describes. Building on
this, Heim (1982) develops the notion of what she calls
file change semantics. With regard to definite and indefinite
noun phrases, what this essentially amounts to is this: We
Cristophersen 1939 seems to have been one of the first to be
fully explicit about this.
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are to envisage information as being stored on file cards
(metaphorically speaking). The use of a definite noun phrase
will then indicate that a file concerning what is being
described already exists. The use of an indefinite noun
phrase will indicate that a new file is to be opened. In
file change semantics, then, the use of a definite noun
phrase presupposes that a file exists. If such a file does not
exist, then matters can proceed no further, and no question of
truth or falsity can arise. The approach is, therefore,
Strawsonian to that extent. For a statement in which
definite noun phrases occur to have a truth value, it must,
according to Heim, be felicitous, i.e. all of its definite
noun phrases must have pre-existing files or file cards. As
Heim herself notes, given that a file is somehow in the head,
many uses of definite noun phrases do not presuppose a file
in this sense. She quotes Hawkins (1978) as listing eight
uses of definite noun phrases, only two of which fit the
requirement of a pre-existing file. To overcome this difficulty,
Heim introduces the notion of accommodation. Quite simply,
accommodation allows a file card to be created if there is a
failure of felicity due to its non-existence. This proposal
is not so ad hoc as it appears because it allows space for
environmental context and inference to operate in creating
the file card. So, for example, Heim quotes the case of an
utterance of (25),
(25) VtTatch out, the dog will bite you (: 371)
I
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said while walking up a driveway to a house. There is no
dog in sight and the hearer has no previous knowledge of there
being a dog at the house. The utterance of (25) fails the
felicity condition simpliciter because no file card exists for
the expression the dog which is contained in it. However to
overcome this, accommodation can be used and a new file card
created containing the information, "is a dog somewhere
close by" (: 372).
Heim's ideas are interesting, but they seem to have two
major flaws. First, they do not distinguish between
occurrences of definite noun phrases in different positions.
Hence they add nothing by way of explanation to the phenomena
which Strawson calls centres of interest except with regard
to an utterance of (22) in response to a question. In this
case, the question itself could create a file card in the
sense of setting up a file on notables that are bald.
Alternatively, accommodation could be invoked to provide the
file card. Second, however, is that accommodation is so
powerful that it fails to be explanatory in the sense of
giving a reason why it should be used in the case of (22)
when uttered as an answer but not in the case of (22)
uttered by itself.
Ileim's files and file cards can perhaps best be seen
as analogues of representata including the possibility of
augmentation. And it is augmentation, I believe, which
holds the key to a uniform account of the phenomena discussed
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above. The suggestion is this: names and most uses of the
definite determiner have as part of their meaning that they
ought to be augmented, i.e. that there should be some other
information available and this should be added to them. I
make no apology here for introducing another Latinism as a
new term to cover those representata or parts of representata
which correspond to proper names and definite referring
expressions used in a definite way. These I call augmentanda.
the term meaning "those which should be augmented" in Latin.
An augmentandum is then a collect or structure of collects
which has the property of initiating a search for augmentation.
In the case of proper names, one may assume this to be an
inherent property of their corresponding collects. In the
case of definite referring expressions, the property of
requiring to be augmented, like that of the particulariser,
17
seems to be inherited from the definite article .
Augmenting a representatum, will normally cut down the
search space that needs to be looked at in order to obtain a
match. Augmentation puts extra conditions on the possible
matches and thus eliminates many non-possibles. However,
augmentation is not restricted to augraentanda. Parts of
representata corresponding to almost all other parts of
statements may also be augmented, especially those corresponding
17
This raises difficulties in languages like Latin that do not
have articles. Ileim suggests that in such cases an ambiguity
exists between the definite and indefinite meanings (1982 : 267).
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to indefinite noun phrases. It is nonetheless the case that
augmentanda alone have the property of requiring a search for
augmentation and it is this which can be used to explain the
notion of Strawsonian presupposition and its related phenomena.
It is reasonable to suppose that some more or less
efficient algorithm directs the search for matches of
representata. This algorithm does not have to be seen as
some explicit separate instruction mechanism, it might just be
a consequence of the mechanism of invocation. Usually,
though not invariably, before such an algorithm begins to
operate one would expect that any instructions that were part
of the meaning of an expression would be acted upon and
completed. One such type of instruction is, as we shall see
in the next section, concerned with negation, another could
be the requirement associated with being an augmentandum that
it should (not must) be augmented. Suppose now that the
search for augmentation fails or is only partially successful,
then the move on to the matching algorithm will be inhibited
because the demand for augmentation remains. Such frustration
of the matching algorithm caused by a prior requirement to
find a positive augmentation could well explain the intuitive
appeal of the idea that there is some kind of a presupposition
and that it is false. However, the matching process is not
dependent on augmentanda as witness the fact that a truth
value can quite readily be assigned to utterances containing
nothing but indefinite noun phrases as, for example, in an
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utterance of (26).
(26) A man once bit a dog.
This is not to say that augmentation does not take place in such
cases but, rather, to say that it need not.
The claim thus far is this: Built in to augmentanda are
mechanisms which initiate searches for augmentation. If such
searches are frustrated because augmentation cannot be
readily found then this inhibits the move to attempted matching.
Such frustration and inhibition is the basis for any intuitive
feeling that an augmentandum presupposes, rather than entails,
the existence of a match, and hence that it presupposes the
existence of a referent.
It will now be useful to recap and expand on some of the
phenomena that the augmentandum proposal is claimed to explain.
First, in Strawson's view, in the context of (27) (27b) is false
and not lacking in a truth value. What this amounts to in
my approach is that (27b) in its context will inspire less
strangeness than (27b) out of the context of (27) when it is
given a truth value despite the assumption in both cases
that there is no king of France.
(27)(a) What bald notables are there?
(b) The king of France is bald.
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I think that this difference in strangeness, to the extent that
such strangeness exists, can he accounted for if it is borne
in mind that the augmentandum corresponding to the noun phrase
the king of France in (27b) and in the context of (27) has
available some information for augmentation, viz. that the
king is a notable. Now, of course, that a king is a notable
is a matter of sense relations and is, therefore, always
available as augmentation, but its status grows given that
it is in accordance with the given information of the question.
Sense relations will be considered in the next chapter.
Second, as noted above, there are a mixture of views
concerning the truth bearing status of (25) (repeated here
for convenience) in the case where only one of the referring
expressions actually refers.
(23) The king of France visited the exhibition.
Strawson (l97l) claims that whether an utterance of (23) has
a truth value or not depends on whether the expression that
does refer is theme. If it is, then the utterance of (23)
will have a truth value, if it isn't then it will not.
Fodor (1979) argues in contrast that if either referring
expression, whether theme or not, refers, then an utterance
such as (23) has a truth value. Cooper (197^) takes yet a
different position, arguing that the referring expression
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which actually refers is the theme of the utterance wherever it
18
may occur.
It was noted in the case of examples (23) and (24) that
the intuitive feel concerning truth value was somewhat different
in the two cases where the assumption for both was that there
was an exhibition but no king of France. Now in either case on
the approach taken here utterances of (23) and (24) can have a
truth value, but some explanation is called for concerning the
different intuitive feel concerning a truth value which they
seem to call forth. Suppose that in a particular representatum
there are two augmentanda. Now, assuming linear order of
information presentation (as is found in all natural languages
with the possible exception of some prosodic features) and
real time processing, one of these augmentanda will be invoked
first (barring the cases of mishearing and misunderstanding).
It just makes good operational sense to assume that augmentation
will normally commence on that augmentandum first. Once an
augmentation has been found for the first augmentandum, there
is much less need for an augmentation of the second since if a
match can be made for the first, it will quickly become apparent
whether the second figures in the matching stimulatum. But
suppose that the first augmentandum cannot be augmented, then the
18
Burton-Roberts in "Implications of the Pragmatics of
Non-Descriptive Definition" (unpublished paper) argues that
both Fodor's and Cooper's positions are in fact incoherent.
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process becomes frustrated and is inhibited from moving on.
Thus, the general claim is this: Normally, if the
first augmentandum that is invoked in a representatum fails
to be augmented then there is a stronger intuitive feeling
that the corresponding utterance's having a truth value is
odd than is the case where the first augmentandum is augmented
but the second not. Hence, assigning a truth value to an
utterance of (23) should feel much stranger than assigning
one to an utterance of (24) in the situation where there is no
king of France and, granted always, that one has such an
intuitive sense of strangeness in the first place.
The departure point for the above discussion of
presupposition was the consideration of what was involved
in a positive representatum being false. At the bottom of my
concern to explain presupposition in a way which avoids any
of its effects on the truth value of a representatum was the
desire to preserve the notion that for a representatum to be
held true in a basic sense, it had to, as a first step,
represent some situation (mediated by a stimulatum). If,
to the contrary, a representatum fails to represent
(to match) then it is held as a false representation and
hence a false representatum. In actual fact, as with being
held true, it is necessary to allow for the possibility of
additional conditions to apply to a representatum's being
held false. Such conditions might include the (passive?)
satisfaction that sufficient information in the form of
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augmentation was at hand for clearly establishing a non-match.
In parallel to the set Delta, containing conditions over and
above the matching requirement for a representatum to be held
basically true, there will, therefore, be a set Gamma, being
the set of any conditions that must be satisfied in holding
a representatum as basically false over and above the non-matching
requirement. In parallel with Delta, Gamma is specified as
in (28).
(28) Gamma The set of conditions, if any, which must obtain,
irrespective of failure to match, if a
representatum is to be held false.
For basic positive representata, the formal specification
for holding a representatum as false will then be as in (29).
(29) Hold False A positive representatum is held false
if it cannot be matched and the conditions
of Gamma, if any, are satisfied.
In this section, I have been concerned with what is
involved in holding a basic representatum true or false. By
basic representatum I mean a representatum which requires no
inferences beyond the reduction inference and any inferences
involved in Delta and Gamma to establish whether it is to be
held true or false. Whilst basic representata have a special
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place in the scheme of things being proposed here, it would be
wrong to view the difference between basic representata and
non-basic representata as being a fundamental difference in kind.
It is just the case that for contingent truths basic representata
are nearer the beginning of the inference chain than are non-basic
representata. Viewed objectively and even though the meaner may
not be aware of it, there is always an inference involved
in assigning cause to an experience.
It is to be noted that representata are divided into basic
and non-basic not according to their intrinsic properties
(although these may have some consequences), but according
to how they are held true or false. It is therefore possible
that a representatum may be non-basic on one occasion and basic
on another.
The holding of non-basic representata true or false will
involve various kinds of inference. A representatum containing
universal quantification, for example, will involve inductive
inference unless the quantification is restricted to an observable
domain. Many other non-basic representata will involve
inferences based on or partly based on the sense relations to
be discussed in chapter 5.
In the requirement for a match given in (l), certain
exceptions to a match were allowed if they were specified
in a representatum. The next section will be specifically
concerned with that exception involving negation. The other
two exceptions, concerning quantification and intensional
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contexts, I shall not treat in any detail. With regard to
quantification, it is quite clear that modification is necessary
to allow for the collecting together of more than one
stimulatum in order to obtain a match. For example, it is
distinctly possible that the representatum corresponding to an
utterance of (30) involves three separate stimulata.
(30) Three women were wearing red hats.
In addition to intensional cases like that of (31), where
the truth of the statement is not materially affected by there
being or there not being a unicorn, there are those involving
what are called propositional attitudes; believing, doubting,
maintaining, etc., and these will briefly be considered in the
last section of this chapter.
(31) Jane is looking for a unicorn.
If a representatum is neither true nor false, either
because it has failed to satisfy the conditions of Delta or
Gamma or because no attempted match has been made, then I shall
say that it is undetermined. It is not, therefore, the case
that all representata are held either true or false: the form
of the law of excluded middle which runs, "If r is a
representatum, then either r is held true or r is held false"
does not hold in the model of the semantic apparatus being
presented here.
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4.2 Truth, Falsity and Negation
So far, only positive representata have been considered.
Now we must turn to how it is that negative representata,
i.e. those containing negative elements, are held true or
false. I have already remarked that the almost universal
practice of bringing arguments concerning presupposition to
bear on the question of negation and arguments concerning
negation to bear on the question of presupposition seems
unwise, to say the least, given that neither of these
notions are clear-cut and both involve very considerable
difficulty. Because of this, I attempted in the previous
section to deal with what I consider to be the real problem of
presupposition, viz. that concerning the falsity of a
positive representatum. The conclusion reached in the previous
section was that Strawsonian type presupposition plays no
part in truth values. Consideration of examples containing
negatives is often held to show that this conclusion must be
wrong. I shall argue, however, that such considerations rest
on a misunderstanding of the function of negatives and of a
confusion over what is negated in various negative sentences.
I shall begin with what I think is the correct explanation of
negation and then I shall consider some of the discussion and
examples on this topic from the most recent literature.
Traditionally, and by far the most commonly held view to
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this day , is that the most basic operation of a negative is
to negate a whole proposition. Morphologically incorporated
negatives, such as in unrivalled, inconspicuous. disproportionate.
are recognised to he sure, but they are not thought to herald
the possibility that particular item negation is more
widespread than the formal manifestation indicates. But if the
idea of whole proposition negation is to be taken seriously,
then something like the Russell analysis of names and definite
description, illustrated in 4.1 (18), (19)* above is needed,
because it is widely recognised that different parts of a sentence
may be negated. If all negation is propositional then a
sentence must decompose into various propositions in order
that the various parts may appear in propositions and thus be
capable of negation. Traditionally, two types or two scopes of
negation are recognised: Unmarked, internal, or narrow scope
negation; Marked, external, or wide scope negation. So in (l)
the negation is internal or has narrow scope, being restricted
to the predicate; whereas, in (2) the negation is external or
has wide scope, negating the whole sentence (or, rather, the
utterance of that sentence).
(1) The king of France NOT (is bald).
(2) NOT (The king of France is bald).
^ A notable exception is Gabbay and Moravcsilt (1978) who allow
negation of constituents; however, even here, sentence negation
is taken as the more basic or ordinary according to Seuren(1985) •
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But why stop here with just two positions for the
negative? Language abounds with examples where the sense
is that negation clearly occurs other than in these positions.
For example, by use of stress and a change of intonation it
can be made plain to a hearer that it is the capitalised
words in (3) and (4) which are being denied and not any other
parts of the utterances.
(3) The KING of France is not bald.
(4) The king of FRANCE is not bald.
A Russellian type analysis could, I believe, capture these
different positions of negation but only by multiplying the
number of propositional functions into which the definite
description decomposes. Hence instead of the proposition
in (5), one could have the set of proposition, (6) - (9).
(5) x is the king of France now.
(6) x is a king, z, at a time, t^.
^
Seuren (1985 * 216) raises a similar point for Russell's
propositional analysis, but whilst it is true that Russell
concentrates on two ways of "The present king of France is
bald" being false, viz. the present king of France not being
bald and the present king of France not existing, it does seem
to me that further propositions could be posited in the
Russell style which would readily accommodate other positions
for the negative.
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(7) z is the king of France at a time, t^.
(8) t^ = "now".
(9) tg = "now"
The uniqueness condition still needs to be added to this set of
propositions, but it can be readily seen how utterances of (3)
and (4) could be true, without denying that which is true, by
using a finer decomposition into propositional functions.
However, although I think that suitably fine decomposition into
propositional functions may paraphrase what is actually
happening, I do not believe that it offers any explanation
of what is going on and I shall not, therefore, pursue it.
I shall from now on take it as one criterion of adequacy of
a theory of negation that it allows in some way for the denial
of almost any item in an utterance and not just for the
predicate or the whole utterance.
The view of negation taken here is that there is only
one negator, but that this negator is frequently ambiguous
when realised in language with respect to scope. Internal
or unmarked and external or marked negation do not signal
different types of negator, merely a different scope of the
same negator, I assume that the scope possibilities of what
I shall call scopal negation are many and that the
morphologically incorporated negatives are also instances
of scopal negation -hath very narrow scope.
The mechanics of the scopal negator within the model of
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the semantic apparatus are quite readily envisioned. The
scopal negator acts in the same way as bracketing does in
written language to demarcate the extent of the effect of the
negative. This bracketing effect of the scopal negator may
be viewed as being achieved by the scopal negator having
two associative links (in the case of only one negative)
with the representatum to mark the end points of its
influence. Hence in Figure 4.2.0, only BLONDE lies within
the scope of the negator.
HAIR
Figure 4.2.0
In actual operation, I take it that the scopal negator acts
like a kind of label, which when associated with a representatum
or part of a representatum has the effect of designating that
representatum or that part of the representatum as not in fact
representing at all. In other words, whilst a positive
representatum purports to represent, a negative representatum
purports not to represent, and in some cases will indicate
by the scope of the negator precisely what part of the
representatum supposedly does not represent.
In considering whether a negative representatum matches,
BLONDE ki
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that part or those parts outside the scope of the negator must
match in the usual way, whereas the part within the scope of the
negator must not match. Hence in the case of (lO), one reading
is that a situation does not obtain now where Jane smokes. If
Jane does in fact smoke now, then (10) is false because that
part of the representatum corresponding to (10) which was
labelled as not representing by the negator, does indeed represent.
(10) Jane does not smoke.
21
An example such as (ll) could he many ways ambiguous
in respect of the negative. The various possibilities are
shown in (12) where brackets indicate the scope of negation.
(ll) Ann hasn't blonde hair.
(12)(a) Ann has blonde NOT (hair)
(b) Ann has NOT (blonde) hair
(c) Ann NOT (has) blonde hair
(d) NOT (Ann) has blonde hair
(e) Ann has NOT (blonde hair)
21
The emphasis here is on the could. In many situations,
because of stress, intonation, previous linguistic context,
general context, or particular knowledge, an utterance of (ll)
would not in any way be taken as ambiguous. But since it
could in general have various readings, account must be taken
of how this is possible.
I
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(f) Ann NOT (has blonde hair)
(g) NOT (Ann has blonde hair)
(h) NOT (Ann has) blonde hair
(i) NOT (Ann has blonde) hair
(j) Ann NOT (has blonde) hair
For simplicity of exposition, let it be assumed that (l2a)
to (l2g) are representata, then attention can be concentrated
on the conditions that must obtain for these representata to
match. The scope of the negator in (12a) is restricted to
HAIR and for (l2a) to match, its contents, excepting HAIR,
must be contained in a stimulatum. Notice that in (l2a)
that there be Ann is not presupposed but is entailed because ANN
lies outside of the scope of the negative and must, therefore,
be contained in a stimulatum. Examples (l2b) - (l2d) are
similar to (l2a) in that the scope of the negative is restricted
to a single item, but in the case of (l2d) there is a requirement
that ANN not be matched and, by implication, there not be
a relevant Ann.
Examples (l2e) - (l2g) differ from those of (l2a) - (l2d)
in having more than one item within the scope of the negator.
The requirement for a match in these cases is precisely the
same as in the former cases but because more than one item is
within the scope of the negator, the consequences are somewhat
different. It will be remembered that a representatum fails
to match if its contents are not contained in a stimulatum.
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A part of a representatum fails to match if its contents in
the context of the rest of the representatum are not contained
in a stimulatum. The upshot of this is that only one item
within the scope of the negator needs to fail to match in order
for everything within the scope of the negator to fail to
match. Hence in the case of (l2e) it is sufficient that Ann
has dark hair for there to be a match since that part of it
within the scope of the negator, viz, BLONDE HAIR, will
fail to match since BLONDE fails to match. There is no
requirement in such a case that Ann he hairless too. Thus in
example (l2g) it is not necessarily the case that the
entailment concerning Ann is cancelled. (l2g) will match both
if there is no Ann and if there is an Ann but she doesn't have
blonde hair. The only sure way to cancel the entailment of
Ann's existence is by using (l2d).
The various possibilities of scope with the scopal
negator and the fact that a failure to match may be induced by
one or more elements within the scope of the negator leads to
situations where there can be a vagueness about the meaning
of some negative utterances. The term vagueness I appropriate
from Kempson (1975) where she draws a distinction between
vagueness and ambiguity. Although Kempson makes this
distinction, she does not make it quite as precise as would
be useful. This is so, I think, because she continues to
talk of sentences as being both vague and ambiguous. She
has this to say on page 16:
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Furthermore, the two semantic concepts of vagueness and
ambiguity are theoretically distinguished. An ambiguous
sentence is formulated as having two quite separate
structures, whereas a vague sentence is one which is
characterised semantically by a disjunction.
Kempson, in speaking of sentences as being both vague and
ambiguous, blurs the sharp distinction between ambiguity and
vagueness. Only something which has meanings can be ambiguous.
Therefore a sentence, sign, or sub can be ambiguous because
they can all have more than one meaning. Meanings themselves,
however, cannot be ambiguous since meanings do not have meaning
but AHE meanings. Vagueness, in contrast, is not a property of
sentences, signs, or subs at all, but a property rather of
meanings. Speaking loosely for convenience one might talk of
an utterance as being vague instead of ambiguous to mean
that the utterance is not ambiguous but its meaning is vague,
but such loose talk is likely to hide the fact that vagueness
is a property of a meaning that an utterance might have and not
a property of the utterance itself. An utterance which has a
vague meaning is not itself vague: it is quite precise in
designating a vague meaning.
Negative representata are therefore matched in the
following way:
(15) Negative Representata Match
A negative representatum matches if all parts of it not
within the scope of the negator match and each scopal
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segment of it fails to match. Where scopal segment is
defined as that part or whole of a representatum which
lies within the scope of the negator and is the greatest
such part that lies within that particular scope of the
negator.
Scopal segment is so defined in (13) as not to require that every
part of a representatum which is within the scope of the negator
fail to match because if it was, then there would be no
vagueness in respect of negation and this is contrary to the data.
The conditions specified in 4.1 (17) and (29) for holding a
representatum true and false respectively now apply to negative
representata as well as positive representata. Again,
attention is restricted to basic representata, i.e. representata
which do not involve any inferences beyond the reduction
inference to be held true/false.
Before leaving the proposals on negation and considering
how they fare in comparison to some other recent treatments,
a comment is called for concerning double negation. In some
English dialects, double negatives cancel each other out, but
there are many dialects and languages where this cancellation
does not happen; rather there appears to be a reinforcement
effect. In some cases, Spanish for example, the use of
multiple negatives is obligatory and any reinforcing effect is
perhaps long lost. A study of the limits of the cancellation
and reinforcement effect might be quite informative as to
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how negation works in language. For example, it is readily-
agreed that there is no question of the negatives in the
first or second conjunct of (14) cancelling or reinforcing
the other. The cancellation and reinforcement effect do not
seem to cross conjunction boundaries.
(14) Jill didn't meet Jane and Ann didn't go to town.
In traditional terms, cancellation and reinforcement are
restricted to operating within a clause, whether that clause
is co-ordinate as in (14) or main or subordinate as in (15).
(15) Ann didn't see the man that Jane didn't know.
It seems to be a reasonable assumption that negation
cancellation and reinforcement effects occur when two scopes of
the negator overlap, and the fact that such effects are in
general clause limited suggests that a scope of the negator
rarely exceeds that of the clause. It would be interesting to
find within the model of the semantic apparatus a reason as to
why this should be so, especially in view of the considerable
flexibility of scope that the negator is supposed to have in
that model. I have not, however, been able to discover any
plausible reason for the clause limited scope of negation and
the matter remains a puzzle.
That negator scope interaction within the clause is responsible
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for cancellation and reinforcement effects is supported by the
lack of such effects when one of the negator scopes is indicated
by morphologically incorporated negatives as in examples
(16) - (20).
(16) She cannot avoid the unavoidable.
(17) Impatience is not a virtue.
(18) I never visited the non-Africans.
(19) Jane did not sense the inhospitality.
(20) People do not see the inconspicuous.
In such cases, the morphologically incorporated negative indicates
narrow scope, scope restricted to a single item, and the two
scopes of negation do not overlap; hence no cancellation or
reinforcement effects.
The lack of negative scope interaction is the case for most
morphologically incorporated negatives, but there are exceptions.
Chief among these exceptions are the lexical items: nobody,
none, nowhere, nothing, as examples (21) - (24) show.
(21) Jill didn't see nobody.
(22) Jane hadn't got none.
(23) Ann hadn't been nowhere.
(24) She didn't see nothing.
It is undoubtedly significant that in these cases the morphologically
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incorporated negative is no-, but I can suggest very little
concerning the precise nature of this significance beyond
observing that either no- induces vide scope or it is attracted
into the other scope of the negator.
The fact that no ready explications are to hand in respect
of the clause limited scope of negation or of the negative scope
inducing properties of no- does not detract from a scopal view
of negation since these remain tough problems for any theory of
negation.
I want now to turn to a recent article on negation by
Horn (1985). Horn distinguishes two types of negation which
he calls descriptive negation and metalinguistic negation.
Descriptive negation is very like (the very same as?)
internal negation. On the other hand, whilst Horn sometimes
uses external negation or marked negation for metalinguistic
negation, he uses the latter term to cover such a variety of
phenomena that it would be unwise and misleading to construe
metalinguistic negation in terms of the more traditional and
restricted notions of external or marked negation. For Horn,
metalinguistic negation is "...a way for speakers to announce
their unwillingness to assert something in a given way, or to
accept another's assertion of it in that way." (: 135)»
Whilst I accept that all of Horn's examples do share this
characteristic, I do not believe that this is a useful way to
group them given their disparate natures in other respects. I
shall look at some of Horn's examples and offer some alternative
4.2 Truth, Falsity and Negation 246
explanations of what is going on.
A striking feature of many of Horn's examples is a particular
use of stress or intonation. Thus in (25) and (26) the
capitalised words are to indicate heavy stress.
(25) SOME men aren't chauvinists - ALL men are. (: 132)
(26) John didn't manage to solve SOME of the problems - he
managed to solve ALL of them (: 132)
22
According to Horn, (25) and (26) exhibit metalinguistic
negation. In both cases the use of some is being objected to
because it understates the situation. Here the prosodic cues
tell one that negation is not being used in a normal way but
rather to mean something like "not only". However, Horn
objects to this explanation on the grounds that it is not
extendable to other types of cases. He cites Lehrer and
Lehrer (1982) who put forward this interpretation because of
the hyponymic relationship involved in such cases. They
quote example (27) (their example (14)) in this connection.
(27) This wine is not good, it's excellent.
(28) This wine is not only good, it's excellent.
Not typical metalinguistic negation because Horn brings such
a variety of phenomena under this label that one would be hard
pressed to say what is a typical example.
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(27) is to be interpreted as (28) because "excellent" is
a hyponym of "good". A similar kind of hyponym - superordinate
relationship can be seen as existing between "all" and "some".
Horn's objection that this explanation does not extend to
other cases surely misses the point: the negative used in
this particular type of context containing stress and hyponymy
has the meaning of "not only", it does not have the same
meaning in other cases because the context is different. It
is only Norn's seeking to bring such a disparate set of examples
under one term that leads him to claim the inadequacy of the
Lehrers' explanation for these particular cases. They might
just as well respond that he is seeking to unify that which is
not unifiable.
Another use of negation that Horn seeks to bring under
the metalinguistic umbrella is exemplified in (29) and (30).
(29) I didn't manage to trap two MONGEESE — I managed to
trap two MONGOOSES. (: 132)
( )
(30) We didn't ( 'have intercourse'/'make love') - we fucked.
( ) (: 133)
In both these cases, prosodic features are used to indicate
that negation is not being used in the normal way. In (29)
this is achieved by stress and the effect is to give a meaning
as paraphrased in (3l)»
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(31) I didn't manage to trap two things called mongeese -
I managed to trap two things called mongooses.
(31) is not ad hoc as may he learnt hy asking any English
speaker what (29) means. Frequently, more elaborate
paraphrases will be given involving an intimation that
mongeese is not the plural of mongoose. hut even speakers who
do not know this can get the meaning of (3l) out of an
utterance of (29).
In the case of (30)» Horn claims that the negation is being
used to deny the style or register of the quoted elements.
This seems exactly right, but it is prosodic features (slight
pauses and change of intonation pattern) which change quite
clearly and precisely the meaning of (32) into something like
that of (33).
(32) We didn't have intercourse - we fucked.
(33) The phrase have intercourse is not appropriate
in this situation where fucked is appropriate.
Notice that in both the paraphrases of (3l) and (33) negation
remains - presumably descriptive negation in Horn's dichotomy -
and this suggests that in this type of metalinguistic negation,
the negation can be rendered in non-metalinguistic terms.
This raises suspicions as to whether there really is a
metalinguistic negator in these cases or whether prosodic
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features plus perhaps some inferences simply put the negator
in its right setting. Horn himself talks sometimes of the
"...metalinguistic uses of negation..." (: 145) rather that
of metalinguistic negation, as if after all there is only
one negator.
Cases where inference alone, without the help of prosodic
features, is used to arrive at the correct meaning are also
cited by Horn, although he has nothing to say as to how the
correct meaning is arrived at. One such example is given in
(34) where a guess that the speaker is talking about Elizabeth II
of England and some inferences concerning the fact that
although a familiar form of the name Elizabeth is Lizzy in
that particular situation it is inappropriate.
(34) She isn't Lizzy, if you please - she's Her Imperial
Majesty. (133)
In dealing with what Horn calls scalar cases on page 139»
he gives the examples (35) — (37)» remarking
It seems peculiar at first glance that the same state
of affairs can be alternatively described in terms of
Max's HAVING three children and of his NOT having
three children.
(35) Max has three children - indeed, he has four.
(36) Max doesn't have three children - (*but) he has four.
(37) Wax doesn't have three children, (but) he has two.
4.2 Truth. Falsity and Negation 250
Horn claims that (35) and (36) are consistent, and so they are,
but the parts before the dashes are not and for Horn to claim
that Max's having three children and Max's not having three
children describes the same state of affairs seems very
misleading to say the least. The assumption is, of course,
that if Max has four children then he has at least three
children, just as it is the case that if a box of apples
weighs twenty pounds then it weighs at least five pounds;
but in both cases the phrase at least is important because
it is false that Max has three children and that the box
of apples weighs five pounds.
23It is perhaps futile to swop intuitions on these matters,
but based on his intuitions Horn claims that (36) is a use of
metalinguistic negation to deny the conversational implicatum
that is carried by the non-negated sentence, viz. that Max
has ONLY three children. Once one allows that three is not
equal to four, then (36) is perfectly adequately understood
with descriptive negation.
Horn observes that morphologically incorporated negatives
cannot be metalinguistic. Two of his examples are given
in (38) and (39).
^ Intuitions do vary widely on these types of cases, including
my own. Much seems to depend on the subject matter. So, for
example, if one asks somebody who has £25 on them if they have £8
the answer will be invariably, "Yes". If on the other hand, one
asks a two legged person whether they have one leg, the answer
is invariably, "No".
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(39) The queen of England is (not she 's
( )
ecstatic.
In both these cases, the morphologically incorporated negative
in unhappy will not permit what Horn calls a metalinguistic use,
hut what might be more generally seen as a wide scope reading.
This, of course, is hardly surprising if the variable scope
of negation is accepted since apart from the exceptions noted
earlier, morphologically incorporated negatives have their
scope firmly restricted to the item in which they occur.
So in the case of (38), the scope of the negative in unhappy
is restricted to happy and cannot he widened or moved to cover
the king of France. The scope of not is not so restricted. In
the case of (39)t there is no possibility of reinterpreting the
incorporated negative as "not only", but as was seen earlier
in (27) this is perfectly possible with not in the case of
a hyponymic relation.
Horn has collected together under the umbrella term of
metalinguistic negation a disparate bunch of uses of negation.
Clearly, the negatives that occur in language are sometimes
ambiguous with respect to scope and clearly where prosodic
features or inference indicate that the normal meaning of an
utterance involving a negative does not hold, then a revision
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of meaning, including very often a movement of the negative,
occurs; but these things by themselves do not justify the
descriptive/metalinguistic dichotomy suggested by Horn.
In particular, Horn's dichotomy offers no suggestions as to
why descriptive and metalinguistic negation often do the
same job. (40) and (41) have the same meaning, though in
(40) one has, in Horn's terminology, descriptive negation,
and in (41) one has metalinguistic negation. Prosodic
information in (41) restricts the scope of negation just as
surely as morphological considerations in (40), and this argues
against Horn's distinguishing two types of negation in this
case.
(40) That's a young unhappy girl.
(41) That's not a young HAPPY girl.
Another recent treatment of negation has been offered by
Seuren (1985). After considering some evidence, he comes to
this conclusion:
The minimal conclusion from all this is that there are
at least two ways of using the negative operator in
language: a presupposition-preserving way and a
presupposition-cancelling way. The question now is:
what is the optimal formal account of this difference:
two truth-functionally distinct negation operators,
two possible structural positions of the same
negative operator, or some third alternative. (: 234)
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Seuren plumps for the first alternative and introduces the
terms minimally false for presupposition-preserving negation,
and radically false for presupposition-cancelling negation.
This gives Seuren a trivalent truth-value system instead of
the classical bivalent one.
Seuren makes a point of emphasising (: 240) that radical
negation cannot be equated with metalinguistic negation since
frequently it will be minimal negation which is involved in
the metalinguistic function. Seuren offers as an example (42).
(42) He isn't just "well off": he is damned rich.
Minimal negation and not radical negation is said to be involved
in (42) because all presuppositions are preserved, but clearly
the negation is used metalinguistically according to Horn's
criterion.
The main evidence that Seuren looks at for his conclusion
consists in a number of environments where it is claimed
"...negations are per se presupposition-preserving". (: 229).
I shall consider these environments in turn to see whether
they offer any counter-evidence to the scopal interpretation
of negation being proposed here.
(A) Morphologically incorporated negations'^ (: 250)
24
I use Seuren's headings, but not his example numbers.
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Except for the cases of nobody and never, morphologically
incorporated negatives seem to be of the minimal negation
type only. Hence, both (43a) and (43b) entail that Harry
exists, whereas (44) does not. If the morphologically
incorporated negative is used to try and cancel the presupposition
of Harry's existence as in (45) then a contradiction results.
(43)(a) Harry is co-operative )
) = Harry exists.
(b) Harry is unco-operative )
(44) Harry is NOT co-operative: he doesn't existl
(45) Harry is UNco-operative: he doesn't exist!
As was noted above, the scope of the morphologically
incorporated negative is restricted. It cannot, as Seuren
shows in (45), extend to cover other items. The fact that
morphologically incorporated negatives (apart from the
mentioned exceptions) do not cancel presuppositions follows
from their restricted scope and not from any intrinsic feature
they possess.
(b) Negation in non-canonical positions (: 250)
By canonical position for negatives in English, Seuren
means that the negative is in construction with the finite
verb. According to Seuren all non-canonical negations are
minimal in that they are presupposition preserving. Hence
(46) entails that there were doors, and (47) is a
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contradiction because it attempts to cancel this entailment.
There is no contradiction in (48) where the negative is
in canonical position.
(46) Not all the doors were shut. = There were doors.
(47) NOT all the doors were shut: there WERE no doors.
(48) Tim did NOT shut all the doors: there WERE no doors.
Again this evidence is consistent with a scopal analysis of
negation. The change of scope possibilities indicated by
position is only to be expected if scope possibilities
are to serve any useful purpose.
(c) Non-extraposed factive subject clauses (: 250)
Certain verbs, called factive verbs in the literature, are
said to presuppose their complement sentences. Hence if I
realise that I have missed the bus, then I have indeed missed the
bus and if I do not realise that I have missed the bus, then
I have still missed the bus. What Seuren notices in examples
like (49), (50), and (51) is that with some factive verbs
negation in canonical position with the factive verb does not
usually cancel the presupposition of the factive clause
when it is in subject position. Thus (49) is said to presuppose
that Bill was guilty, and this leads to a contradiction in (50)
when this is denied. In (51) there is no such contradiction
because the clause is now a complement and no longer a subject.
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(49) That Bill was guilty did not surprise her. = Bill was
guilty.
(50) That Bill was guilty did NOT surprise her: he
WASN'T guilty.
(51) It did NOT surprise her that Bill was guilty: he
WASN'T guilty.
Hence in (49) and (50) one has presupposition-preserving
minimal negation and in (51) presupposition-cancelling radical
negation. This is a useful observation, but it is not
explanatory. A scopal analysis of negation on the other
hand, offers an explanation as to how (but not as to why)
these distinctions are made. To see this it is necessary
to cash the usually used above. Seuren makes this parenthetical
remark with regard to (50):
Note that (l3c) [5QJ is no^ contradictory with contrastive
accent on the subject clause and parenthesis intonation
on he wasn't guilty. It is, however, clearly contradictory
with accents on not and wasn't as in (l3c). (: 231)
Thus Seuren recognises that there are ways of cancelling the
presupposition of the factive clause even when in subject
position. But this merely goes to show that intonation and
emphasis are important cues for establishing the scope of
negation, and not that there are two types of negation.
Revising (50) as suggested by Seuren in the above quotation, one
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has (52), which is no longer a contradiction.
(52) THAT BILL WAS GUILTY did not surprise her: (he
wasn't guilty.
The scope of negation in (50) and (52) is now shown in (53) and
(54) respectively.
(53) That Bill was guilty did NOT (surprise) her: he
was NOT (guilty).
(54) That Bill NOT (was guilty did surprise) her: he was
NOT (guilty).
Of course, (54) represents a vague meaning since the scope of
the first negative is so wide; but the alternative is to treat
(52) as ambiguous, which indeed it may be. She might have been
surprised but not by Bill's guilt, and certainly, if the last
clause is true, she could not have been surprised by his guilt.
Bill and her are outside the scope of negation in (54) and
this means that if (54) is to be true then "Bill" and "her"
must match. This amounts to saying that (54) entails that
there be a Bill and a she, and does not merely presuppose them.
One difficulty with Seuren's whole approach on this matter is
that whilst radical negation is said to cancel presuppositions,
it is not clear what ones it cancels. Seuren certainly seems to
envisage a reading of (52) where the presupposition concerning
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Bill is taken to hold, but even this could be cancelled in the
case where the last clause is replaced by: "There's NO such person".
(d) Cleft and pseudocleft constructions (: 25l)
(55) is a contradiction because the pseudocleft sentence
entails that he said something even though it may not have
been "aargh".
(55) What he said was NOT "aargh!he didn't say anything
at all!
This in fact may be a similar situation to that seen in (c)
above, for in both cases one has a first clause which does not
usually come within the scope of a following negative. Once
the negative is moved into the first clause then the cancellation
of any entailment seems to be possible:
(56) What John did NOT say was "aargh": he said nothing!
(57) What JOHN did not say was "aargh": there is no John!
Notice that with a preceding negative as in (58) and subordination,
cancellation of entailments is straightforward.
(58) It is not the case that what John said is "aargh":
nothing at all was said.
(e) Contrastive accents (: 251)
Seuren observes that (59) and (60) entail that somebody
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started the argument and that a contradiction results, as in
(61), if one attempts to cancel this entailment.
(59) The WAITER STARTED THE ARGUMENT ) . . . . .v
j _ somebody started
(60) The WAITER didn't start the argument ) arSumen^«
(61) The WAITER did NOT start the argument: NOBODY did!
This is excellent evidence for a scopal analysis of negation
since the item hearing the contrasting accent restricts the
scope of negation to itself and in the context of (6l) this
cannot be overriden by stress on the negative. Seuren,
however, claims that (62) is not contradictory. My intuitions
are that it is because the scope of the negative is again
restricted to "waiter" by stress or contrasting accent. For
me it is (63) rather than (62) which is non-contradictory.
(62) It is not true that the WAITER started the argument:
nobody did!
(63) It is NOT true that the waiter started the argument:
nobody did!
(f) Negations in non-assertive clauses (: 23l)
Clauses involving verbs such as seem, appear, look
(= "have the appearance of") do not assert that something is
the case. In such cases, Seuren notes that presuppositions
are not cancelled, nence (64) entails that Harry had a sister
4.2 Truth, Falsity and Negation 260
and this leads to a contradiction in (65) where an attempt is
made to cancel the entailment. In (66), on the other hand,
the first clause does not entail that Harry has a sister, and
so (66) does not involve a contradiction.
(64) Harry seems NOT to have been to his sister's funeral.
(65) Harry seems NOT to have been to his sister's funeral:
he never HAD a sister!
(66) Harry has NOT been to his sister's funeral: he never
HAD a sister!
Why the scope of the negative in (64) and (65) should be
restricted to the verb cluster when it is not similarly
restricted in (66) is something of a mystery. Clearly it
has much to do with the particular verbal item and verbs
like seem might have a clearly defined range for what it is
that is only seeming as opposed to what is accepted. Whatever
the correct answer, these examples offer no evidence against
a scopal analysis of negation.
(g) Negations with Negative Polarity Items (: 252 ff)
Negative polarity items (NPIs) are words or phrases which
require an accompanying negative, negative adverb or adjective,
in declarative sentences: such sentences becoming ungrammatical
if the negative is ommitted. Hence, in English one can say:
"I haven't seen her in weeks", but not: "I have seen her in
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25weeks". Seuren lists a number of NPIs and notes that in some
cases emphatic or contrastive accent can replace the negative.
He maintains that in the case of factive NPIs these preserve all
the presuppositions of their positive counterparts (ignoring
the ungramraaticality of those positive counterparts presumably).
Hence, because (67) entails that Joe's boss is an alcoholic,
(68) is a contradiction
(67) Joe does NOT mind that his boss is an alcoholic.
(68) Joe does NOT mind that his boss is an alcoholic: the
man ISN'T an alcoholic!
Since NPIs by definition are closely bound up with negation,
it is not really surprising that they should involve some
scope restrictions on negatives.
In contrast to NPIs, Seuren discusses positive polarity
items (PPIs). These are not strictly opposite to NPIs since
it is not the case that they cannot be used with a negative,
but when they are they produce what Seuren describes as
"...a feeling that the non-negated sentence has been uttered
just before, and the negation is felt to have the function of
indicating that there is something radically amiss with that
25
Some of these seem doubtful to me. Seuren lists can possibly,
for example, but: "I can't possibly make it next week" and
"I can possibly make it next week" both seem equally acceptable
to me without any need for the emphatic accent which Seuren
notes can replace the negative in other cases.
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sentence as a whole." (: 233)« Seuren gives examples (69)
and (70) to highlight the contrast between the way an NPI
(any more) under negation preserves presuppositions and the
way in which a PPI (still) under negation cancels presuppositions.
(69) is, therefore, a contradiction, while (70) is not.
(69) Harold doesn't live in Paris any more: he has never
set foot in France!
(70) Harold does NOT still live in Paris: he has never
set foot in France!
From this evidence, Seuren argues for two negators: a
presupposition-preserving negator, the minimal negator; and the
presupposition-cancelling negator, the radical negator. The
evidence that Seuren adduces, however, is perfectly consistent,
as we have seen, with a single, variable scope negator. Ytfhat
is clear from Seuren's evidence is that environment (including
especially prosodic features) is important in determining scope.
The fact that entailments (or presuppositions, in Seuren's terms)
change according as the scope of negation changes, is satisfactorily
accounted for by the changing matching requirements that changes
in scope bring about; and entailment changes are best viewed as
the consequences of scope changes and not as the cause, for in
that way no independently motivated account of entailment changes
need he sought.
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Holding something true is a sort of unmarked attitude
because this attitude or opinion does not normally need to he
expressed explicitly in language. Naturally, to avoid confusion
other attitudes have to he made explicit. For this purpose
languages contain a set of attitude verbs. In English, some
of these are: believe, think, .judge. doubt, maintain. The
truth conditions of an utterance containing an attitude verb or
phrase (other than it is true/false that) differ from the
utterance without the attitude verb or phrase. Hence, (l)
can be true even though (2) is false, and (2) can be true even
though (l) is false. It cannot, however, be the case that
Jill holds (2) true hut does not hold (l) true. This is a
fact about the meaning of believe.
(1) Jill believes (that) Jane smokes.
(2) Jane smokes.
In contrast, it can be the case that Jill holds (l) true without
being willing to assert (2): I may believe that Jane smokes
but I might not be of sufficient certainty concerning the
Holding is used here as previously to distinguish between what
is true and what in somebody's opinion is true. Such opinions are
normally asserted in statements without any explicit reference to
truth. The locution "I hold x time" in containing an explicit
attitude is not of the unmarked kind referred to above.
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facts about Jane to assert unequivocally that it is true. The
as Jill or I are concerned because of lack of information or
even just because of lack of consideration.
Attitude items like holding true, holding false.
believe, know, think, have as their referents processes
internal to the semantic apparatus. To hold something true
or to believe it is just to be in a state where the holding
true process or the believing process has been successful.
It is important to make clear that these internal referents
for attitude items are not the meanings of those items.
The meanings of these items are the discriminators which the
referents stimulate, and these discriminators may be invoked
while being stimulated just like any other discriminators.
The meaning of believe therefore is not the fact of believing
but, if one likes, the sensor of the fact of believing. A
simple diagram may help make this clear.





I shall not attempt to specify here what is involved in
the believing process or in the processes relating to the
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many other attitude items. This is because it is very unclear
as to what is involved in detail. This may he because the
meanings of such terms are not homogeneous, i.e. they have
more than one underlying process as their referents. That
this may he the case is readily seen from the simple mismatch
of attitude vocabulary between languages. So, for example,
croire in French overlaps hut does not coincide with English
believe. The way in which the processes connected with
attitude items may he spelt out, however, has been fully
demonstrated by the cases of holding true and hold false,
which themselves are attitudes.
No alteration of the matching requirement is needed
for representata containing attitude items since in the
case of the attitude holder being the same as the subject
of the representatum, if the attitude process has been
successful, then there will he a stimulatum to this effect;
and in the case where the attitude holder is different from
the subject of the representatum some inferencing mechanism
(beyond the reduction inference) will he involved since,
presumably, we can only infer other people's attitudes.
It is possible that attitudes other than holding
something true or false may have conditions, like those of
Delta and Gamma, which must be satisfied in addition to
any other requirements. But if this is the case then
there is a possibility of an infinite regress, for suppose
it is a condition in Delta that the experience (the stimulatum)
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be believed veridical, then further suppose that a belief also
has conditions and one of these conditions involves a belief,
then there will be an infinite regress since a belief
depends on a belief and that belief in turn depends on another
belief and so on ad infinitum. The only way out of this
regress as far as I can see is to assume that there must be
basic attitudes which do not have conditions involving other
attitudes attached. The possibility of the existence of such
basic attitudes is of considerable interest because it involves
the idea of some kind of decision procedure which operates
in the absence of firm criteria.
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5. Sense Relations
In this chapter, I consider sense relations from the point
of view of the semantic apparatus. I treat sense relations as
objective phenomena (i.e. not a consequence of the theory) which
are in need of explanation, and the object here is to suggest
some explanations of the major sense relations in terms, as far
as possible, of the components of the model of the semantic
apparatus already introduced. When this is not possible, new
components must be added. My purpose is to attempt to explain
the basis of sense relations rather than merely describe them.
As such, I reject the purely descriptive approach to sense
relations advocated by Lyons:
I consider that the theory of meaning will be more
solidly based if the meaning of a given linguistic unit
is defined to be the set of (paradigmatic) relations
that the unit in question contracts with other units of
the language (in the context or contexts in which it
occurs), without any attempt being made to set up
'contents' for these units. (1963 • 59)
Despite their name, sense relations do not form a
homogeneous class of relationships because some of them hold
between form and meaning and others between meanings alone. In
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the case of polysemy there is one form and several meanings
which may or may not be related. Whereas in the case of hyponymy
a relationship exists between one meaning^ and another, whether
or not those meanings are associated with forms. One can bring
all sense relations into one class providing one always talks
of the meaning of a form, but this way of looking at matters
has two serious shortcomings: First, it ignores the fact that
a division can be made between sense relations which necessarily
involve form and those that do not. Second, it assumes that all
meanings are associated with forms; this is especially doubtful
with regard to partial synonymy and hyponymy as will be shown
later.
One writer who makes a very clear distinction between the
two kinds of sense relation is Leech (l97^)> and he puts it this
way on pages 101 and 102:
(i) Synonymy and polysemy are relations between form and
meaning:
(a) Synonymy: more than one form having the same meaning.
(b) Polysemy: the same form having more than one meaning.
Meaning here is not being used in the strict way defined in
chapter 2, but in the usual pre-theoretic way. This is
because for something to be a meaning in my terms it must be a
non-sub associated with a sub. Meanings that lack an associated
form would seem to lack an associated sub. The definitions
of hyponymy and partial synonymy to be given later will not
mention the word meaning and will, therefore, observe the
strict theoretical sense of meaning given in chapter 2.
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(il) hyponymy and incompatibility are relations between two
meanings:
(a) Hyponymy is the inclusion of one meaning within
another.
(b) Incompatibility is the exclusion of one meaning
from another.
I shall follow Leech in his general division of sense relations
but I shall treat partial synonymy as being a relationship
between non-subs, and incompatibility will not be taken as
unrestricted meaning exclusion.
I take the view that sense relations arise in the first
instance within individual associators and that only in a
derivative sense can one speak of them occurring in a public
semantic system. For this reason, the basic discussion and
specification of sense relations is in terms of the individual
associator. This is then followed by specification of sense
relations in terms of a public semantic system.
Inevitably, there will be rather a lot of definition or
specification in this chapter. Such detail is unavoidable if
it is to be demonstrated how the fundamentally important
sense relations can be handled and explained in the model of
the semantic apparatus which has been presented. Some




Polysemy, one form having more than one meaning, is often
contrasted with homonymy, two or more identical forms having
different meanings. However, from the point of view of the
semantic apparatus, this distinction is a logical nonsense, for
how can two identical forms be different for an associator?
The logical nonsense arises because of the claim that homonymy
involves two identical forms. One way round this is to talk
of lexemes in the sense of Matthews 1972, 197^, where lexeme is
taken to be an abstract unit similar to a phoneme or morpheme.
Hence, one would have a lexeme EAR^ (of hearing) and a
lexeme EABy, corn) one could say of these that their forms
of realisation were homonymous. However, has much been gained
by the introduction of the term lexeme? That the term lexeme
is useful in technical discussion to identify one sense of the
polysemous term word is clear. What is less clear is that its
use or the notion it captures is in any sense explanatory. The
problem, as is so often the case with abstract terms, is that in
order to be useful lexemes must be individuated. There appear
2
to be only two ways of doing this and only the second way will
in fact yield the level of individuation required. The first
3
way of individuating lexemes is by their syntactic function ,
2
Cf. Matthews 197^ : 22
3
In the view taken here, of course, syntactic function derives
from the meaning of the word form. Cf. chapter 3.
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the form class of which their forms are members. Hence, PLAY^
and PL-IYg can distinguished as lexemes because the forms of
PLAY^ are verbs and those of PLAY^ nouns. But this helps not
at all in the case of the lexemes EAR^ and EAR^, the forms of
which are both nouns. Worse still, syntactic function does not
distinguish the lexemes PLAY^ and WALK^ (to walk), since the
4
forms of both are verbs . The second way in which lexemes may
be individuated and the only satisfactory way is by their meaning.
So PLAY^ and WALK^ are different lexemes because they have
different meanings. But this amounts to saying that lexemes
are meanings which have lexical forms associated with them.
Viewed as such lexeme may be a useful technical term but it
is not explanatory; indeed, it may even be misleading since
it may obscure the true nature of what is being referred to by
its use. The more explanatory way of describing homonymy is,
therefore, to say that it is where more than one meaning is
associated with but a single form. Such a description of
homonymy helps not at all, of course, to distinguish it from
polysemy since it is merely a variant of the definition of
polysemy.
4
The forms of PLAY-^ and WALK cannot be used to individuate
the different lexemes for as Lyons states: "Lexemes as such, as
we have seen, are abstract entities and do not have a form" (1977:22).
Neither will it do to claim that lexemes are individuated by
the formal differences between their associated word-form
sets, because two lexemes could have identical, associated
word-form sets and the non-occurrence of such identities
in any particular language would be merely accidental.
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Lyons (1977 '• 550ff) suggests two ways in which the
distinction between polysemy and homonymy have been drawn. The
first concerns an etymological criterion as to whether the words
concerned are derived from formally distinct words (homonymy)
or distinct meanings have been associated with a single word
(polysemy). As Lyons points out (: 55l) this criterion has
little to recommend it as far as the synchronic study of language
is concerned because most speakers are totally unaware of etymological
considerations. Added to Lyons' point may be the further all
important one that even a lexicographer cannot tell homonyms
apart save by using their meaning. All roads, it seems, lead to
meaning]
The second way in which Lyons suggests that polysemy and
homonymy are distinguished is much more promising. Essentially,
the idea is that the meanings associated with a homonymous form
are unrelated and those with a polysemous form are related.
Thus Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary (1964 edition)
lists eye as being polysemous, meaning not only "eye" but
"anything resembling an eye", including things as diverse as
a mine entrance, a loop on a hook, and the centre of a cyclone.
All these and many more are felt to share characteristics which
relate the meanings of the terms that describe them. A difficulty
arises, however, as Lyons notes (: 552), in that what meanings
are felt by one speaker to be related are not necessarily felt
by others to be related. He points out that ear which is treated
by most dictionaries as homonymous is regarded by some speakers
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as polysemous in that they feel there is a similarity between the
external hearing organ and a seed head of corn and, thus, a
relationship between these two meanings of ear.
The relatedness of meaning seems to lie at the heart of any
plausible distinction between homonymy and polysemy, hut in
practical terms this does not allow the distinction to he made
precise unless something precise can he said ahout what relatedness
of meaning is. Again as Lyons points out (: 553) it may not
just be the quantity of similarity between meanings which counts
on some relatedness measure, hut the quality of similarity.
So, for example, sharing the feature of "animateness" or
"physical objectness" might count very low on the relatedness
scale because of their widespread occurrence. Whereas sharing
a feature such as "adult" might count much higher. All this
suggests that instead of a sharp division between polysemy and
homonymy there is a cline with many in-between cases. I shall
not here attempt, therefore, to offer any distinction between
these two, but rather I shall regard homonymy as a sub-type of
polysemy^ which along with other possible sub-types remains to be
distinguished within the general type of polysemy.
The specification of polysemy for an individual associator
is quite straightforward.
q
There is no particular significance in the choice of polysemy
as the general type and homonymy as the sub-type: it could just
as well be the other way round.
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(1) Polysemy A sub is polysemous if it is directly
associated with more than one non-sub.
x and y are directly associated if the associative link between
them does not pass through any collect. This condition is
necessary since there will be many associations between non-subs
and subs, and by some roundabout route a sub could be indirectly
associated with a great number of non-subs.
In terms of the public semantic system, public polysemy
is specified as follows:
(2) Public Polysemy A public language object (v. section 3*2),
m, is publicly polysemous for two
associators, A, B, if m stimulates,
directly or indirectly^, a sub, x,
in A and a sub, y, in B and both x and y
are directly associated with more than
one non-sub.
This is a fairly liberal specification of public polysemy for,
apart from the constraints imposed by m having to be a public
language object for A and B, it is not required that A have the
same number of senses for m as B, or that the senses they do share
^
Stimulation will be described as indirect or direct in order
to leave it open as to what other organs or apparatus may
mediate it. In general, it would seem to be the case that
much of the stimulation which reaches the semantic apparatus as
realised in humans has been mediated by various sense organs.
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be identical. Various types of public polysemy could be identified,
but there seems little to be gained by doing this, especially since
much of this specification would overlap with the specification
for public synonymy in one sense.
3.1 Synonymy
Whether there are any true (or, as I shall call them below,
strict) synonjms in language is perhaps open to doubt. The fact
that, apart from considerations of rhyme and metre, true synonyms
would be redundant, may be a pressure which tends to depress their
occurrence; however, whether they exist or not, it seems logically
possible that they could exist and they must, therefore, be taken
account of.
Three types of synonymy are considered here: strict synonymy,
i.e. true synonyms interchangeable in all contexts without effect
on ANY aspect of meaning; synonymy in one sense, i.e. the synonyms
are ambiguous and only one or some of their senses coincide; partial
synonymy, i.e. any overlap of meaning whatsoever between linguistic
items. The use of linguistic items instead of words is required
because synonymy extends beyond single words to phrases, clauses,
and sentences.
Although natural language is heavily dependent on linear order,
it must be remembered that this is not a logical requirement of
language. If, therefore, the specifications given are to be quite
general, they cannot involve a term which implies a linear ordering of
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words. Hence, terms such as sequence and string cannot be used.
For brevity and convenience, I shall use the term M group W
7
for a group of words in a language, ordered or not, which form
a meaningful expression under the syntax of that language.
The term M group S will then be used to speak of the
subs corresponding to an M group W.
The specification for strict synonymy and synonymy in one
sense for an individual associator will now fall into three
parts: single subs, M group S's, sub and M group S. Since
partial synonymy is to be construed wholly in terms of non-subs,
the three part division will not apply to it.
(l) Strict synonymy
(a) Two subs are strictly synonymous if they are each
associated with the same non-subs.
(b) Two M group S's are strictly synonymous if together with
the syntax they invoke the same semantic structures.
(c) A single sub and an M group S are strictly synonymous
if together with the syntax they invoke the same semantic
structures.
7
I use word here in a wide sense to mean any basic unit that a
language uses in a similar way to that in which words are used.
In particular, word here covers what else where I call public
language objects.
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Where semantic structure is as defined as follows:
g(2) Semantic Structure A single non-sub or a structure
of non-subs.
There is no requirement in the specification of strict
synonymy that synonyms he unambiguous. Ambiguous synonyms,
however, have to he ambiguous in precisely the same way if they
are to he strictly synonymous. The syntax, of course, determines
what semantic structure is built and it is for this reason that
syntax is involved once M group S's are considered. The syntax,
however, does not operate on the subs, but only on the non-subs
invoked by the subs.
Since strict synonymy deals with true synonyms and since
these are possibly non-existent in natural language, any
examples offered can only be tentative. Tentatively, therefore,
I offer examples (3) — (5) as exemplifying the three parts of
the specification of strict synonymy.
(3) Single/unmarried (Corresponds to (la))
(4) Not single/not unmarried (Corresponds to (lb))
(3) Single/not married (Corresponds to (lc))
A structure of non-subs is built by linking arguments with
argument-places. Cf. Chapter 2.
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Synonymy in one sense only requires that ambiguous synonyms
have at least one sense with regard to which they are synonymous.
As with strict synonymy there are three parts to the specification.
6. Synonymy in one sense
(a) Two subs are synonymous in one sense if both have an
associative link with the same non-subs, but at least
one of the subs has an associative link with a non-sub
that the other sub does not have.
(b) Two M group S's are synonymous in one sense if both
groups together with the syntax can invoke the same
semantic structure, but at least one M group S
together with the syntax can invoke a semantic
structure that the other M group S together with
the syntax cannot.
(c) A single sub and an M group S are synonymous in one
sense if together with the syntax they can invoke
the same semantic structure, but at least one of them
together with the syntax can invoke a semantic structure
that the other cannot.
As examples, again tentative, of synonymy in one sense, I
offer:
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(7) Page/sheet (Corresponds to (6a))
(8) Place of worship/house of God (Corresponds to (6b))
Most synonyms will probably only be partially synonymous
in that their meanings or one of their meanings coincides
to a greater or lesser extent but they are not identical.
Partial synonymy is best seen, therefore, in terms of meaning
alone. The coincidence of the meanings of what might be called
partial synonyms could vary greatly from being almost identical
((a) in Figure 5.1.0) to having very little in common ((d) in
Figure 5.1.0).
Because of this variability in coincidence of meanings, it
would be possible to subdivide partial synonymy into as many
categories as one wished; but, as in the case of polysemy and
homonymy discussed above, the criteria of similarity of meaning




are not self-evident. The special case of partial synonymy
called hyponymy will be discussed later, but no other attempt
will be made to differentiate out other particular types of
partial synonymy except to note that under the specification of
partial synonymy given in (10), the relationship of the meanings
of strict synonyms and synonyms in one sense come out as other
special cases of partial synonymy.
(lO) Partial synonymy Two semantic structures are partially
synonymous if they contain some or
all of the same discriminators.
Turning now to synonymy as a sense relation in a public
semantic system, it becomes necessary to give a somewhat involved
set of preliminary definitions of sameness of meaning for two
(and hence for any number) of associators. I begin by specifying
what public simple sameness of meaning requires. It is simple
sameness of meaning rather than just sameness of meaning because
it involves only what was called in chapter 3 the core subset
of a public language. Essentially, items in the core subset
of a public language are those for which observable referents
exist.
(ll) Public simple sameness of meaning
(a) A public language object, m, has simple sameness of
meaning for two associators, A, B, if m stimulates
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directly or indirectly a sub, x, in A and a sub, y, in
B and x and y are associated with non-subs in A and B
which are stimulated directly or indirectly by the
same objects under the same conditions.
(b) An M group W, M, of a public language has public simple
sameness of meaning for two associators, A, B, if M
stimulates directly or indirectly an M group S, X,
in A and an M group S, Y, in B, and together with the
syntax X and Y invoke semantic structures, S^, in A
and semantic structures, S^, in B, and and
are stimulated directly or indirectly by the
same object under the same conditions or by the
same arrangement of the same objects under the same
conditions.
What it is for an object to be the same object for two
associators will be considered shortly.
Having now established what public simple sameness of
meaning involves, public sameness of meaning simpliciter can
now be specified.
(12) Public sameness of meaning
A public language object, m, or an M group W, M, of a
public language has public sameness of meaning for two
associators, A, B, if either m(M) has public simple
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sameness of meaning for A and B or m(M) is wholly-
definable in other public language objects which do have
public simple sameness of meaning for both A and B.
By definable here is meant no more than that the words in the
public language which do not have public simple sameness of
meaning for associators because they lack observable referents,
be able to be defined, at least in the sense that their use can
be described, in words that do have public simple sameness of
meaning. This is how a dictionary works: it defines meanings
of words in terms of other words, the latter words hopefully
being familiar to the dictionary user. The point of insisting
on non-core public language objects being definable in terms of
the core subset of the language is that this is the only way,
given the model and the background assumptions, that it makes
any sense to talk of two speakers of the language as having the
same meanings for that language.
In order to be able to give a specification for synonymy
in one sense in a public semantic system it is necessary first
to specify what it is to have public simple sameness of meaning
in one sense and public sameness of meaning in one sense.
(15) Public simple sameness of meaning in one sense
(a) A public language object, m, has public simple
sameness of meaning in one sense for two associators,
A, B, if m stimulates directly or indirectly a sub, x,
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in A and a sub, y, in B, and x is associated with
non-subs, t, u, in A and y is associated with
non-subs, v, w, in B, and t and v, but not u and w, are
stimulated directly or indirectly by the same objects
under the same conditions.
(b) An M group W, M, of a public language has public simple
sameness of meaning in one sense for two associators,
A, B, if M stimulates directly or indirectly an M
group S, X, in A and an M group S, Y, in B, and together
with the syntax X invokes the semantic structures
and in A and Y invokes the semantic structures
S_ and S. in B, and S., and S_, but not and S, ,3 4 1 1 3 2 4
are stimulated directly or indirectly by the same
object under the same conditions or by the same
arrangement of the same objects under the same
conditions.
Public sameness of meaning in one sense can now be specified
in a straightforward way using the definition of public simple
sameness of meaning in one sense.
(l4) Public sameness of meaning in one sense
A public language object, m, or an M group W, M, of a
public language has public sameness of meaning in one
sense for two associators, A, B, if either m (>l) has
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public simple sameness of meaning in one sense for A
and b or m (m) is wholly definable with respect to
one sense in terms of other public language objects
which do have public sameness of meaning for a and b.
Finally, by way of preliminaries, something must be said
about what it is for an object to be the same object for two
associators because the foregoing definitions rely heavily on
this notion.
To begin with, it is important to bear in mind that the
whole notion of public language rests on the premiss that there
are external objects. Here I am not concerned with the Tightness
of this premiss, but only with the fact that in talking about
public language from the point of view of general semantics,
this premiss is accepted without question. This acceptance is
not a matter of choice. If there is to be public language, then
an explanation of how this is possible, how two associators can
be talking about the same things, is required. As far as
I can see, the only remotely plausible explanation is that
public language is possible because external objects mediate
the private worlds of meaning of associators. The starting point,
then, for the idea of "same object" is that there are in reality
external objects. Furthermore, if there are external objects,
then these can occur in various relationships to each other,
that is, in various arrangements.
In considering sameness of objects for associators, there
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are two cases to be covered. First, there is the question of
what constitutes the same object in respect of a single
associator. Second, there is the question of what constitutes
the same object for two or more associators. The first
question is somewhat easier than the second and I shall begin
with it.
An account of what it is for an object to be the same
object for a single associator will go something like this:
An associator, A, receives a set of stimulations from external
objects. A groups the stimulated discriminators into one or
more collects. The stimulations will, of course, be fixed in
9
time but there could be no sameness of object if time was a
factor, i.e. the same building I see out of my window each day
could not be the same building if by being the same was meant
that each experience of the building has to share the same
point in time. It may thus be assumed that in the case of
sameness of objects, time is not a factor. When, in the future,
the collects A has formed are stimulated, then A is held to be
experiencing the same object or objects as originally
experienced. In all probability, stimulation of the collects
after their initial formation will be a matter of degree according
to how similar the stimulus sources are. Sameness will then be
also a matter of degree and may sometimes more happily be called
9
What constitutes sameness of object in an objective sense is a
much discussed matter and I do not address that problem here.
Rather the associator-centred description of sameness avoids this
difficulty, I believe, without any loss to the purpose at hand.
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similarity.
Although the premiss that there are external objects is to
he assumed and not questioned, it is not assumed that these
external objects, these causes of stimulations, come in such
types and patterns that all associators (strictly realisations
of associators) are stimulated by all external objects. Rather
it is assumed that different species might have discriminators
which are receptive to different stimulations. This possibility,
pushed to the extreme, leads to the colouron case of chapter 3*
The possibility of different realisations of associators having
different receptivenesses to the stimuli of external objects is
the first problem in talking about sameness of objects for two
or more associators.
The second problem is that two associators might receive
exactly the same number of stimulations in the presence of a
set of external objects, and yet each might associate their
stimulated discriminators into different collects. In such a
situation, an associator, A, might recognise three objects,
while an associator, B, might recognise only two. Again in
accepting the premiss that there are external objects, nothing
is assumed about their objective number. How many external
objects occur in a certain situation may vary from associator to
associator.
Both these problems can be overcome by the specification
given for sameness of object for two associators in (l5)»
5 .1 Synonymy 287
(1?) Sameness of object for two associators
An external object, 0, is the same for two associators,
A, B, if it is the case that A has a non-sub, x, and B
has a non—sub, y, and BOTH x and y are invariably stimulated
in the presence of 0.
Extra details will need to be added to (15) in the case of
particular realisations of associators. So, for example,
it will be necessary to specify in the case of human associators
that they are open to the possibility of stimulation by an
object by ensuring that they have their eyes"*"^ open, that the
light is good, that they are not daydreaming, etc. Ensuring
that all such details are attended to is important in the case
where one wishes to know as far as possible whether an object is
the same object for two associators, but it does not change or
bear on the general question as to whether an object is in
fact the same object for two associators. The distinction is
important, for (15) does not set out to specify how one could
know that 0 was the same object for A and B, but simply to
state what it is for 0 to be the same object for A and B.
Utilising the various preliminary specification given
concerning sameness of meaning, it is now possible to state
what strict synonymy and synonymy in one sense are in a public
I am not suggesting that humans receive stimulation only through
sight. The conditions mentioned are just a sample.
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semantic system.
(l6) Public strict synonymy
Two public language objects, m, n, or two M group W's,
M, N, of a public language or a public language object, m,
and an M group ¥, N, are publicly strictly synonymous for
two associators, A, B, if m(M) has public sameness of
meaning for A and B and the subs that m and n (M and N, or,
m and N) stimulate in A are strictly synonymous and the subs
that m and n (M and N, or, m and N) stimulate in B are
strictly synonymous.
Essentially, (l6) amounts to this: If a word, x, has public
sameness of meaning for two associators, and if each of these
associators has another word, y, which is strictly synonymous
with x for each associator, then x and y are publicly strictly
synonymous.
(17) Public synonymy in one sense
Two public language objects, m, n, or two M group W's
M, N, of a public language or a public language object,
m, and an M group W, N, are publicly synonymous in
one sense for two associators, A, B, if m(M) has
public sameness of meaning in one sense for A and B,
and the subs that m and n (M and N, or, m and N)
stimulate in A are synonymous in one sense and the
5.2 Hyponymy
subs that m and n (M and N, or, m and N) stimulate in B
are synonymous in one sense.
In a similar vein, it would be possible to give a
specification of what might be called public partial synonymy,
but it would have to be expressed in a somewhat circuitous
way to allow for the fact that partial synonymy has been
defined in terms of non-subs alone.
5.2 Ilyponymy
Hyponymy is meaning inclusion. For example, the meaning
of woman includes the meaning of female, and the meaning of
whale includes both the meaning of mammal and the meaning of
animal, whilst the meaning of animal is itself included in the
meaning of mammal. Hyponymy is a relation from the more
specific meaning, the hyponym, to the more general meaning,
the superordinate. Hence, in the foregoing examples "woman"
is a hyponym of the superordinate "female" and "whale" is a
hyponym of both the superordinates "mammal" and "animal",
whilst "mammal" itself is a hyponym of the superordinate
"animal".
Hyponymy can be regarded as a unilateral implication with
the meaning of the hyponym indicated in the antecedent and
that of the superordinate in the consequent. Hence, if x is
a woman, then x is female; if x is a whale, then x is both a
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mammal and an animal; and if x is a mammal, then x is an animal.
The unilateral implication from hyponym to superordinate is
only preserved outside of negation. Thus, whilst (l) entails
(2), (3) does not entail (4).
(1) A woman left here.
(2) A female left here.
(3) No woman left here.
(4) No female left here.
Or, to take an example used in the literature: Lyons (1977 J 292)
offers (5)'s implication of (6) as showing the hyponymous
relationship of "crimson" and "red", hut this implication is
cancelled if one introduces a negative as in (7) and (8).
(5) She was wearing a crimson dress.
(6) She was wearing a red dress.
(7) She wasn't wearing a crimson dress.
(8) She wasn't wearing a red dress.
In the case of the hyponym and superordinate coming within the
scope of the negator, as in (7) and (8), the unilateral implication
goes in the other direction; from superordinate to hyponym.
Hence (8) implies (7).
Negation, however, is not the only factor affecting the
implications that hold between hyponyms and superordinates in
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particular contexts. (9) does not imply (10), nor (11), (12)
despite there being no negative in sight.
(9) The people in crimson hats were nice.
(10) The people in red hats were nice.
(11) Every person in a crimson hat was allowed in.
(12) Every person in a red hat was allowed in.
Neither is it clear that the implications hold the other way
around, for whilst it is the case that if there were people in
crimson hats and (l0) and (12) were true, then (9) and (ll)
would be true, (l0) and (l2) by themselves say nothing about
there being people in crimson hats. Example (l2) is perhaps
open to more debate in this respect in the sense that some
might hold (l2) to be true in the case where there were no
people in red hats; however, (10) cannot, on a normal understanding
of English, be given such a conditional reading, and the most
that one can deduce from the truth of (10) is (13).
(13) If there were people in crimson hats then they were nice.
The sense relation which holds between a hyponym and the
superordinate is, however, constant and independent of the
context sensitive implications that hold between them. Hyponymy
in the case of an individual associator is specified in (14).
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(14) Hyponymy A semantic structure, x, is a hyponym
of a superordinate semantic structure, y,
if all of the discriminators of y together
with their significant structure, if any, are
also in x, and provided that any discriminators
within the scope of the negator in x are
also within the scope of the negator in y.
It will he recalled that a semantic structure is either a single
non-sub or a structure of non-subs. The requirement concerning
the negator is needed to stop, for example, "unconnected" being
a hyponym of "connected".
Turning now to the specification of hyponymy in a public
semantic system, one has:
(19) Public hynonymy
A meaning, i, of a public language object, m, or an
M group W, M, of a public language is a public hyponym
of a meaning, j, of a public language object, n, or
an M group V, N, of a public language for two
associators, A, B, if each of m(M) and n(N) has public
sameness of meaning in at least one sense with respect
to i and j for A and B and i is a hyponym of j for
both A and B.
Co-hyponymy is meaning intersection. If two meanings
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intersect in any way at all, then they share that intersection,
that superordinate. This is the right way to explicate co-hyponymy
in general, I believe, allowing as it does for such implications
as (16) and (l7).
(16) If x is big then x has size.
(17) If x is a table then x has size.
It is part of the meaning of table that it has size and hence
the implication in (17) holds just as surely as does the
implication in (l6). The meanings of big and table intersect
in the area of "size" and they, therefore, both share the
superordinate "size" and imply it. Hence "big" and "table"
are co-hyponyms of the superordinate "size".
Using the terms colour and coloured in an unusually wide
sense to include "black", "white", "grey", "silver", and
even "transparent" etc., for convenience, the implications
in (18) and (19) also hold. For take any ball one likes, that
ball will be of one colour or another. Hence "ball" and "red"
are co-hyponyms because they intersect.
(18) If x is red then x has colour/is coloured.
(19) If x is a ball then x has colour/is coloured.
Some semanticists draw a line between what they call linguistic
meaning and knowledge of the world. Since the examples I am
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using are perhaps on or close to the borderline of these two
areas of knowledge, a short digression to consider this proposed
division is in order. Leech (1974 : 88) in arguing for this
division has this to say:
Let us take, as a particular case, the definition of the
word elephant. There are indefinitely many properties of
elephants (positive and negative) about which it is possible
to construct absurd necessarily false assertions:
The elephant had eighty legs.
Elephants have horns.
Some elephants talk sensibly.
etc.
If we wanted our semantic theory to explain the absurdity
of these statements, we should have to include such
features as 'four legged', 'hornless', and 'incapable
of speech' in our definition of elephant. But if we
included ALL such features, we should end up not with a
dictionary entry, but with an encyclopedia entry of
indefinite length. The two solutions must therefore be
either (a) to include some features of this kind but not
others; or (b) to exclude all such features. The first
solution is unattractive because there are no obvious
grounds for distinguishing properties which are criterial
to the meaning of the word from those which are not.
We arrive at an indefinite number of possible definitions,
the choice between which is no less arbitrary than the toss
of a coin. In other words, we find ourselves claiming
that elephant has indefinitely many meanings, but that
none of these meanings is more 'correct' than any other.
The second solution, which has no obvious drawbacks of
this kind, amounts to a refusal to anatomize the meaning
of elephant any further than to define it as 'an animal
of the species elephant'. The conclusion of this argument,
which will be regrettable to some, is therefore that
'The elephant had eighty legs' and sentences of the same
kind, are absurd in a way that semantic analysis cannot
explain.
In this quotation from Leech, a number of confusions become
apparent. First, we are concerned with getting a semantic
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theory right and the amount of space that theory would occupy if
written down cannot he a consideration given that it will he a
finite amount of space. Second, there are only finite hrains
with finite storage space; so however extensive the knowledge of
elephants is, it must fit into a finite amount of storage and
not as Leech suggests an indefinitely large amount of storage.
Third, most of the indefinitely large number of features of
elephant will he negative, hut there are no negative properties
of elephant as Leech suggests, hut only positive ones. The fact
that part of the meaning of elephant is "hornless" comes not
from this being a feature that is recorded hut as a deduction
that there is no feature "horned". Fourth, part of what Leech
might be trying to do is to distinguish the particular knowledge
of individuals from the general knowledge of the population of
speakers. This is a necessary step in establishing what a
particular public semantic system involves, hut it requires a
distinction between a personal semantic system and a public one
and Leech does not draw on this distinction in his argument.
Lastly, it must be said that a semantic theory which has
nothing to say about the falseness of sentences such as
"Some elephants talk sensibly" is perhaps a theory which is too
weak to come to grips with meaning as it exists in the world.
From my criticisms of Leech, it is apparent that I do not
share his view of a distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic
knowledge. Unlike Leech, of course, I am not concerned with a
semantic system but only with the semantic apparatus and its
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properties. For me, information which is conveyed by non-natural
signs must be mediated by the semantic apparatus and involve
meaning. Further, because of the way meaning is tied to the
world, direct knowledge, i.e. knowledge not gained via nonnatural
signs, feeds back into meanings and it just does not seem
plausible or sensible to force a distinction between parts of a
meaning gained via signs and parts gained in other ways.
Jackendoff (1983 : 95) comes to a similar conclusion in respect
of semantic structure and conceptual structure, which can be
seen as equating with linguistic knowledge and conceptual or
world knowledge respectively:
In subsequent chapters I have not been especially
careful to preserve the distinction between conceptual
structure and semantic structure, tending to use the
term conceptual structure when talking about non-linguistic
matters and semantic structure when discussing the relation
to language.
The time has come to make good on my unscrupulousness.
This chapter will argue that once enough machinery has
been developed to meet the needs of conceptual structure,
the semantic properties of sentences can be formalised
with little further ado. It would therefore miss an
important generalisation to insist that there is a separate
semantic level of mental representation, with its own
special characteristics, whose purpose is only to account
for logical inference and the like. We will conclude
that the terms semantic structure and conceptual structure
denote the same level of representation.
Returning now to examples (18) and (l9)» it is to be noted
that although those implications hold, those of (20) and (21)
do not, and this despite the fact that "red" and "ball" are
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co-hyponyms. The failure of the implications in (20) and (21) seems
to stem from the fact that whilst co-hyponyms, such as "red" and
"green", are incompatible in this context,as (22) shows,others
like "hall" and "red" are not.
(20) If x is red then x is not a ball.
(21) If x is a ball then x is not red.
(22) If x is red then x is not green.
Incompatibility will he discussed in the next section,
but there we shall have need of a more restrictive form of
hyponymy. This more restrictive type I call kind hvponymy
for the reason that in addition to the normal requirements of
hyponymy, kind co-hyponyms must each he a kind of the
superordinate. The implications in (20) and (21) fail because
ball is not a kind of colour even though it is something which
contains the meaning "coloured". Kind hyponymy will be defined
as follows:
(25) Kind hyponymy
A non-sub, x, is a kind hyponym of a non-sub, y, if x
is a hyponym of y and x is also a kind of y, i.e. it is
part of the meaning, x, that x is a kind of y.
I do not think that to be a kind of something derives from
anything more basic, for, though there may be clues, in general,
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that x is a kind of y is something that one learns, a label that is
stuck on. Similarity is sometimes a good guide to grouping things
as things of the same kind and sometimes a had guide. Whether
something is a kind of something else depends on the criteria
applied. On some criteria a whale is a kind of fish, on other
criteria it is not a kind of fish at all but a kind of mammal.
That red, for example, is a kind of colour is part of the
meaning of red. Somebody who did not hold red to be a kind
of colour would have a different meaning for red than somebody who did.
Public kind hyponymy may now be specified as in (24).
(24) Public kind hyponymy
A meaning, i, of a public language object, m, or an
M group V, M, of a public language is a public kind hyponym
of a meaning, j, of a public language object, n, or an
M group V/, N, of a public language for two associators,
A, B, if each of m(M) and n(N) has public sameness of
meaning in at least one sense with respect to i and j
for A and B, and i is a kind hyponym of j for both
A and B.
Before leaving hyponymy, it is necessary in view of the
claims of the next section to emphasise that hyponymy and
particularly superordinate are defined above in terms of
non-subs and not in terms of language items. There will be
very many superordinates in a semantic system, only some of
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which will have a corresponding term in the language. Lyons
(1977 s 301> 302) noting that there are lexical gaps for both
superordinates and hyponyms asks whether co-hyponymy can exist
if there is no lexical item corresponding to the superordinate.
He answers affirmatively; so reinforcing the claim of Leech
adopted here that hyponymy is a relationship between meanings,
and more strictly still, between non-subs.
3.3 Antonymy
The term antonymy is restricted by some linguists (Lyons, for
example, 1977 : 279, who restricts antonymy to gradable opposites)
to a particular kind of semantic opposition, whilst other
linguists (for example, Katz 1966) use it in a broad sense to
cover many types of semantic opposition. Common usage is
sufficiently flexible to permit both these extremes of usage
without notable deviance being involved. The usage adopted by
a particular writer is generally the one which is most convenient
for the task in hand. Here I take antonymy in its broad sense
as a general term covering a number of more specific types of
semantic opposition.
I take as the basic notion underlying all antonymy,
incompatibility. Lyons (1968) distinguishes incompatibility
from what he calls "mere difference of sense" (: 459). It is a
feature of incompatible meanings, and indeed of all antonymic
meanings, that they share a certain similarity of meaning,
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whereas meanings that are merely different lack this certain
similarity of meaning. Hence, "rose" and "tulip" are
incompatible because they share the common feature of "flower",
but "rose" and "table" are different and not incompatible
because they lack a sufficient degree of similarity, even though
they do share the feature of "physical object". Exactly what
constitutes a sufficient degree of similarity will be one of
the issues I address below.
Leech (197^) does not make the distinction between
incompatibility and difference of sense, expressing the notion
of incompatibility like this:
We may say that two componential formulae, or the meanings
they express, are INCOMPATIBLE if one contains at least one
feature contrasting with a feature in the other. Thus the
meaning of woman is incompatible with that of child because
of a clash between + ADULT and - ADULT .... Other
meanings incompatible with 'woman' are 'man', 'boy',
'girl*, 'cow', not to speak of more remotely contrasted
meanings such as 'tree' or 'screwdriver'. (: 100)
This collapsing together of incompatibility of sense and difference
of sense raises certain difficulties which become apparent when
Leech gives the following rule of inconsistency:
A relation of inconsistency arises between two assertions
whenever (the assertions being otherwise identical) the
predicate of one assertion is incompatible with that of
the other. (: 137)
Leech uses componential analysis as the basis of his semantics.
In componential analysis, each meaning is seen as composed of a
set of features or components. Hence "woman" will have among its
meaning components: + HUMAN, + ADULT, + FEMALE.
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Leech offers as examples (: 138) of inconsistency of assertions
under this rule (l) and (2), hut (2) and (3) will also be classed
as inconsistent even though the paint can he both blue and thick
because "blue" is incompatible under Leech's definition with
"thick".
(1) This paint is scarlet.
(2) This paint is blue.
(3) This paint is thick.
The only way out of this difficulty for Leech it would seem is to
claim to be using inconsistency in an unusual way. Normally,
there is nothing wrong in using every-day terms in a somewhat
different technical sense, but inconsistency is held commonly,
legally, and logically to have truth functional consequences and
a technical use of the term which does not preserve these, as
Leech's does not, will have an uphill struggle for acceptance.
Hence under Leech's definition (4), (5) and (6) will all he
inconsistent with each other. If the truth consequences of normal
inconsistency were preserved, then it would he the case that no
two of these assertions about the same book could be true
together, but it is perfectly possible to have a long, thick,
pornographic book.
(4) This book is long.
(5) This book is thick
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(6) This book is pornographic.
To avoid the kind of difficulties that are apparent in
Leech and also to recognise a seemingly real difference, it
is necessary to insist along with Lyons on a distinction between
incompatibility of sense and difference of sense. I shall not be
concerned in what follows with difference of sense, assuming
that it is to be negatively defined in respect of incompatibility.
Incompatibility is a complex subject and here I shall only
attempt a first approximation of the kind of mechanism it
involves. Incompatibility can be demonstrated by an appeal
to the inconsistency of two sentences. Hence, on the assumption
that the same ball is being talked about in both (7) and (8),
these sentences are inconsistent.
(7) The ball is blue (all over).
(8) The ball is red (all over).
An utterance of (7) cannot be true if an utterance of (8) is
true, for it is the case that if the ball is red (all over) then
it cannot be the case that the ball is blue. Similarly, the
pairs (9) and (lO) and (ll) and (12) are inconsistent on the
assumption that the same person and time are being talked of.
(9) Jane was born on Tuesday.
(10) Jane was born on Friday.
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(11) Jane walked to work.
(12) Jane rein to work.
The inconsistency in these three example pairs of sentences can
he traced to the incompatibility of the pairs "blue"/"red",
"Tuesday"/"Friday", and "walked"/"ran" in these contexts. The
question then is: Why are these pairs incompatible?
A first suggested answer might be that since each pair
involves kind co-hyponyms, incompatibility is the result of
kind co-hyponymy; but an example will quickly show this not to
be the case. (13) and (l4) are not inconsistent in spite of
"electrician" and "plumber" being kind co-hyponyms to the
superordinate, "tradesman".
(13) Paul is an electrician.
(14) Paul is a plumber.
Paul's being an electrician does not preclude him from being a
plumber or vice versa, and this seems to show clearly that
whilst some kind co-hyponyms are incompatible, others are not.
A second suggestion is that whether kind hyponyms are
incompatible or not depends on the nature of their common
12
superordinate. Hence, the superordinates "coloured" , "day",
^
Lyons (1968, 1977) maintains that "coloured" is not a
superordinate of "red", "blue", etc. There is, I agree, some
dispute about the facts in this matter with the possibility of
coloured being ambiguous and only one of its meanings being a
superordinate. Whatever the actual situation, however, it does
not affect the substance of the example given.
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and "move feet" are seen to possess some property that makes
their kind hyponyms incompatible. There are, however,
counterexamples to this suggestion too. (15) and (l6) are
inconsistent when used of the same occasion.
(15) Jane is singing.
(16) Jane is reciting.
If Jane is singing, then she is not reciting. The inconsistency
comes from the incompatible kind co-hyponyms "singing" and
"reciting", having as their superordinate something like
"using voice". However, built into the assumption of inconsistency
of (15) with (16) is a presumption that Jane is human and has,
therefore, only one voice. If it is now assumed that Jane is
in fact an alien with two heads and two voices, (15) and (l6)
are no longer inconsistent. This shows conclusively that it
cannot be some special property of the superordinate alone which
determines the incompatibility of its kind hyponyms.
Yet a third suggestion is that incompatibility is the
consequence of particular contexts. Hence, the incompatibility
of "singing" and "reciting" in (15) and (l6) is the consequence
of the context "Jane is....". Of course, counterexamples to such
a suggestion are readily available as (17) and (18) show.
(17) Jane is singing.
(18) Jane is walking.
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None of these suggested answers taken individually is
adequate and any satisfactory explanation is likely to involve
all three. This may seem to be overstating the case because some
incompatibles, for example, the meanings of colour terms, can be
predicted irrespective of context. However, I would want to
claim that although accidentally the meanings of colour terms
are always incompatible whatever the context, logically they need
not be, and that to treat them as involving a different kind of
incompatibility to that residing in examples (9)» (l0)» and
(ll), (12), results in a lack of generalisation about
incompatibility that can be made if it is assumed that
incompatibility is a single phenomenon.
Despite the clear counter-evidence, explanations of
incompatibility are almost universally given in terms of the
supposedly incompatible items themselves and without regard to
their context of occurrence. Even Katz's (1972) most careful
and revised definition of incompatibility seems to fall into the
same error, given that he sets up what he calls antonymous n-tuples
of semantic markers (: 52) as the basic notion underlying
incompatible constituents of sentences. He describes antonymous
n-tuples like this:
The most natural way of defining the notion 'antonymous
constituents' so that the definition will be adequate for
antonymy sets containing infinitely many particular n-tuples
of antonymous expressions is to group semantic markers into
antonymous n-tuples on the basis of the incompatibilities
they are supposed to represent. This can be accomplished
by using some suitable formal device in the formulation
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of semantic markers in which they are so represented
that the membership of any n—tuple of antonymous semantic
markers can he uniquely determined on the basis of formal
features of the symbols that comprise the semantic markers.
For example, we could write the semantic markers that
represent the concepts of maleness and femaleness, assuming
them to be incompatible and jointly exhaustive of the
sexual domain, in the form '(S+)' and '(S~)'....Actually,
later we shall find reason to further modify this notation
in certain ways, but, generally, the notation for
X-antonymous n-tuples of semantic markers will be
represented by a common base semantic marker with
semantic marker superscripts that indicate the incompatible
elements within the domain determined by the base semantic
marker. Thus, the general form of an antonymous n-tuple
of semantic markers is as shown in (2.50) and as
specified in (2.5l)i
(2.50) (M(* , (M(<X>2)), ..., (M(W>n))
(2.51) Two semantic markers belong to the same antonjanous
n-tuple of semantic markers if and only if one has
the form (Mv *■)) and the other has the form (m( j))
where i ^ j and li i _n and 1 j n. (: 52
What this description of incompatible semantic markers does
bring out is that such markers must be co-hyponymous with the
base marker being their superordinate. While this is a necessary
condition it is not a sufficient one for incompatibility as has
been shown. The context in which would-be incompatibles occur
decides whether in fact they are incompatible in that occurrence.
However, when Katz defines incompatibility in context, that
context plays no part whatsoever in deciding the incompatibility
of the larger meanings in which the would-be incompatibles occur
as an examination of his following definition of incompatible
shows:
5.3 Antonymy 307
Two constituents Ci and Cj are incompatible (on a sense)
if and only if they are not full sentences and they have,
respectively, readings Ili and Rj such that Ri contains a
semantic marker (Mi) and Rj contains a semantic marker (Mj)
and the semantic markers (Mi) and (Mj) are distinct
members of the same antonymous n-tuple of semantic
markers. (: 53)
In this definition, it is quite clear that incompatibility
depends on, and only on, a predetermined, identified set of
incompatibles. Since Katz proceeds to define contradictoriness
in terms of such sets of incompatibles, the basic mistake over
considering incompatibility as context free permeates upwards to
cause further and larger errors in more complex meanings. The
fact that Katz's infinite antonymous n-tuples are built in some
recursive fashion on finite subsets which may themselves have
been garnered from actual contexts is, of course, no guarantee
that the right prediction of incompatibility will be made in
different contexts. As was seen earlier, "singing" and "reciting"
are members of an antonymous n-tuple in some contexts, but not in
others. I now turn to trying to give a sketch of what is
actually involved in incompatibility.
For ease of understanding, I shall first characterise what
I think is going on in the case of incompatibility in ordinary
logico-semantic terms, then I shall try and relate this in a
general way to the model of the semantic apparatus.
If one considers sentence (7) and asks what the colour
blue is predicated of, the usual response will be that it is
predicated of the ball. And if one asks in the case of (19),
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(20), (2l), and (22) what softness, roundness, roughness, and
heaviness are predicated of, the answer will again be that it
is the ball.
(19) The ball is soft.
(20) The ball is round.
(21) The ball is rough.
(22) The ball is heavy.
So, many things can be predicated of the very same ball. The
question is: How is it possible for the ball to be blue, soft,
round, rough, and heavy all at the same time? The natural
answer is that this is possible because these properties concern
different aspects of the ball. Being blue concerns the ball's
aspect of colour, being round concerns the aspect of shape,
being heavy concerns the aspect of weight.
Now the suggestion is that blueness, softness, roundness,
etc. are not in fact being predicated directly of the ball at all
but, rather, of the colour, resilience, shape, etc. aspects or
dimensions of the ball. For this reason, the predications
seemingly about the one ball do not clash. However, if one
tries to predicate two things of the same aspect at the same
time, then there is a clash and an inconsistency results.
Hence, the ball cannot be red if it is blue, hard if it is soft,
oblong if it is round, smooth if it is rough, or light if it is
heavy, because this would amount to its aspects being in two
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different states at the SAME TIME.
The emphasis on the same time is needed because of examples
such as (23) and (24).
(23) Jane is a walker.
(24) Jane is a runner.
Although, one cannot walk at the same time as one runs, as the
inconsistency of (ll) and (12) shows, one can be both a walker
and a runner even though both activities involve the same aspect
of a person, viz. movement of feet. This is possible because
to be a walker merely requires that one walks sometimes and to
be a runner only requires that one runs sometimes. The times
of walking and running need not then coincide and, hence, there
is no question of an aspect being claimed to be in two different
states at the same time.
The examples of (15) and (l6) and the considering of Jane to
be a two-voiced alien, however, shows that aspects of people or
objects need not be singular. Clearly, where there are two or
more occurrences of the same aspect in an object or person, then
two or more different states of these aspects are possible.
Hence, when Jane has two voices, she has two voice aspects,
and each may be in a different state. If an object had two
colour aspects or two texture aspects, then it could be both
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red and blue^ or rough and smooth at the same time. It is
buried deep in our conception of the world that objects (as
opposed to different parts of objects) can only have one colour
and one texture aspect, but this appears to he an accidental
rather than a logical necessity. Suppose, for example, our
eyes were prismatic, then whilst a red object or a blue object
would still be red or blue, an object which reflected white
light would be red and blue and yellow, etc., all over at
the same time. Such an object would not just be multicoloured
since that means that different parts of it have different
colours. In the imagined case, every part of the object would
be all the colours of the spectrum at the same time.
Returning to the example concerning the ball, it can be
said that the roundness and roughness of the ball can never be
in opposition because they involve different aspects of the
ball and the property of roundness cannot be predicated of
the aspect of texture any more than the property of roughness
can be predicated of the aspect of shape. There is, it would
seem, something in the nature of properties which restricts them
to particular aspects.
Leaving objects and properties and considering meaning,
one can see that an aspect of an object will correspond to a
particular part of the meaning (aspect feature) of the name of
13
An object can, of course, be both red and blue at the same time
but by this is then meant that it is partly red and partly blue
which is not the same as being red all over and blue all over.
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the object and that meanings which qualify this aspect feature
must somehow he restricted to doing just that. One way this could
happen, and indeed the way it seems to happen, would be for the
meanings which qualified an aspect feature to themselves contain
that aspect feature, i.e. the qualifying meanings imply the
aspect feature. This, of course, amounts to the aspect feature
being the superordinate of the qualifying meanings, which are
its hyponyms. This brings us back to the idea that co-hyponymy
underlies incompatibility with now, however, the additional
concept of incompatibility also depending on the number of
occurrences of the superordinate of the hyponyms in the meaning
which is being qualified.
Quite generally, but with a particular restriction which
will be introduced shortly, it can now be said that all kind
14
co-hyponyms are incompatible if they qualify a single occurrence
of their superordinate. Whether in fact they are incompatible
in any particular context will depend on the number of occurrences
of their superordinate that they qualify. Hence, talent is a
multi-aspect of people, so that (25) and (26) are not inconsistent.
(25) Jane is a dancer.
(26) Jane is a singer.
14
Occassionally in the literature this requirement for singleness
is noted, though not pursued. Lehrer (197^ s 25), for example,
notes that for "Bill punched Mary" and "Bill kicked Mary" to be
inconsistent requires not only that "kick" and "punch" are
related meanings but also that one action is involved.
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However, in a context which establishes a single talent only and
hence a single occurrence of the superordinate "talent" in the
qualified meaning, "dancer" and "singer" will become incompatible
as in the case of (27) and (28).
(27) Jane has only one talent: She's a dancer.
(28) Jane has only one talent: She's a singer.
As a preliminary to trying to relate this view of
incompatibility to the model, it is necessary to introduce the
notion of predicational relator. A predicational relator is
one that directly associates its second argument with its
first argument, so adding the meaning of the second argument
to the first as if the second argument were a relator taking
the first argument as its argument. How this is achieved
is of no particular concern, but the fact that it is is
important in recognising in the model of the semantic
apparatus a phenomenon which occurs in all natural languages.
The usefulness of predicational relators is not hard to see since
they provide a way of uniting two non-relators in a structure.
Without them, such meanings as: "The woman is a school teacher"
would be impossible. Corresponding to predicational relators in
English will be, along with the expected copula, the perhaps
unexpected prepositions such as iii and on. That these are
predicational in nature will be readily seen if it is observed
that prepositional phrases are always adjectival or adverbial
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in effect, always qualifying or modifying their first argument.
Two non-subs will be predicationally associated if either
they are associated by a predicational relator or one non-sub
is included in the other. (The notion of inclusion was explicated
in the last chapter). Incompatibility can now be specified as
follows:
(29) Incompatibility
Incompatibility of two kind co-hyponyms occurs if they
are predicationally associated at the same time with a
co-hyponym which contains only one occurrence of their
superordinate and neither of the kind co-hyponyms is a
superordinate of the other.
Although being a kind hyponym implies being a hyponym, I shall
not in general redundantly use the terms in this way. So in
(29) a co-hyponym is not, even though strictly it could be,
a kind co-hyponym. Kind co-hyponyms lead to straight contradiction
if predicated of each other as one would expect, but this is not
an aspect of incompatibility but merely a consequence of the more
basic fact that saying that two different things are the same
fails because by definition they are not.
The requirement that neither kind co-hyponym is to be the
superordinate of the other is needed because of pairs like
"red"/"crimson", "cat"/"kitten", "pear"/"doyen du Cornice"
(a variety of pear). In each case, the first term is a
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superordinate of the second, hut, clearly, if x is crimson
then x is also red, and no question of incompatibility arises.
Kind co-hyponyms only have the general property of being
potentially incompatible if one is not the superordinate of
the other.
An idea of how (29) works can be had by a consideration of
examples (7) - (l4). In (7) and (8) "ball" is a co-hyponym, but
not a kind co-hyponym of "blue" and "red". Furthermore "ball"
contains only one occurrence of the superordinate "coloured"
because it is part of the meaning of ball and more generally
part of the meaning of terms referring to physical objects,
that it can only have one colour all over, "blue" and "red"
are incompatible in this context because they are both associated
with the single superordinate "coloured" of "ball". (9) and (10)
offer a good example of the predicational relator "on", "born"
is a co-hyponym of "Tuesday" and "Friday" because they have in
common a superordinate something like "particular day". Being
born for a human (as opposed to a star or galaxy) occurs on a
particular day and this is captured in the meanings of (9) and
(lO). Again, "Tuesday" and "Friday" are incompatible in this
context because they are both associated with a single
occurrence of their superordinate. Examples (ll) and (12) are
straightforward, but (13) and (14), where kind co-hyponyms are
not incompatible, is worthy of study. It is part of being a
man that one can have one or MORE trades. The meaning of man
captures this fact and since Paul is assumed to be a man then
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the meaning of Paul captures this fact. However, the meaning
does not specify how many trades, if any, a man should have and
this indicates that more than one occurrence of the
superordinate "tradesman" is available if required. Hence,
since in general there appears to be no upper bound on the
number, there will always be an occurrence of this superordinate
for a kind hyponym. The failure of "electrician" and "plumber"
to be incompatible in the context of (13) and (l4) is directly
attributable to this multiple availability of occurrences of
their superordinate. Precisely what mechanism makes it
possible for the meaning of Paul to have none or a dozen
occurrences of the superordinate is unclear, but it appears to
be connected with modality - a subject I have not attempted
to cover in this work.
Incompatibility of meanings can be specified for a public
semantic system, but it has to be relativised to some context, C,
as in (30).
(30) Public incompatibility
A meaning, i, of a public language object, m, or an M
group V, M, of a public language is publicly incompatible
with a meaning, j, of a public language object, n, or
an M group W, N, of a public language in a context, C,
for two associators, A, B, if m(M) and n(N) have public
sameness of meaning in at least one sense with respect to
i and j for A and B, and i is incompatible with j in the
context C for both A and B.
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Kind hyponyms come in two types: categoric and non-categoric
Categoric kind co-hyponyms divide up the area of meaning they
cover in a fixed way. The kind hyponyms considered so far in
this section have all been categoric. Non-categoric kind
co-hyponyms retain a fixed relation to each other hut their
meanings are not fixed. Categoric kind hyponyms allow
inferences which are not possible with non-categoric ones; hence,
the logical form of the argument in (3l) is identical to that
in (32), hut whilst (31) is a sound argument, (32) is not as
can be readily seen.
(31) x is a white mouse
a white mouse is an animal
x is a white animal
(32) x is a big mouse.
a big mouse is an animal,
x is a big animal.
Meanings such as "big", "medium", "small", form non-categoric
kind, co-hyponymous groups. Sapir (1944 : 122, 123) noted that
^ Cf. Katz' relative-adjective/absolute-adjective distinction
(Katz 1972 : 254).
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these carried what he called implicit grading"*"^:
Such contrasts as "small" and "large", "little" and "much",
"few" and "many", give us a deceptive feeling of absolute
values within the field of quantity comparable to such
qualitative differences as "red" and "green" within the
field of color perception. This feeling is an illusion,
however, which is largely due to the linguistic fact that
the grading which is implicit in these terms is not
formally indicated, whereas it is made explicit in such
judgements as "There were FEWER people there THAN here"
or "He has MORE milk THAN I".
Non-categoric, kind hyponyms (NCKH) require a measure or norm'
to make them categoric in a particular context. About all one
can say of the meaning of big in isolation is that it is a
measure of size; one cannot say what size. Once, however, a
norm has been added then one can say something about size. Where
1
The terms categoric and non-categoric are not equivalent to the
terms ungradable/non-gradab1e and gradable respectively as used
by Lyons (1968,1977)•Many categoric hyponyms are gradable but
they are not implicitly graded. There is some possibility of
confusion in this area for two reasons: First, the quotation
from Sapir above (which Lyons quotes both in 1968 and 1977)
seems to imply that "red" is absolute and not gradable;
however, Sapir tells us: "Every quantifiable, whether existent
say "house") or occurrent (say "run") or quality of existent
say "red"... is intrinsically gradable" (1944 : 123), and
surely the existence of redder and more red proves his point.
Second, as pointed out, Lyons uses the term antonym in a narrow
sense and opposes it to contrast. The meanings of colour terms
for Lyons are not antonymous but contrastive (1977 • 287) and
this means he has no incentive to point out the wrong impression
that the quotation from Sapir is likely to induce when coupled
with his own gradable/ungradable distinction. The important
difference, and the one Sapir was anxious to point out in
the above quotation, is between implicitly graded kind hyponyms
like "big" and "small" and the non-implicitly graded kind
hyponyms like "red" and "green".
17 Cf. Leech 1974 : 109.
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does the norm come from? The norm in a particular context of
the use of an NCKH seems to he adopted from the subject of
predication. Hence a big mouse is a mouse which is big with
respect to the norm "mouse", i.e. a big mouse is big for a
mouse but not necessarily for anything else. In (32) two norms
are being used: a "mouse" norm and an "animal" norm, and since
these are not interchangeable, the argument is unsound.
This requirement of NCKHs for a norm is an intrinsic feature
of them, i.e. without it they cease to be NCKHs, and, as far as
I can see, cannot be derived from other components in or features
of the model of the semantic apparatus. I shall assume, therefore,
that what NCKHs have in common is the property of being normable,
i.e. of being able and requiring to take a norm. The property of
being normable will derive from a specific type or types of
discriminators which form part of every NCKH. Such
discriminators are not reducible to other types of discriminator
any more than the discriminators which distinguish red are
reducible to other types. The difference between non-categoric,
kind hyponyms and categoric, kind hyponyms will now be that of the
former having the normable property and the latter lacking it.
NCKHs are incompatible in exactly the same way as categoric,
kind hyponyms, but they differ for inference purposes by not
being transferable as qualifiers to the superordinates of the
meanings they qualify. Hence a big puppy is not a big dog even
though "dog" is a superordinate of "puppy". This is in contrast
to categoric, kind hyponyms where it is the case that a black
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puppy is a black dog.
Within the types of antonymy discussed above, various
subcategories could and have been distinguished. I shall not
attempt to individuate these subcategories here except in
18
respect of complementarity, which has considerable inferential
consequences. Complementary meanings exclude one another, so
that from the assertion of one, the other can be denied,
and from the denial of one the other can be asserted, always
assuming that the assertions and denials are within the
application of the complementary meanings. Hence, of something
that can live and die, i.e. an animate, if it is asserted that
it is alive then it can be inferred that it is not dead, and if
it is denied that it is dead then it can be inferred that it is
alive. Complementaries are a special case of categoric, kind
co-hyponyms, with the number of kind co-hyponyms being restricted
to two and neither co-hyponym being a superordinate of the other.
As with other kind co-hyponyms, incompatibility of complementaries
depends on context, and it cannot be assumed that complementaries
are incompatible per se.
(53) Complementarity
Two non-subs, x, y, are complementary if they are kind
Lyons (1968 : 463) distinguishes between complementarity and
antonymy, reserving the latter term for gradable opposites and
the former for ungradable. In 1977 - 270 ff, Lyons brings both
types of opposition under the umbrella of antonymy but prefers
the term opposition to the former.
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co-hyponyms, neither has any other kind co-hyponym in
respect of the superordinate common to x and y, and
neither x nor y is the superordinate of the other.
(54) Pnhlic complementarity
Two meanings, i, j, of two public language objects,
m, n, or two H group Ws, M, N, of a public language are
complementaries for two associators, A, B, if m and n
(M and N) have public sameness of meaning in at least one
sense with respect to i and j for A and B and i and j
are complementaries for both A and B.
5.4 Analyticity
There has long been held to be a distinction between
synthetic statements which are true or false in virtue of
extra-linguistic considerations, and analytic statements which
are true or false in virtue of their meanings alone. In "Two
Dogmas of Bnpiricism" (l95l)» Quine attacked this distinction,
and any treatment of the analytic/synthetic distinction which
supports that distinction, as mine does, must needs defend
itself against Quine's position. Quine sums up his position
like this:
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language
and extralinguistic fact. The statement 'Brutus killed
Caesar' would be false if the world had been different
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in certain ways, hut it would also be false if the word
'killed' happened rather to have the sense of 'begat'.
Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth
of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic
component and a factual component. Given this supposition,
it seems reasonable that in some statements the factual
component should be null; and these are the analytic
statements. But, for all its a priori reasonableness,
a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements
simply has not been drawn. That there is such a
distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of
empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. (: 36, 37)
In the course of these somber reflections we have taken
a dim view first of the notion of meaning, then of the
notion of cognitive synonymy, and finally of the notion of
analyticity. (: 37)
Quine feels that he has cast sufficient doubt on the notions
listed in the second quotation, viz, meaning, synonymy, and
analyticity, to render the conclusion of the first quotation
acceptable. Quine's method of proceeding is this: First he
implies that the notion of meaning is beyond explication except
in terms of synonymy and analyticity:
For the theory of meaning a conspicuous question is the
nature of its objects: what sort of things are meanings?
A felt need for meant entities may derive from an earlier
failure to appreciate that meaning and reference are
distinct. Once the theory of meaning is sharply separated
from the theory of reference, it is a short step to
recognising as the primary business of the theory of
meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and
the analyticity of statements; meanings themselves,
as obscure intermediary entities, may well be
abandoned. (: 22)
Second, Quine shows that synonymy, divorced from any support by
an independent notion of meaning is not generally explicable.
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Analyticity, being generally dependent on synonymy , suffers
the same fate.
I shall not consider Quine's arguments against synonymy
and analyticity per se because these really only count if Quine
was right to dismiss an independent notion of meaning. In
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Quine offers no reason for dismissing
the notion of meaning and he is clearly aware of this shortcoming
because in a footnote in the reprinted edition he directs the
reader to two other articles: "On What There Is" (1948) and
"The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics" (l953t>). However,
these articles offer no argument against an independent notion
of meaning other than that there does not seem to be any way
of explicating it. Quine's behaviourist outlook leads him to
reject mental entities as explanatory devices and I share this
rejection if by mental entity is meant "non-physical entity",
but this gives Quine no grounds for dismissing brain entities
or relationships between brain entities as being meanings,
as here proposed; and it is no argument against such entities
and relationships that they cannot be directly observed since
Quine readily embraces the notion of subatomic particles as long
as these are useful:
19
And on antonymy, cf. "The red ball is blue", although Quine
never discusses contradictions which are so in virtue of
incompatibles as opposed to negation.
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Objects at the atomic level are posited to make the
laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of
experience, simpler and more manageable; and we need not
expect or demand full definition of atomic and subatomic
entities in terms of macroscopic ones, any more than
definition of macroscopic things in terms of sense data.
Science is a continuation of common sense, and it
continues the common-sense expedient of swelling ontology
to simplify theory. (1951 : 45)
At bottom, Quine's only objection to an independent notion
of meaning, i.e. one that is logical prior to synonymy, is that
such a notion has not been explicated. What I have done is to
make a first attempt on such an explication and I feel it shows
sufficient promise to warrant further attempts and to reject
Quine's move from meaning to synonymy and analyticity. Once
one rejects such a move, then Quine's argument fails to bite and
one is left free to offer explanations for not the "a priori"
synthetic/analytic distinction, but the empirically observed
distinction that some of our statements seem to come out true
or false however the world is while others do not.
The terms analytic and synthetic are applied to statements,
but it is really with the meanings of statements that these
notions are concerned. This can be readily seen in cases
where the statement is only analytic in one sense. So an
analytic statement is a statement which has an analytic meaning.
But it would be misleading to talk solely in terms of analytic
meanings because many structures of non-subs could be analytic
even though they are not meanings. This follows from the
definition of meaning which requires a non-sub to be associated
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with a sub in order for it to be a meaning. To avoid this difficulty,
I shall talk about analytic and synthetic structures. The latter
will not further concern us since they are defined negatively
with respect to analytic structures. An analytic structure
is a structure of non-subs which is such that any and every match
makes the structure come out either always true or always false.
In other words, matching is irrelevant to the truth value of an
analytic structure. For an analytic structure which is always
time I shall use the term tautologous structure, and for one that
is always false the term contradictory structure.
To explicate the notion of analytic structure in terms of
the semantic apparatus requires the introduction of a special
kind of predicational relator which I shall call definitional
relator. The definitional relator corresponds in English to the
copula and it is not reducible as far as I am aware to other
entities of the semantic apparatus. There are aspects of the
if, then construction which make it look like a realisation of
another definitional relator, but since if, then constructions can
be translated into ones involving the copula, it is fair to assume
that there is only one definitional relator after all. (l)» for
example, is analytic in one sense, but it is equivalent to (2).
(1) If a man is a bachelor, then he is unmarried.
(2) All men who are bachelors are unmarried.
Sentences (3) - (9) exemplify some of the range of analytic
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constructions that must be explained in any account of analyticity.
(3) A triangle is a triangle.
(4) A bachelor is unmarried.
(5) A bachelor is a man.
(6) A man who is not married is a man
(7) A big red book is a big book.
(8) A green hat is not a blue hat.
(9) A triangle is not a triangle.
(10) A red ball is a blue ball/blue
The form of these examples is interesting because they are all
generic. This is not at all a requirement of analyticity as (ll)
shows, but it will be recalled that in chapter 2 it was claimed
that true generics are not things which can have a truth value,
and it was pointed out that analytic statements were exceptions
in this respect. Their exceptionness is more apparent them real,
however, because analyticity is independent of truth in the sense
that, although analyticity tends to be characterised in terms of
truth and has consequences for truth values, truth and analyticity
arise separately in the semantic apparatus and this explains
why an utterance may be analytic, generic, and have a truth
value in spite of my claim that generics are not candidates
for truth values in general.
(ll) My sister is my sister.
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Throughout, in dealing with analyticity, I shall assume
that examples and their corresponding structures which involve
conjunctions are excluded from the discussion. This is a matter
of convenience and clarity, not one of necessity. Trying to
specify for tautologous and contradictory structures involving
non-subs corresponding to conjunctions would make the definitions
so complicated that they would he extremely difficult to read.
Some of the complications can he seen in examples (12) and (13)
where in (12), although the predicate occurs in the subject,
it does not occur in both conjuncts of the subject, and where in
(13) one conjunct is of definitional form and the other is not.
(12) Robots and pigs are animals.
(13) A triangle is a triangle and sharks eat fish.
Examples (3) - (8) are tautologies, and of these, (3), (5)»
and (7) are positive tautologies, i.e. they do not involve
negation. As a first step, a positive, tautologous structure
may be specified as follows:
(14) Positive, tautologous structure
A positive structure is tautologous if it contains an
occurrence, x, of the definitional relator whose first
argument is non-relative, and the first argument of x
contains the second argument of x.
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By non-relative argument is meant one that does not correspond to
just a relative pronoun. This condition is needed to stop
examples like (15) corresponding to tautologous structures.
(15) A triangle which is a figure may he seen in any book
of geometry.
The sense of contains being used in (14) is that given and
discussed in chapter 4; so the reduction inferences apply,
and this accounts for example (7) where "a big red book" is
reduced to "a big book".
Examples (4), (6), and (8) are tautologies also, but they
involve negation. (8) is a special case since it relies on
incompatibility and this is to be specified under contradiction.
Since all denials of contradictions are tautologies, a clause
to this effect in the general specification of tautology will
be required. (14) can be generalised to include all tautologous
structures by the addition of several clauses.
(16) Tautologous Structure
A structure is tautologous if:
Either (a) It is the denial of a contradictory structure,
or (b) It contains an occurrence, x, of the
definitional relator whose first
argument is non-relative and contains its
second argument providing always that:
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if the second argument of x lies partly
or wholly within the scope of the negator,
then that part or whole must lie within
the scope of the negator in the first
argument of x.
if the first argument of x lies partly
or wholly within the scope of the negator,
then that part or whole, if it occurs in
the second argument of x, must lie within
the scope of the negator also.
Example (4) corresponds to a tautologous structure under (l6)
because, although it contains a negator, it meets condition
(l6i), and (6) is also tautologous under (l6) because its
negation is not relevant to the conditions on (B). Example
(8) is tautologous under (l6), of course, because it is the
denial of a contradiction. Condition (Bii) is needed to stop
sentences like (17) being tautologous. The problem in cases
like (17) is that the predicate occurs twice in the subject,
once positive, once negative. (Bii) requires that only the
negative occurrence count.
(17) The fox which is not really a fox is a fox.
(i)
(ii)
Examples (9) and (lO) are contradictory. A contradictory
structure can be specified as follows:
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(18) Contradictory structure
A structure is contradictory if:
Either (a) It is the denial of a tautologous structure,
or (B) It contains an occurrence, x, of the
definitional relator whose first argument is
non-relative and incompatible with its second
argument.
(9) corresponds to a contradictory structure under (18) (A) and
(10) under (18) (b).
The notions of tautologous and contradictory structures apply
only to individual associators and to extend these to the public
semantic notions of tautologous and contradictory statements, the
following specifications are needed:
(19) Public tautology
An M group ¥, M, of a public language is a public tautology
for two associators, A, B, if M has public sameness of
meaning in at least one sense, i, for A and B, and A has
semantic structure, S^, corresponding to i and B has
semantic structure, S^, corresponding to i and and
are tautologous structures for A and B respectively.
(20) Public contradiction
An M group W, M, of a public language is a public
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contradiction for two associators, A, B, if M has public
sameness of meaning in at least one sense, i, for A and B,
and A has semantic structure, S^, corresponding to i and B
has semantic structure, S^, corresponding to i and and
are contradictory structures for A and B respectively.
The view of analyticity taken here is the traditional one
first made explicit by Kant:
In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to
the predicate is cogitated (i mention affirmative
judgements only here; the application to negative will be
very easy), this relation is possible in two different
ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A,
as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the
conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of
the conception A, although it stands in connection with it.
In the first instance, I term the judgement analytical,
in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgements
(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection
of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through
identity; those in which this connection is cogitated
without identity, are called synthetical judgements.
The former may be called explicative, the latter
augmentative judgements; because the former add in the
predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but
only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which
were thought already in the subject, although in a
confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the
subject a predicate which was not contained in itf and which
no analysis could have ever discovered therein.
(From a translation by Meiklejohn (1934 : 30))
The identity which Kant talks of in this passage is, I claim,
an identity of meaning, and it is identity of meaning or parts of
meaning that underlie the account of sense relations offered in
this chapter. Identity of meaning is not by itself, as has been
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seen, sufficient to explicate all the sense relations discussed
because non-categoric, kind hyponyms rely on the normable property
and kind hyponyms themselves require to be linked to their
superordinate by the kind-of property. Nonetheless, meaning
identity remains the bedrock on which sense relations rest.
The attack that Quine has mounted on Kant's distinction
relies on his implicit claim that meaning itself cannot be
explicated independently of synonymy and analyticity. I have
attempted in the preceding chapters, by making a start on an




Argument (a) A relator or non-relator which is associated
with an argument-place of a relator.
Argument-place
(ap)
An order-marker associated with a focal together
with some or no other discriminators.
Associate/
Association:
To connect in some manner so that access to
one item in the association gives access to
all the others in that association. Each
use of an associative link is distinctive
and ordered.
Associator (A) Someone or something in which discriminators
may be associated with focals, collects with
collects via focals and markers with collects.
Augmentation The association of any stimulatum or invocatum
with an invocatum.
Collect (c) An association of one or more discriminators
with a focal or an association of one or
more collects with others.
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Congruous Argument An argument which has semantic congruity
with its argument-place.
Delta The set of conditions, if any, which must
obtain, irrespective of matching, if a
representatum is to he held true.
Discriminator (d) A "hit" of and within an associator which
is distinct in respects other than
spatio-temporal ones and which may he
associated with focals, hut no proper
subpart of which can be independently
associated with a focal.
Focal (f) A "hit" of and within an associator which
is not necessarily distinct in respects
other than spatio-temporal ones and which
may be associated with discriminators and
other focals, hut no proper subpart of
which can be independently so associated.
Gamma The set of conditions, if any, which must
obtain, irrespective of failure to match,




A relator immediately includes its argument(s)
but not the argument(s) of its arguments.
Inclusion A relator, r, includes its argument(s) and
if a is any argument included in r, then r
also includes any argument of a.
Invocation The stimulation of a discriminator,
discriminators, collects, stimulata or
invocata via associative links.
Invocations are distinctive and ordered.
Match A representatum matches or is a match if
its time index, if any, agrees with the
occurrent time of a stimulatum and its
contents, including any augmentation, are
contained in that stimulatum except insofar
as specified otherwise by negative,
quantifying or intensional elements in the
representatum.
Negative A negative representatum matches if all parts
Representata
Match of it not within the scope of the negator
match and each scopal segment of it fails to
match. Where scopal segment is defined as
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that part or whole of of representation which
lies within the scope of the negator and is
the greatest such part that lies within that
particular scope of the negator.
Non-relator (nr) A non-suh which is not a relator.
Non-sub (ns) A collect which is not a sub.
Order-marker (o) A distinguished discriminator or collect which
is associated with a focal to form an
argument-place which may be associated with
a non-sub to form a relator. The order-marker
indicates and effects the ordering of any
argument associated with the argument-place
in respect of any relator of which it is part.
Order-markers are, therefore, of various
degrees, and this may be indicated by adding
subscripts like so: o,, o.,... o , where o,1' 2 n' 1
is to be an argument-place marker for the first
argument of the relator, o^ for the second,
and so on.
Particulariser (p) A distinguished discriminator or collect
associated with a non-relator to indicate and
effect that that non-relator be taken as a
particular.
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Relator (r) A non-sub associated with one or more
argument-p1ac es.




Semantic congruity obtains between an
argument-place and its associated argument if
all of the semantic features apart from the
order-marker present in the argument-place
are also present in the argument and if any
order-marker present in the argument is
also present in the argument-place.
Semantic
Structure
A single non-sub or a structure of non-subs,
Sign-marker (SM) A distinguished discriminator or collect
associated with a collect to indicate and
effect that that collect be taken as a sub.
Stimulation The stimulation of a discriminator,
discriminators or collects other than by
association.
Stimulations are distinctive and ordered.
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Structure An association which consists of argument(s)
and relator(s) and in which the argument(s)
are associated with the argument-place(s) of
the relator(s).
Sub (s) A collect associated with the sign-marker.
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